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I TRODUCTION 
1. St nt ot th Problem 
The problem or this di ert tion 1 to deter 1ne the 
ext nt ot Berg on's in luenc on 1teh d. It ie aug eated 
that 1t he d'a o 1tion 1n the twentieth c ntury 1 ao 
what compar ble to that ot K nt in the 1 hteenth. Kant 
reared hi m t physics upon th round tion or ewton's 
ph sica nd profoundly intlu no d all auba quent philoaoph1~ 
c 1 thought. t science nd m the tics in the modern 
world are under otn such r t c ngea th t A. E. urphy 
s ya that there is 1n pro ee n • nti- 0 pernican R volu-
odern non-H wtoni n phyaice and non- ~ olldian 
eo etry ve ao ltered t ou ht abo t t e n ure or t e 
universe t philo ophy requires co plete rec nstruct1n 
in th li t or the new physic 1 concepts. Thi ts t k 
r quirin a n of en1u like Kant . uch a ater w 8 1-
orth iteb d, nd the po 1 ton or h s d1 aert t on 
1 that hie philo ophy 1 si ntrtc t contribution to the 
recon truct1on in philosophy th t modern ctentitic develop-
menta hav de n c 88 r,.. 
1te e d' philosophy 1 the product or de p le rning 
and years of edit tion . ong those who ofoundly 1ntlu• 
enc d 1teh d, ocordin to hi own t tem nt , wae Henri 
Ber on .2 The determin ti n or thi influence will help 
1 . • E . 
281 . 
pby, rt.(l929), 2 . itehe d, P , vii . 
/ 
8 t Whitehe d in hie proper position in the dev lopment or 
ph1losoph1c ideas. 
2 . ethod ot Proc dure 
In order to rel te itehe dt ph loeophy to the con-
5 
t1nulty of 1 toric thou ht there will be de, r ~ t or 
11, brief hi torte l urvey or Whit head' leading idea, 
the org nic p~1nc1ple, tro tts first ppe r nee ln Greek 
thou ht to it odern expre slon 1n 1t head. No tte pt 
will be m de to make this aurv y exh u t1ve, by 1nd1c t1ng 
wher Yer 1dea parallel to 1tehead 1 s occur, but cert 1n 
i port nt developments or this type or ph1losopby"w111 be 
point d out they lllu tr te ite dev lopment ccordin to 
the principles of the Heg 11an d1 lect1c. By this pr1na1ple 
1teh d' philo ophy will be vi wed a 
1de 11 m nd re 11 m. 
synthesis or 
A brief pr 11m1n ry au ry nd comp rison o~ the phi• 
lo ophles or ltehe d n er eon will follow, indio tln 
eneral 1 il r1t1 • ext will be n inquiry into th 
roots or 1tehe d' p lo op Y• There will be, fir t or 
11, n ocount or itehe d' ' form 1 eduo t1on, t en 
brier ex !nation ot th . import nt men and book mon 
ltehe d' conte or rie th t influenced h1e thou t, an 
coount o 1tehe t :r lation to the philo op 1o 1 t:r di-
t1on, nd lly, a note on th common influence on both 
Berg on d . 1teh d. 
The jor work of t 1 1 rt t on will con 1 t or 
c retul ex in tion · nd oompnr1 on ott work or itehe d 
and Bergson. rst th lead1n h1loeoph c 1 ideA or 
Bergson will be con 1dered, with their influence on 1te-
he d, after- which th le ding 1de s o·f lteh ad will be 
eonatd re , with their roots in Bergson determined. 
Sine 1t 1e quit poe 1bl , nd indeed probabl , th t 
ny 1deaa 1n lt he d which par llel those in Bergson may 
have been in ependently arr1v d at, eltb r s novel 1d a 
o~ a idea derived ~om common source • th tho e ot Berg• 
eon, the n xt ect1on or thl 1nveet1 atlon w 11 oone1 t or 
a consider tion ot th pl c of' Bergson nd itehead in 
the total p1ctur ot modern philosophy. n thi has been 
don 1t will be pos lble, with a rea on ble degree or o-
curacy, to dl tl tab betw en those idea in it e d that 
h ve direct Ber eon! influence nd t o e idea which, 
while p llel to Ber eon, ve till b d oth r ori ins. 
The final chapter will include a brier di cue ion ot 
t e ori in llty of' Bergson, followed by mmary or he 
tot 1 intlu nee or er son on 1tehe d, nd concludtn 
with a ways in which i tebe d has gone be-
yond Ber eon tn tho e ar s 1n which influence has been 
noted. 
3. Prev!ou ork on the Proble 
Tbe problem or tb1 d1 ert t1on, the de er in t1on or 
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t e influence ot r son on itehe d, h d very little 
reatment in the pa t. Re earch into th matter ppe s to 
have been c rri d out only by Victor Lowe, nd with neg -
tlve result • In th volume d vot d to itehead in Th 
-
Library ot L1v1ns Philo ophere Profe sor Lowe, in hi 
t1cle on it he~d' Philo op ic 1 Development," note• th t 
r 1 t1 a e ent tor h ve reterr d to Ber sonian in• 
tluenoe. Low t 1 d to det ct auoh influence. Hie 
conclusion i 
B r 
think h1 hly of lex nder' 
b n eene1ttve to t e lively ort i-
nd er son lao, I o n t1nd in h a 
t phy 1o 1 writ! no ole r demonstr t on or 
t 1r influence e ther in hie chota of problema 
or 1n th e nt 1 or his lut1on • The r fer-
nee to co te porary philo opher 1n hi preface 
rtl er pprec1 tion , rtly the over-
nt or a ode t n.l 
t in spite or Lowe' n tive o 1 ton, t e rumor ot 
nee persist d, partly due to reenforce• 
ent 1t r eetv d tro other writers 1n the ch1lpp volume 
to w ioh Lowe h d contribut d. o in 1949 Low inve t1 ated 
rther nd publ1 bed article in the Journ 1 ot the Hi -
tory of td 
lex nder on 
b sed on ny n 
el bor tion o 
on The Intluenc or er on, J e nd 
1te e d. e tiel did not ppe r to be 
ter1 1 b t w r ther a ore detailed 
i fo er view. Hie conclusion w th 
a t of h1 1941 rt1cl • He w u1te w1111n to 
admit t1on on the p rt o 
1. Lowe, t.(l9.1) in 
ch1lpp, 8 • 
1tehe d but, he put 
a 
1 • 'Intlu no • me ns 1ntlu noe. 1 
Probably Lowe h over t t d 1 oaee. He P e to 
know 1te e d b tter th r son. He 1 let 
th t BeP son 1 dual1 t, it d 1 ot. Then on 
t e e e h y th erg o •• concept on of 11f is 
tund m nt lly mon1 tic, 1tebe d's plur 11 tio."2 Lowe 
tre • • the itt rene betwe n Ber on nd ttehe d nd 
tail to note 1 11 rity or ide 8 wh n they re pl' s ed 
by the two men 1n differ nt terms . ther re, Lowe 
see ed to te 1 t t to ay t t it w 1nt'lu need by 
rgson • the e as ying e w r oni n. 'l'h1 
would be oin too t r. Th re re e t ny d1f'tere e 
b twe n th thou t of' h two n . t ther lao 
e1mil r1t1es, Th1 d!. ert t"on will 1nv t1 te whether 
or not the indicate inf'luenc • 
11 no one but Lowe eem to b ve don re e reb on 
th subject, t ere are ny w o h v eeerted ·tbe :r -
aonl n influence on it head. tn th oh1lpp Yolu 
' 
orth-
PUP t ted that th r eont n 1nflu nee can h rdly be 
ex a He tnt in d th t the Be:r on1 ph1lo ophy 
ca e to itehe d through H. w. C :r:r nd • b to to " ite-
b d's ntir ac1ent1t1c nd philo oph1o 1 outlook." H 
m 1nta1ne that Whit b d followed r son in cceptln th 
1. Lowe, :rt,(1949), 294. 
2. Low ' :rt.(l 49), 286 . 
3. ortbrop, rt,(l 41) in o ilpp, P , 169. 
OJ' 0 0 I' c ., • 1 0 1 tl n 7 
on'• f' t t • -
1 8 n a 1 
e n 'r'7, t to on 
nt n • nd 'P • • 
• ll , 1 • 
1 • 0 1 
t • c 
'• 1 0 
• 0 r hat 0 n c! ao y 
ot 1t 1n 
n • t ta • 0 .. 
c t • ... 
t 
0 c c1 0 
ac e o 
not 1 • 
• • n 1 7 I' 0 on 
' 
1 • 
t 
1- 1 e 
-
y n t • 
ly • ted, ta 
pon 1 t td d d 0 vtd 
r t ... 
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Berg 
seemed to b an tnfluenoe of hie thought upon it he d, 
and rerertted to an ccount of' this influence by Je n Wahl 
1n h1a rttcl on L ph1losoph1e speculative de Wh1tehe d" 
in Ver le ooncret.l Th1 rttcle, bowever1 how a paral• 
lel1 m ot idea rather than the1t' aa e:rtion ot influence. 
Wahl maintains that Whitehe d ttempta to oombine the con-
ceptions of dur. t1on 1n J ea nd Berg on2 to unite in hi 
theory ot prehension• J ••• theory or the double context, 
ane.lagous to Bergson's theory of' image , with tb synthetic 
activity or tho ht :round in Kant.3 In ,the "Pret oe" to 
vc, W bl ention the real! m ot Bergson and 1 tehead, th 1r 
similar instatenoe upon the continuity or time as dur t1on, 
and the treatment ot po 1b111ty by the two men .4 
4. '!'he ea.nins ot Influence 
In this dissertation a statement of Borgsonian intlu• 
enoe upon Wbiteh ad w1ll me n that the thought or 1tehe d, 
a reYealed in its literary xpression, was dif'tei-ent f'llom 
what it would have be n h d he not read Bergson. This ts 
broader Yiew of' 1nf'luence than that t ken by Lowe; who 
aemmed to admit influence only whe~ cle r•cut 1dea of 
Bettgson• appeared in itebead's writings. Whitehead• how-
eve~, seldom accepted the v1ewe or nyone without modifying 
1. Bergson; C ~ , 86, 304n.l2• 3. 
2 . • hl, vc, 151. 4. 
ahl, VC, 156. 
ahl , VC, 9, 10, 15 • 
11 
them. He ~equently accepted th altern t1ve th t nother 
thinker had rejected nd dev loped the thou t of man in 
direction quite d1tte:rent from t 
n 1 author d developed hi ide 
t in which the o:r1 1• 
•
1 Thus ideas 1n White-
he d m y h ve had a Berg on1an o:r1 1n and t111 be quite 
d1f"1" rent from rgson' thought bee u e or it development 
by ttehead.. Furthermore, ide s 1n Whltehe d may have 
been the result or ynthe is of tde taken from v rious 
sources. of which Bergson w only one . 
It is not n sy tter to d ter in the 1ntlu nee 
which one n h on the tho ht of another . It 1 p t1eu·· 
larly d1tr1cult in the o se ot 1tehead and Ber on. By 
the time 1tehead began to write philo ophy, the influence 
ot 8 rgson wa · lready pre ent, so th t the method ot con-
tr ting earlier writing or ltehead with 1 ter one c n• 
not be u ed . Furthermo:r , the mo t important of itehe d t 
philo oph1e 1 books were written in merle~, while he h d 
. 2 lett the bulk ot his library in England • He ays or P • 
"In th se 1 ct\U'e I hv endeavoured to eompr ss the ma-
ter1 1 derived ~om years or medit tion . "~ pp rently, 
the~terore, 1tehe d ~ote h1 ph1losop y w!thout eon t nt 
reference to other writer • Thi 7 ccount, 1n part, tor 
th 1 ck of explicit references to other writer • 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1tehe d, PR, us. 
This inform t ion w 
bead !n telephone 
1 tehead, PR, x • . 
rurn1shed the utbor by Mr • 
conver t1on in J nuary. 1950 . 
ite-
·These diff1cult1 8 indio t that the olution or t 
p~oblem ot th1 di ert t1on c n only be approxim te. 
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e~ ther 1a clo e ai 11 rity o 1d a between 1te ad 
and rgaon, where 1tehead refer explicitly to r eon, 
an where the~ 1 no 1nd1c t1on that tehe d h d 1ved 
at hi v1 wa fro ny other source, t m y b conclu ed 
that 1ntluenc ia p~ob bly or 1 oat certainly pre nt. t 
oth r plac a, th evidence will be 1nconclua1v ao th t no 
mor can be a id exc pt th t in luence is po s1ble, and con-
clusion arriv d t will b b a d upon wei h1n or th 
v1d nee, rather th n upon d c1 ive proor. D1at1nct1on will 
be de throu hout, b tween influence nd mere m1larity 
of idea betw en Ber on nd 1tehe d. 
13 
C PT I 
RG IC RI CI t 
H. Wildon C rr, one ot the beat tnterpr ters of rg-
aon 1n En 11 h, at tea Bergson' b to pr1no1pl as follows: 
The fund mental notion on which 1t /the Ber son1an 
.phtl ophz7 1 sed 1 t t the human 1nd, 
rat ed to elt•oonsoiou n , and seeking truth, 
ttnd ttselt do ed by n 1llu ion--an 111us1on 
con rived to serve, n pl ndtdly ervin 1 the pr otto 1 nee or ltte, but n 1 u ion which ob· 
sour ev ry ttort to attain cle knowledge•• 
the illu ton t t ch e ts co d1t1on d by thin 
which ch ngele a.l 
1tehe d t ba to rtnct le 1 e1 11 • In h1 "philo o hy 
ot organ!s ,u the ulttm te c t ory te or t1v1tyJ p:roeeee 
1 re 11ty,2 Th 41stinct1ve oh r ct•rt t1o 1n the tho ht 
-
or both philosoph r 1 cr t1ve chan e. The "or nic prin-
ciple,' s u ed 1n th1 ch pt r, ha two character! ttca. 
Re ltty, ooordtn to t ts pr nctpl , is dyn ic r th r 
than tatto. The nature ot real ty 1 ore ttve cb n e tt-
lt, not erely the subject of th e n e. The a cond 
ch acter1 tic follow from th t1rat. Reality 1 both 
plur 11 ttc nd on1 tic. It 8 t plur 11 m o dis-
t1ngul hable things, but these thin ~e 1nte~l t d and 
' 
ve the _unity or n erg ni m. ttehe d's phr e, the 
"philo ophy of oP ntam," will b dopted to indicate 11 
philo ophtea char cter zed by thi principle. a with all 
1. 0 r. rt.(l 18), 333. 
2 . 1tehe d, PR, ·11. 
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reRt philo oP 1 a, they h d the~ root 1n the p st nd 
emel' ed he n tural re ult o h creative dv nee of 
t Th rogre a or th1 or an1c prtnclpl • there-
fore, w111 be tr ced briefly ita origin 1n t1 ulty, 
through t dern ex onent , nd u to 1t cul in tlon 1n 
t e tho ht of ltred orth tt he d. 
1. In 4nc!ent Ph1loeopht 
The re 1 or1 1n ot the or nlo p~-1nc1ple ems to have 
b n 1n Plato, but hi tho ht in turn 1e the product of 
t e thought that pr ceded or w e contemporaneous with b1 •1 
ee distinct lin of Greek thought m y be diet1n ul bed, 
e ch oont 1n1n the germ of the or ntc principle• ~hey 
y be deal n ted by the na or th 1r chief exponents, 
Pythagora 1 Her c11tua, nd P rmen1dea. n theme lve 
the e form of t oug t w r not or n!c in the en th t 
Pla to' philosophy w • But they turn1 hed element from 
lob Pl to' or n1c philo o hy er ed by the ayntheatzin 
ct v ty or his mind. 
The prtnctpl or the Pyth ore n which profoundly tn-
flu nc d Plato w th 1r v w that the un1ver 1 ultl te• 
y to b e re ed in them tical rel t1one.2 Th Bound-
leas or Unl it d 1a oppo ed by the principle ot Limit o~ 
it e d, 
lteh d, 
, 182. 
I, 1 2. 
15 
.1 1 Li it 1 xpr sed a umber nd 1ve to 
thin s n eminent re 11ty,2 or wb t it he d would 11 
ctu 11~7· 
eraclitu nt to the -h rt o perenni 1 eta• 
p y to 1 probl by th t "all thin tlow.• H 
t lt th t notb!n 
" 
r n nt; all wa in tat ot 
tlux.3 Yet he ob ved c rt 1n order tn th world th t 
dtd ot t"1t in with h1 th ory and 0 h • 1 d to .,. 
t at ther 
" 
a per an nee 1n t e w rld, th Law ot Ch n~ • 
wb1oh he o lled tb Lo 0 • 
' 
This i on ot tb 0 t i -
port in tb h1 tory ot philo op Y• 1tehea. 
put it, The lucid t on ot n1n involv d 1 the phl' • 
t 11 t in low,' i one obi t t or t phy ice. 6 H 
turt er po nt out the pr1 ctple or 
11 thin tlow h ben p phraa d by m th tio 1 
phy c to e y th t, • 11 thin e r v ctor • It 1 o c-
pt the to 1 tic doctrine ot D ocr!tua nd ay th t, 
• 11 tl ot e er y obeys 1qu ntum' oond1tiona."6 
1. Ph1lol u , 
5. 
s. 
• 1•4, in ytha or a 
rlt-
ot 
n• 
20, '73. 
30, 1, in n, P.P, 2 ·31. 
eraclitu , tr. 1, in ee n, 
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Thu . in odern thou bt, well 1n the t ou ht of Pl to, 
Pytha or nd Her cl1tu have ch in common. 
The third echool or t ou ht in 1 Greek ph losophy 
wa th t or the tic , whose exponent wer Par en d 
nd Zeno. in t the c ool of H r cl1tu , they contend d 
th t th tund ent 1 met pbys1c 1 c tegory a Being, nd 
t t . c ng w 1llue1on.1 On tbe whole, the p 1lo ophy 
o organ! h been influeno d ore by er ol!tu than by 
Par n1de • Hegel round the idea o i , which 1 
th fir t cate ory of h1 logic 1 Id a, n b tr ct thought 
th t does not cont in the id of 1st nee. B cit e Her -
cl1tua' crtt1c1sm of the El tics when h ay that, • 
ing no re 1e th n no • ing • For 1 th tl:r t eoncr te 
cat gory wae ecoming, or in tb concr te e e, ture.2 
t tbi ohool is import nt tor the philo ophy o org ni 
tor 1ts emph at on per nence d unity which 1 a e r o-
ter1 tic or n org n1 1 it oh n e. 
Th se thre chool o tho ht, then, r tho e th t 
influenced Fl to. There ta another chool or thought wh1c 
• conte por y with lato, th t or moc.rttue, t up11 
or Leuo1ppu , which att pted to reconcile the le tic 
and Heraclitus. They thou ht or re lity 
tiny, 1nde ndent to movin accord! 
tty 1n votd.s Pl to, howe• r, e m 
to 
con iating of 
tr1ct neoee-
1. ller, OP, 25•29. 3. Fuller, HOP, 38-43. 
2. llace, LOB, 144 (Hegel, 
EP , #88 en). 
1'7 
t ie elution to the pro le • 
h been e ted, t re- ocrat1e t ou~ht eon• 
t n d tnt o~ ·n org n~c r ei le, but it found 1te 
ocrt complet :to in ncte t p 1lo ophy tn that ot Plato 
al'ld ristotl • Pl to d it w1th the Pytha. ore ns that 
xi tene 1 11 11 it t1o or d ter tn tton.1 This S.a 
lso tb vi w or es 1. 2 e r ject8 the v1ew P rmen1de · 
and y that thin e do h ve an ext tence 1n themselves. 
t e l o reje te the view o the atom1 t th t they exist 
only 1n t emselv • Tb1 g · 1 o x1st 1n other thtn •· 
Tb r 1s both a One d 
ver e 1 1nterrel te .a point out th t for 11 
it :rel t e , the unl er e wa not a co pl ted tot l1ty, 
ut inco plete n · owing. t 1 both tomistie and 
or nto. 
Tber ia no ultimate tot 11ty. Th 'other' per-
v de th ole r e or bel • t ey ob-
· j eted that t Good _(Rep. • VI) is totality 
inc usive r the ole ran o e1ng.. Our 
at this ~oint o n be of a gener 1 n tur -·-
o r a th d aleet1c for Pl to, 
1 completeJ wh tev r 1 , 1 transcend 
thin el e, into 1oh tt mov • • • • n 
short_, every entity 1 delimited, 1ft :r-ked. ott from 
the re t or be ng. Given an entity, there re 
the k>-.>-oe (oth :rs) .4 
1. Plato, 1leb. 26d. Ct. R ph el Demos, The One and 
the ny in Plato, 1n orthro nd other , • 41-66~ 
ueh or the 1n o ll t on on Pl to' views 1n t 1 eon• 
neet on 1 t ken from th1 tiele. 
2. al ce, LOH, 145 ( egel, , ). 
3. Demos, t.(l936), 2. 
4. De o , rt.(1936), 49. 
18 
e bove q ot tion emph. 1z a th p1ur 1 ty of b n • 
But e1 1 1 o On • P rt e t in ~ r o ~ nd ~orm 
ty, w ch in urn y be a p rt ~ 1 1gh r un ty. 
c nnot y 1ch~ the One or the y, 8 0 t o:rt nt 
1 
11 
e• 
1 o' thou~ht, 
th 
oint o~ v , 
ly n e 1 ter 
de d, it th t epen upon 
· tho ht which, like uch 1n ree 
v no in h lo ophy d philo p y, re 1nd one of th 
y th relat tty r1na ple . 
t.rher are two other ho 
lo ophy o or ni m, w to 
t t t re 1 port t 1n the 
r round 1 Pl to . Th y 
r the r1nc1pl o · ere t1 tty and e· t1v1ty . 1thout 
the princ ple o or ti 1ty we do not v n org 1 m. 
The thou ht h it nntn in er clttua the Lo oa . 
e ot th1 de m y jud ed by oneider -
1n th Lo o octrin 1n h lo nd 1n the ourth Go pel . 
In 1 to t e r1nc1pl or or t1v1ty 18 &~vti.)A- rs ( o er) . 
tn n ych1 tio w y, everythin 1n th un1ver e p rt kee 
of t 1 creative ow r, ltho h not 11 in t e e de • 
1 r ult in at D moe 0 11 the ie:r :rc '1 0 oul • 
1 hi rarcby, a h 11 t it, 8 follow : 
or Go theoretic 
or God in h1 
, or ore ted or 
th w rld- oulr son 
1 . 1 to, 
' 
nh1 t, 253d (Cor ford) . Th ide ot r ony 
• 
al 0 pha 1z d by the yth ore n • ct. Ph1lol u , tr . 6 , in Preem n, P P, 74 . 
( t) p1r1tJ (g) d si:r : (h) the oula or nimals; 
(1} the soul of pl nt (i.e. tho oul a merely 
v1t 1 ct1v1ty)J (j) the urely inert, yet ord rly. 
mot!on ot in n!m11te bodies: (k} the oh otie move-
e t tn· the recept el .l 
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ere 1s a p a e .in 
re lity, or re 1 thin "• 
t se to 1nd1c t th t 
power.n2 Co~ntord 
'PO nt out that th Gl"e k eonetruct1on 1 d1ft'1oUlt n that 
the e n e y e 1 ther a he tr n 1 ted tt, or it m y 
b th t .. t e mark or r al thin s (not the re 1 thin e them-
elve ) noth1n but pow ~.·3 t in ny case, this pas-
e ee to j tify the cont ntion that lato, like tte• 
head, c n 1dered or ~tiv ty ult te. t the vid nc 1 
too sG nty to b t ken ae t n 1, nd. the question u t re-
~ a!n, tort~ 1 e be1n 1 on of the unan ered question re-
terr to the Platonic philo ophy• 
The othel" prtno1ple whie 1 found in org n1e ph1los_-
opb1e 1 that of neg t v1ty. This of course is pal"ticular-
ly 1 t1net1v of t e philosophy o e el.4 tn 1teh ad 
thl notion that of perishtn .s n 1de derived t.P m 
r1nc1ple of ne ativity statement by Locke. In P at th1 
reside · in the o~ of Dit erenee, Po that e!" a de 11. 
ot er fo ~.a Thi principle 1s neces ry 1n d1aleot1cal 
thought. 
1. Demo 
2 . 
3. 
•• 5 .. 
a. 
t in i determ1n t bee u e it 1e not o eth1ng 
1 61. 
EP • 91.) • 
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el e. But. although Plato said some very relevant things 
bout ·act v1ty nd mov m nt. n is world-view 1~ or~ nic 
log1oally, he do not e 1z the re 1 ty .ot ~ Qe s. 
er 1e dual! ev1 ent in 1 to with the etern 1 Tde 
opp e to the chari 1n flux of th p t1eu ~ • t 1' -
in d fo~ r1 totle to bring the pr1nc1ple or movement 1n-
to prom1nenc ,. 
Pla o was an extremely gestfve thinker. 1te-
h · ad y , ".Plato ra1 e all: tunde.ment l que tton w tbout 
nswe~1ng them. 1 · yetemat1e nd 
mor orit cal. e could not ce pt ·Plato' dua11 t1c view 
of a worl of Formts s p 1" te n-om t e world o o rttculs.r • 
orm, o:r etual1ty, could n t x1 t w!.thout 1ts correl t1ve, 
matter or potent1 11ty. 11 things ext t as or ante whole 
in a tr1n1ty or potent! lity, movement, nd actual ty.2 
The e senee o a thin 1s not 1t tb1n ne~ , bat it be-
coming, the proce s by which the potential becomes actual • 
This pl'inc1ple o ovement 1 perv 1ve 1n ~1stotle's 
philo opby, and 1s found ev n in the preme Being, who 1a 
called the Unmoved ove~. God tor rietotle 1s holly ac-
tual nd for tbts reason doe not move. He 1a f'1na.l o use 
and ro ace movement by be1n loved. 11 other thin 
move by be1n mov d.3 Regel too tound love to be char c-
1tehead, F. ~ P, 117. 
be~ nd Perry, HOP. 94J rtstotle, 
1 totle, et. , ~ r. 7(1072b). 
-
et., 
-
I, 5( 107la) • 
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t 1' t!. r r 1n t 0 t 1~hl d v lo • t t 
" 
1 d.1 
t :reo n ze 1 e 
n st :re r 1n 00 n • lt 0 h h elt th t 
r tle 1 o eon 1d r e:r h n or u c ent 1 ... 
rt a • 
One ho 1 not be le to thin , 0 ver, that t tle w 
totally w r 0 t • H r co ze t t erieh-
1 nd be eo 1n e cor e1 tiv d • He e1 t t en-
8 bl b t nee w f tw ind , one c n 1n d other 
t r 1. t 
' 
y , eont1 11y 
n r t1 n e~tructlo • 3 
r to 1 ' hil 0 y , t t yr bl nee to 
or an1e1 , ut doe no o rry 1.t d e1 0%9 
te e d, r t tl • en n v 1 t 11 
thin , t 1 not nia r 1 0 th 
d 8 r te thin e er • t , e und 
O!lly r n 1e ,. r t on, y h l'r n h 
1. , OH, 24 ) . 
• 3. 
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in cl e • However, eber point out th t there 1e ab~o-
lut1 m tn ri totl in ·th t God 1 both fi~ t and 1 t 
e use .1 He even u e• th term, b olut • to e i ;;o ate the 
Go o r atotl •2 But r1stotle's b oluti m w s not 
Hegelian doctr1 e or concrete univera 1; it waa, however , 
the rel ted doctrine that the whole 1e prior to the parts. 
~ter the reat period of Greek philosophy. there were 
not ny very tgn1fic nt development.e ,or the organic philoa-
ophy until the modern period. reek philosophy ot the 1 ter 
period was pr rily concerned with t e oul, it nature and 
de t1ny.3 The scholastic p ilosophy or the Middle ea was 
. 
concerned mo~ with theology than met physics, and wh t 
metaphy iea rema1ne wae mostly repbr sin ot Pl to or 
rtatotle in schcl tic rm • \ consider ble conflict 
rag d over the question ot the real ty or univers 1 , the 
conflict b twe n real! m and nominalism , 
not ble exception to the decline in metaphy 1oal 
.speculati.on durin the , !ddle ee w s the philosophy ot 
Plot1nu , who i called by Full r "the reateet thinker eer-
t 1nly between \r1stotle d Cpinoz • "4 The philosophy ot 
lotinu ~ "emanat1st1c panthetsm,n hae Porm, Unity, or ore 
p rttcula.rly God, as the supreme pr1.ne1ple.5 Oppoaed to 
1. eber nd Perry, HO , 8 · 87 . 
2 . eber _. nd Pel'ry., HOP, 79. 
3. Weber and Perry, HOP, 101. 
4. Puller, BOP, 282. 
5. eber nd Perry, DO I 128·0 • 
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God ie matter w ich, oweve~, e an tea r.rom d d r tu:rwns 
to God , eo th t it 1 not really a separate principle . The 
taphy 1e o~ lotinu 1s mystical and clo ely ~onneet 
with h1 ethic 1 v ews. While b1 vie . should oez-ta1nly be 
included mong the torebe rs or the ph losophy o~ or n1sm, 
Plotinus 1 not lways oons!stent . Re omet1mes consider 
God s the unity or 11 thin e, n tur nd M nd, and o, 
eon id.ered in t e absolute ense, pure perf'eet1on. t 1n 
oth r mood , prob bly the ore dom1n nt, he look upon na• 
ture as negative and evil nd ao mak e a dualistic oont~a t 
bet een n ture nd m!nd.1 
2. In odern Ph11osophx 
.odern philo ophy, from Des cartes unt 1 the twent eth 
century, wna dominated by what E. • Bu~tt c lla the Galt-
lean-Ca:rtes1an• ewton1an world view. tt2 eeor !ng to th1e 
v1e , the world of nature te eoh nis ic 9nd m ter1 1i tie 
wh le mind 1 an 1mm te~lal ub ance d trerin in e ence 
from nature. The only r 1 t on h p between mind and nature 
1s that or knowledge. Just e nature 1 conceive t rl-
a11 t1c lly to be composed or d13ere e object , so the 1de 
of th mind are conceived to be oleal' and di t1nct, in so 
fer AS t ey are true. The ep ration mind an n u~e re-
u t ln e 1 te olo !c 1 pro 1e t at weJ:te praettc lly 
eber 
But-tt 
to in 
nd Perry, HOP, 130n. 
nd R nd 11, Mak1ns of the Modern 
orris, TM, 27-§. 
ind, l"ef"erred 
n oluble. ct1o lly very ph. lo ophel' 
24 
e tled w th tbe 
probl rn th m ny d or~e solut ne, n ne f t em w lly 
atisfaotory. Th r sul t t · t th p r od was marked by 
p:roroun s'k som b~1111 nt or1t1o 1 t inking. 
lut on or t 1nd•n tur 1 b;y obb s tte pt d 
denying the re or 1nd. erkeley dented the re llty 
o m tter. Hume 
t1es or knowledge. 
compl tely kept1c 1 or the po 1b111-
nt bell ved 1n the ex te oe ot 
''thing -in-th m elve n but h 1 th 1r natut'e to be unknow• 
b1e. Thus t e domin nt world-view w s er1ou ly oue t1oned, 
but 1t was not until the t ent eth centur1 with new hyai-
c . l nd mathem tio 1 theor1 that lt w poesibl to sup• 
pl nt lt w th or-e coh rent org nie worl •v!ew in 1oh 
dynamic proce s ot' er ti ity w substituted ~0 the older 
doetr1n of sub ta:n.ee the b s1e et phy e 1 re lity. 
any of the e rly ttempts to olve the pb lo op ic 1 pr-ob-
1 ms of the d y re ulted in 1ns1 ht that ant1e1p ted mod rn 
cont mporary tbou ht. One gr at or! 1nal thinker • 
c-pinoz • 
The brilli nt mind of ~pinoz r fU ed to re t in the 
c rte ian dual1 m, an he could no conceive of he un1verRe 
in ny other terme exc pt fundam nt lly one. t, un-
1 k any mon1 t , he felt the need to~ preserv1n the 
re llty ot both nature and 1nd. nd eo. 1nat d of the 
or De e rte , th1nk1n sub t ne and xtended 
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ubst nee, ·p nnz9 posit d in le u t nee with n~ ni e 
attributes , two only of which are known to t1e human mind , 
thought n~ xte s\on. St!ll oldin to the C rtesian 
def1n1 1on of a t:Pue idea (:j one th. t 1 ole r end d1 tinct, 
Sp noza olved t e ep1 te olog1o 1 pr ble by 
that "the' or er n oonnectton of de s 1e the 
1nt 1n1ng 
me as the 
oFder and connect · on .of t n or in ot .er wol? 
• 
sy-· 
c phyf'iCFtl par lleli s • 1. dvonoe over De e~rtes a 
mor ten verb- 1 •• p1noza nt e1p t c the organ o p 1los-
ophy of tehead ~Y hold n to a un!ver b t wa organ-
ie 11y unified, yet one in 1oh both phys1ogl noture nd 
mind bad 1 p ye~opby e 1 p r allel1 m 
w s ntio1p tory or e .ent 1 ~nd phy Oll pole o x-
pertecoe n the pb1loa ph of ~1te ead. The close all1 ne 
0 hi philo ophy 1th t t or ~pinoza t 0 rt 1 po nt ha 
bee noted. by ttehead, although, o eourse, th re qre a 
gre t many fund mant 1 d1rferenoee. 
The p 1lo ophy or or n1sm 1 olosely alli d to 
Sp1noza's aeheme ot thought. But 1t d1tters by 
t e aban onment of the eubjeot-predicate ferns of 
thought. • • • The reault 1s that the nsubst ne -
qu. 11ty- concept 1 vo ded; nd that the mor-
phologic 1 description 1 replaced by d script on 
of dyn .. m1e proc ~ • • • • e eo renoe, wb eh t a 
system ae k to pre erve, i th diseove~ that 
t e proees • or eoncre canoe, of ny one actu 1 · 
entity involve th other ctu 1 entities mong 
. t~ e ~~onent • In t 1~ w y the o 1ou ol1da~1-
ty of' the world receive 1ts explanat1on.2 
J op. I • 
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In gener 1 the forerunner of 1tehe d 1 h lo opby 
or or ani m were the philo oph r or the vente th nd 
et bteenth centuries, in contra t to most of the p 1loao-
pher or he nineteenth century who, he cl 1med, by their 
ccept noe or number of prev lent fall c1 , excluded 
themselves n~om r lev noes to the ordinary stubborn facta 
of d 11y 11f' • 1 it he d mention~'~ rt cul ly thin -
era s eat1ve or hi system, D c rte , ewton, Locke, 
H e, Kant, although he d1 a r ed in m ny respects with 11 
or th • 
philo ophers were perplexed by the 1ncon 1 -
pp tion~ underlyin t ~ r inherited 
or expression. In o t r they, or th ir 
ucee r , v en or d to r dly yet -
m tic, the tend ncy h a been to bandon j t those 
e ~ t in h ir tho t ich the 11o -
ophy or organ! m base it 
Locke, he a y , w a mo t s tive of all, e peeially in 
b1 3 • IV, Ch. VI. Sect. II, itehead descrtb • 
hi philosophy a 1 recurrenoe to pre•K nt1 n mode or 
tho ht. " The bove p sa e Y-pl in why is reement 
with the p ilo opher r the eventeenth nd ei hteenth 
centu:r es i not pp rent on the urt c • Th1a is bee us 
his re ment 1a in t c1n the problem they t eed r ther 
th n cce tin their solutions. T ir thou ht wa ug ea-
tive b t, ccord1n to it h d, th y re bound by cert in 
, v11 • 
, v1. 
PR, v and n. 
eonv nt n o o ht w 1eh ~ vente . t em 
2'7 
t o lo tng 
t 1~ 1n 1 ht~ to t e end. ~ nee th r t1 , modern devel · 
o me ts in Ec1enee, 1ncl ding t t Ol' o'f r l e. t1 v ty, 
h~ ve ma 1 t po t ble for 1.te e·d tor e • y of' 
t e1ll co ve t on n ece . truct losop y on r 
~ er nt 1 n • mon ny . uch con nt on , 
e1te three w l"t!:.nt 1.n t p 1loe-
o 'O y of ' 1 oolre. The 1r t t e ic 
" 
1n• 
ttite m e rtee. the " u ;1 
OAte r 1 1'rom to eh p n ene u o the 
lo e. e third conv nt1on •~ 
oiou n uno 1 ~01 ed, 
lio1ty e n e id nt1f1ed with 
const1t t1 n n ex-
'l'hia 1 t t1 n w b ndon d by Locke in the third 
nd rourth boo 0 hi tehe d t -
tributes the re ter u st vene a ror the phil oso hy or 
o:r n m ot this gre t work . 
ong t s ge t!on 1n Locke that nt1c1pa t d te-
h d' philo o by were ... doctr n 0 "po er, " hie dootr1ne 
or p :rt cul r thing , A.nd 1 doctrine o "e ter 1or t n s . " 
t nd th t oek 1nt t the "ontolo 1e 1 
pr no ple h n he y t t power" 1 gre t rt o 
our co pl ld or sub tane 2 Lock al o y : • 
PR. , 84- 5 • 1. i t 
2 . Look __ _.x., 1!, . II, 7J quoted 1n 1t ehe d, PR, 28 . 
Powe~ thu' aonoei ed - two•fold; v z. $ ble 
to make, or able to receive, ny chan_ • • •• 
T o~n~e~ . po er no ud s ~ it ~ m ~ n · r r -
1 tion, • • • For our ide s of exten ion, dura-
t! n. nd vmbe~, do they n t 11 oont n 1n 
th m a aecret relation o the p rt 1 Figure an 
mot n h~ e o e h1n~ relet e n t em much more 
visibly. nd seneibl qu 11ti , a oolour and 
mel , etc., w at l"O they ut th.e po r o 
ditfe~ent bod1 in rel t1on to ou~ p rc pt1on11 
2 
itehead maint ins th t w 1le Hum ha shown th t Lock ' 
doct~1ne i 1ncons1 tent with a purely sensationalistic 
philo ophy, it merely 111uetr te the -point that Locke 1 
marked by dequacy P ther than con 1 tency. For in Locke's 
doctrine of •power, ' 1tehead cla1 to see the m 1n doc-
tr1n s of h1 philosophy ot organism. The e are, namely1 
The principle of r 1 t1 1ty; the r l atton 1 
c ~r oter ernn o t , ereby t y 
con t1tute the torms or th objectification 
of ~ctunl ent1t s or e eh other; th om-
posit ch ~ oteP of n otu 1 entity (i.e. 
u t nee); e oti n of ow r" a in 
principal in ~ed1ent in th t of etual en-
t ty ( ub~t ncP- .2 
Th1 1 tt ~ not!o ! 1teh ay , i wh t be c 11 t on-
tolog cfl .r1nc 1~." 
.1 t eqd believe tl'l..a t Lock ' · use f the term "ide 
lex nd ro'~'~ tE- , 
thin fJ re eom p 
entities" or 'n xu 
o n d ctrine or feel1.n .> 'lnd pre-
rg on 1 • noti n f intuition• d 
3 njoyment. Locke' 
ble to .it h d' 
" In Loeke•s. n • 
"1d a of rt1cular 
o jectif ed actual 
lysis, the episte o-
1. nck, .~~ 
1te ed., R, 
It, I , 1; ouoted in 1tehe d, PR, go. 
2. 65. 
3. 1tehe d, PR, 65. 
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lo ic 1 rocea start with th ide or p rticul r th 
nd then proce d to the form tion of ener 1 or ab tr ot 
id • itehe d conclude th t •Locke ntir ly ndor ea 
the doctr1n that an ctu 1 entity r1 ea out ot compl x 
constitution inYo1vin other ent1ti n • 1 o th t Locke die-
cover d th t the mind 1• unity r1 in out ot th ctiv 
rehen ton of idea 1nto one concret thing.~l 
1teh d felt th t h could oid ubj cttviam nd 
ment 11 without kept c1 by a to of p1 t olo 1c 1 
on1 m. ctual entitle h n 1n~luenc b yond the elv a 
b c u e or the fact or their rehen ion or 11 ot er ct 1 
entitle • In the know1n proc a th p rcipient event ia 
•compre ent with the obj ot of perception. T 1a doctrine 
h d it ori in in Locke' doctrin or "exterior t in ,• a 
vi w which 1tehe d el borated in _Pr __ o.o._._._ __ _.._l.i•t~y· 
uot a t t nt by Lock which he ol 1 ia ex ctly the 
pr1 ary a umption ot the philo ophy t or ani m: 
Tb ind, being furnished with gr at n ber ot 
the imple ide oonv y d in by the en a, 
they are found in ext rior thing , • • .2 --
'l'h pbr e which 1tebe d und rlin h ol i to be 
t tement or the doctrine of h1 th t he c 11 the "v otor 
oh r ct r of the prim r fe lin • 
1. it he PR, 83• • 
2. Locke, -.~I~·· II, II , 11 quoted in 1t e d, PR, 86. 
ore o1n 
rily 1te e d'e 
1d a in Loo •• 
e th only el 
naly a Locke' 
own. ew thin 1' 
in th d ta 
o noepte :re 
1 • 
phil~ ophy 1a 
would in the 
it h d d ita th t he oea b yond 
xpl cit t t nta but b liev th t Look him elf 
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n oe -
a e 
Lock 
• 
1"u:rth r into et by \c 1 pr bl t n some of hi rot-
low r •2 • 
One or the o t curiou thing which to not d 1n 
a tudy or itehe d h r 1 tion ip to H el. it -
he h d 1 ttl u ror the n1net enth c ntury h lo hy 
nd or He 1 in p rt oul r. Y t 
t o n how th t th 1r ditf renee 
c r ful study or the 
re r r ly tho 
ot te 1nolo y nd ro • I 1 r1ty ot d a no ph loa-
oph r 1 clo r to 1teh ad than He el. This m tt r 
ben bro bt to Whiteh d' ttent on an de ao e 
at tem nts t t de ori prec1 ely the xt nt or B 
innueno • 
I bav n v r be n abl to r d B ela I 1nit1-
t d y att pt by tudying om r m rk or his 
which truck e a oompl te nonsen •· It • a 
1. 1tehead , PR, 86. 
2. 1tehe d, PR, 93. 
11an 
•e 
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tool! h of • but I m not wr t1n to expl n 
y ood en e.l 
lt e d w n t the 1rst to c ulre pre judie a in at 
becau e e p r d at fir t to b writing non n e. 
But h d little better exou th n eom bee u e 
when he fir t r d 1 e • 
ph lo op er. He 1 ter ade mor 
m the tiel n, not a 
xpl cit at t ent. 
It i unfortun t t t 1tehead 1 knowl d e of H el 
80 11 1t • or le on p 11o opher w o, 11 1te• 
he d, o nnot b under toed deou t ly from econd ry aourc 
1 
•• 
nd w o mu t be tak n whole to under t nd him. of 
Be el'a followers d o e of h1 interpreter h v notoriou -
ly m1 r pre ent him, and t 1a not fe to ta e their in-
terpr t t on • e el 8 b n cr1t ciz un m 1r1c 1. 
1. itehe d, • P, 7. 
2. 1t he d, P, 115-16. 
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1a critic t 1 t und ~ t nd the · 1 i 1o nc o hie 
r r t bo k, th an 
empiric 1 or eno enolo o l ccount t exp r e ce . 
c rd1 to h1 own cl 1 , 1 
" 
u on t i bro d mp1ric 1 
ound t1on that b1a on ent 1 Log1o w bu11t . l 
it h d w erb p in lueno d by writer who e -
1ze H 1' b olute the 0 t ch ct r1 t1o thin 
hi p 1lo op Y• 1111am J a, or in t nc , r err 
1' co 0 "block univer e . y would e 
t t the b olut of gel i "the n1 ht 1n which· • • • all 
But th y uld 11 to real z th t the e word r e el' 
own cr1t ot th b olut or So 11 • He el w 
h p crt ie b tr ct v ws . uth for h1 w a oon-
e el point d out t t while the true 
the hole, t whole 1 and n 1tb r the in in 
nor th nd or y obj ct o t ou ht could be un 
w t out n a count ot t other a well a th ce unt or 
the p:roo 
t r b 
ot b oom1n wh1eh unit 
ny 1 elated 1d a or, a 
the • either ould 
ry etu 1 nt y i ol every other aetu l nt ty . 
1 . 
2 . 
1ble, w nt to reach 
tt1n t re . Th 
borne w1 th, or 
in w ust h lt 
or 1nd (tr . 
d 
a1 nd 
it lf c pl te 1nd1-
t n lly con idered 
te h r ter 1s tak n 
and concrete w ol • or 
looked t in th 1 t 
eh r ct r which th 
1n th re occur p in e el which ex-
pr r o1aely whet 1tehe d ha in ind. Indeed, t r 
0 ny or t tb t 0 doe not ne it 
' at t -
ent t e t t h n t r d e e 
• 11 Loc e, ul 1 d e 1 
r eniu w not only nt1c1p te t P lo o -Y 
0 or an1 ut ctu lly or t t tore :tt h • e 
r t b t t e two en tro d1f rent b c round and r. -
up o 1tion hould v uo d ph lo o 
hich oa not be 
o e nt1 1-
ly 1 a ph 1~ ed to er 
eo c 0 • 
wer r t h n tn to e o t out. 
ere o any p r all 1 e in 
th t t wo d be beyon the op or t i 
iteh d nd e el 
rel1m1n ry hia-
tor o 1 urvey to 1v nexh naly i o the • 
tew p e t rrtc to i d o c 0 o th 1r 
t 0 t. 
been t , 1 cone Y d t wo ld nd 
truth a proc a • 
Id a 
identity 1 
notion, on 
ty nd f'or 
1. H , 25. 
ea nt1ally pr oe , bee u e 1t 
th baolute nd tree identity of the 
y 1n ao far t 1a olut ne t1v1-
th t r on dialectic 1 ••• 
th idea 1 ( ) proce• , it follow t t 
the expre ion tor th b olute ( uch unity ot 
tho ht nd beln , ot t ntte and infinite, e . ) 
1 t 1 er tor unity exp~e tr nq 1 nd ab-
tr ct ident ty at re t, a the Ide 1 (b) ub• 
j ct1v1ty, it follow that the exp:r a ion 1a equal-
ly t 1 e on not er llCCount . That unlty or wh e 
it pe ke x rea e the sub t nee or implicit n -
ture or th g nuin unity . The 1n~1nlte would thus 
seem to be rely neutral! ed by the tlnlte, th 
bjective by the objective, tho ht .by being. But 
1n the ne tlve unity or the Idea, th infinite 
overl pe n include th finite, thou ht overlap 
being, aubjectivlty ov rlape objectlv1ty. l 
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The ove quot tlon b been given at len th becau thie 
very import nt paa a e how not only that He el considered 
reality to be proce a, but also show how the proce 1a 
oonce1ved . It also showa th t Hegel, like ltebead, re-
pudi ted the aaubject • predic te dogma . " Al o like 1te-
head, He 1 was dis atiatied with rlatotle's logic ot 
cla nd ubetltuted an organic logic. Hegel, however, 
tailed to reco nlze the import nee ot the nroblem or tlme. 
or did ht yste le ve a pl oe fox- the emer enee or 
novelty. 
pre 
ltehe d' concept of actual entitle i al o ex-
m ny t1 e • 
ppear nee 1 the proces of ar1 lng ·lnto being and 
p in w y g in, a procee that it elt doee not 
arise and does not pas w y, but i per se, and 
eonet1tute re 11ty nd the lite-movement or truth. 
In th1 way truth th bacchan 11 n rev 1, wher 
not a eoul !a abe~; and bee u e every member no 
soon r ets det ched than it eo lp o collapses 
1. llaoe, OH, 308•309(He el, EP 1 #215) . 
( 
tra!ghtway* the revel 1a iust a 
tran parent unbroken cal • 
much a 
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t te or 
When th!E~ pe,a a e comp ed to 1tehe t tatement bout 
the tate ot ctual ent t1ee, ,1t may be eeen that the two no-
tion ar almo"t xactly par llel. 
n th ph1lo8ophy of org 1em it · is not "sub• 
st nee 1 which 1s permanent, but "r rm. Forme 
surr r ohang1n rel t1on J otu 1 entitle "per-
petu lly perl h" subjectively, but are 1 ortal 
objectively~ otu 11ty in peri h1n cqu1ree ob-jectivity, while it lose subjective 1 ~d1acy.2 
'l'hes s by no e n exh u t the po stb111t1es ot 
t1nd1n similar ties between the philo ophy or He el and of 
itehead. But they re sutt1o1ent to show how He el'e 
philosophy is just as de ervedly called 
n1sm a 1 tb t or Whttehe d. 
philo ophy ot or• 
In the philosophy ot chopenh uer, Be el'~ a ous con-
temporary, there 1s much th t is aug. e t1ve of Berg on. In 
Tbe orld as 111 9nd Id , will is conceived s a blind, 
impersonal, driving force. Th physical world 1s considered 
1d 1 or ttepr sents.t1on, or m nire tation of the will. Thus 
ohopenh uer reintroduce an 1 oat forgotten concept into 
the philosophy or his d y, n mely, the 1dea that the b 1c 
1-e 11 ty 1 s not neoess rlly tatlo, but might well be 7• 
n mtc, This lin or thought, coupled with the n.ewly dis-
covere theor1e of evolution, w s to culmin te 1n rgeon*s 
Cre volut1on. 
1. , 41. 
2. 1tehead, P , 44. 
It w a Hegel. however. w o w 
36 
t ted to tart a school 
of" thouttht, t, is often the oa e, the te ch1nge of th 
m ter e~ oon lo t 1 ht or ln their original to :rom, nd 
1 er p ct 0~ hl thou ht we:r-e developed and em ph lz d. 
ttempt to view hla ey tem a whole led to an e ph sl 
upon the baolute to tb egl ct of" Hegel's own emph 1 on 
d velo ent nd p:r-ooe e, and hl hi to~1o 1, ec1ent1 to, 
nd cultural em 1:r-1e1sm. The school or bsolute id li m 
oe:r-ta!nly te ed from gel, but many, like tehe d, did 
not bOther to :roe d He el d got th 1r conception o th1 
achool o~ thou t from the ~ollowe~ o~ Hegel. Th bleat 
i n dial ct c 1 ~ea on1ng, and 1 o the most extreme of the 
n o-B gel! ne, w a Br dley. 
re 1 nd all determin t1on 
or him the bsolute lone is 
ppear a movement within the 
bsolute. y phenomenon tak n simply 1e not reality, but 
r ather appe r noe. Th more org ie lly the e various 
pheno en een to be :r- lated, the more re 1 they become, 
until 11 r lat1on r con 1d r d to ether in whole ·wh1ch 
1a th bsolute nd h1ch !a re 1. This view o~ Bradl y' 
profoundly influenced Wh1 ehe d bee u e of it org n1c e -
pbaa1a d it 1a t 1 a t po ible that it head had r d• 
le ' s book, litt, in 1nd when h named 
his own greatest work, Process Both r cogn1z 
an 1 port nt lement of e lin 1n the known prooe 1 and 
1n ult1 te r lit7, and both were agre d that complete 
d 
an de uate coount or re 11ty involved the entire universe. 
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But Whttehe d w th t even th b olut or Bradley had 
aomethtn unreal about it b o ~s • t th st ot the b o• 
lut , ~e 11ty eemed to be st tte. or it he d :r 11ty 
w dynamic, proces • and the g ne:ral th ory of :rel tivity 
uggeRt d to him t t any 'Yent' m1 ht b te:r d r 1. 
itehead's own :remark on hie :r l tton hlp to 
1ntePeet1n • 
dley aPe 
admit clo e tf1liation with 
that I if~e:r ~o dley here 
with alm t 11 the pbiloso~ber 
nd with Pl to, neot :r a Pl to w a a He 11 n. 
d1tter fro ~e where they all a :ree in their 
reeling of the 1llue1Yene nd r 1 t1ve unr alit 
ot the t mpo:r 1 world. • •• Th t proc a is 
som what upe:rtic1 1, illu ory element in our ex-
perience of the eternally r al , the e enti lly 
per n nt .. • • 1 Br dley' standpoint, tr I 
read htm correctly• • • • I r ther uapect th t 
I little mor 1 tot 11 n.l 
teh d cknowled e h1 debt to Br dley in the Pref ce• 
to Proces and Rea11tl• 
Though throughout the in body ot the work I 
in harp dis re ment w1 th dley, the tin l out-
come 1e atter 11 not so reatly different. t 
rt1culaP1y indebted to his c pter on th n t\11' 
ot experience, which ppear in hie E e l on uth 
and Re litJ• Hie !n i t nee on "re 1!ng !s •ery 
con onant with m7 own conc1u ion • Tht whol meta-
physic 1 po 1tion 1 n implicit repudi tion ot th 
doct:ri e or ltv cuous ctu lity.0 2 
nother l)hil so wh c 1 p rticul rly t v in 
the u e of the organic principle 1 the philo ophy or ~ muel 
lexander, nd lte e d• wr1t1n s reveal an cour .te know .. 
ledge or i w rk. 1 xander' y tem, embodies in hie 
1. 1tebe d, SP, 116. 2. 1tehead . PR. v11-v11i. 
~p ce, Time, an Detty, conceives re 11ty a comp ed ot 
p ce-t1me." not tu ton of the two. but ae i le 
r ality. He con !d ~8 it a 
ceive or p ce nd t1me 
ndnment 1 rror that con-
tinct. Ther i n u 
tow r gro tb w th an evolution ooe~r1n o that natu.t-e, 
nd, nd spirit hav rged euooes 1vely h er 1 vela 
orr D tty 1 th next hi her 1 vel which ha not 
y t em ttged. r e ch 1 vel, d tty the ne t lev 1 bove 
1t, and in it r side th "n1 U8° or gro t • up 1ng pUtt -
ly .f'rom n lo y, and not me ning to imply a d1stinet1on b -
en p ce nd tim , 1 x nd r 8 y that time ia "the m1nd 
r p ee."1 lexander h much in co on with b th tte-
he d and Ber on. ttehead gr e with ht that ap ee nd 
t1 e eonst tute 1 l re l!ty, to~ which n err n science 
ha s igne two name , mp a tztng t two 
ep1 tem lo y 1 x n er 1 1 o 1m11 r to 
pect • 
ttehe d . 
n hta 
e 
b lie es that in th knowing ttu tton the know r nd the 
obj et ot knowled e re compr ant" or to ethe~. The idea 
or being to e her 1 on w tch tteh d use hen h 
th t 11 etual entit1 r "to ether nd prebend on 
another. 1elt nd r' ntsu " 1 ery like the 
Ber son . The 'nisus 1 of th n ture o t1 e and carries 
its creatur R orwar thl'ough tt r n lite to tnd •• tnee 
tt n ntte, th proeee of gro o nnot be tho ht ot 
a coming to n end. "Tt e it elf require u to think or 
1. lex nder. STD. II, 38. 
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1 t r btrt of Tim . •1 It houl be noted that 1 x nde~ 
d1f~ers from both chopenh uer and Bergson 1n that the two 
latter philo opher considered the dyn m1e element to be 
the 1c reality, wh le or le andett the b, to real ty 
WO.'l p oe-time, oompo ed of po1nt•1nAtant " e thu be· • 
longs to th t roup or philo opher who cl1:n to "the llu-
ton th t ch nge 1 condition b things which ar e n 
le s . "2 
~ 0 0 ide l1sm th t m k use or the org nic rtn-
eipl s per on 11 m. which had it beginnings 1n Germany 
w th the pirttu 118111 of' HeMnann Lotze.3 R'e held .th t n-
ture w compo ed of un1t in reciprocal nd co pen tory 
rel tton • ~inc t e e r el tion composed a r tional y -
tem, nature ultimat 1y unit. Lotze h ld that reality 
w s th t which m tnt 1ned it identity throughout ch ng1ng 
states • . h1 he round to be the c e tn the unity of con• 
~e1ousnes • He developed theistic view in which n tur-
a compo ed or sp1ritu 1 be1n s having ee11 and will .. 
1nolud1ng elve below the level or m n, human selv s, and 
t e upreme • lt, God . 11 lee.. r being 
p nd nt on God being mode or h1 aot1v1ty.4 
Lotze's view were further d v loped in er1oa by hie 
l• lexander, ~ D~ II, 346. 
2. H. , • Carr, or. p.l. or. lex nder, STD, I~ 329. 
3. Weber nd Perry, HOP, 519-523. 
4. eber nd Perry, H ·P, 522. 
4() 
min nt pupil, Borden Pa~ker Bowne, who g ve the n me per-
onali m to hiw sy t m. Bown emph s1z d the subst nt1ve 
r ality of 11 per ons. H h ld th t th physical orld 
w known by the constitutive ctiv1ty of mind, but esc ped 
subjectivism with tbe dootrin that the physic l ot'ld 1s 
other than tb individual 1nd, b 1ng the xpress1on ot tb 
D1v1n 1nd. S!mil r view w re put forth by G org Howison 
ot the University of 0 11forn1 1 who or1t1c1zed the monis 
of Royce and sub titut d th ory o£ the plurality or ?er• 
eons, a y tem he called "Plural! tlc Id al1sm. 1 
On m y r adily a e ho the re uirem nt of an or n1c 
and dynamic xpl nation or th unit nd v iety of lit 1 
dm1r bly fulfill d in the philo ophy of p rsonali • In 
r ct, He el, Bergaon, and 
g n1e oh r cter of reality, 
iteh ad, ln describing th or-
in and g 1n u . e term Which 
may be constru pe:rs n 11 tic. 
To conclude th1 historic 1 urvey, the philo oph1 s 
of the two n who are th subj ct or thi pap r will b~ 
summarily treated. Ber on waa dl eat! tl d with th tr -
d1t1onal ph11osoph7• Be w 1nt r ted in practic 1 lite 
and xperieno nd bad a gr t de 1 1n co on with r1can 
pz-a tl • Perry s y tb t 'th difference between B rg• 
eon and 111am J me is the difference between a p yeho• 
lo ic 1 b!olo y nd biolo ieal p ycbology. H oee on 
to y th t oth ph1loaoph1 s might b de cr!bed by the 
1. eber nd Perry, HOP, 550. 
1 
ter natural! tio sp1r1tual1sm8 or -sp1r1tu 1et1c n t~ 1• 
t~m.~ and both tend to reduce l!fe nd min to common t rms.~ 
1t or rg on • !' rea11 ty the mo t ad quate term 1 ' eti v1 ty• 1 
r t tor J mes, •exp r1eno •.•1 ergson onoe a nf1ded 
to .friend', Tr d1 t1onal philosophy 1.fl alw-a.ys ey t a tic, 
hav want d to create d tt rent 1nd."2 1 cbj ct1on 
r f' rre to y te that w bound by r1g1d lo to, he 
telt that tbi excluded nov lty. 
di tlnctl:r or an1 c. Re con 1dered both d1 eont n o s y• 
eh1c state nd discrete object to be 11lu~1on. Life and 
eonse1ouan as er n unbr k n dur tton." e o op-
pc ed to anything static th t H. 1ldon Carr calls his 
ph1lo ophy1 "The Philo op y or Chang . ~ o:rt t1c zeCI both 
ldeal1 t nd mater! 11 t~ • trw n an aye: 
Bergson's critique or the purely 1ntell etunl ana-
lyst or tbe idealists nd the purely geometrical 
n ly 1 of t e m teri 11 t 1 shrewd cr1t1c1 m, 
howe~er v gu the positive doctrine or 'oreattv 
evolution'.~ 
Berg on' leading principle te that 11fe 1 due to the 
upward hru t o the ~ !tal 1mpul e" •!tal." It 
ts by t 1 po er t t develop .ent nd evolut on t tre 1 ce, 
that 1 nore tively.fl In eert in p ole thi ev 1 t n 
h eomc to it tull ~t d lop nt, and ha therefore 
topped. In m n alone ar evolution and nov lty still 
1. W ber and Perry, H P, 5~6. 
2 . Report or a visit o~ v. Gremtl to Borg on• Mercure de 
n- nee, 108 (1914), 39'7, cit d in Scharr teln, RBP. 
:5 . !dman, .Art •. ( 1943), x1 v. 
po 
of 
bl.e. In let :r t u t, a 
v lo t s t ft in 
manner ve'!.'y elo e to r1 t1 nd 0 . tnes, p '!l.rt cularly · 
t ey 
t e 
elo 
man 
a e oun tn t Jo e.n..~1n 1t1n • 1-e peot to 
lti te n ture :Pe ltty, er.gson' m ... t p 1 to is 
to 1teh a ' s theory o Crea.t:\vit.y tnt1m t • 
sug;:,oe ts, oommenting on Ber on' 
r son round r altty in move ent nd o an e them-
selves, n fer2u not uneon en 1 to the dyna to 
che.n tng e ety 1n w c e 11 ve • t chan a 
real, novelty w r 1; 1~ novelty w a e• 
dom :r 1. mme 1 t t'lux, 
changing w s ult te.l 
q 
s 
Ther contr t in er eon. The on _ th t 
ha the gre t t cont~ov ~ey 1s hi doet~ ne th t 
th 1ntell ct f 1 1 1e xper1ence, nd th t real ty may 
b ra ped b intuition. Thi doctrine, Which w 1 be 
2 
ta ... 
c retully x mined l ater, w f one h1oh tehe d wts ed to 
d fend tro e r or ant1-1ntell ot 11sm-2 
lteh ad 1 gener lly reco nized the greatest 
philo opher or the f1rst h 1r of the twentt th century. 
th1 historic 1 urv y ha indicate , m nr of the le ing 
thinker have de ge t!ons th t howed reeling f"or an 
or an!c interpret t1on o t e uni rse. it ad, o e er, 
h t n these sugge$t1on , e uple 1th the 1 teet d-
v ne or cienoe, p :rt eul rly phy !es, nd with con 1derable 
l. d an, rt.(19 3) 1 x11. 1tehe d 1 . PR, v11. 
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ere t1ve en1us, ha wJ"1tten ay tem o~ philosophy which 
c nnot be el s 1f1ed ~1th ny o t a tr d!tional y tern~. 
P r p th be t n e o:r 1 t 1 ~ •• or an c r al1. m • "1 1 t ... 
he d • ~ t &rting point n 1 ne ~ al m• R e mb1 ed 
1n 1 th1nk1n exten !ve c1ent1 ie knowledge~ t ner 1 
t heory of rel~t1v1ty, wide ~ neral r~ad ng in hi tory nd 
ph11 sophy, nd extennl v clRs 1e 1 tudie111. The r o :.~l.t w. 
a ighly origin 1 ph or.ophy completely d1vorced 
notion or subst ntlal and t tic r 11ty. For 
om the 
ere t !ty, the not n or a fund-ment ere t ve power, is 
t e "category o~ the tTl t1mate. • 2 '!he unft or r ql ty t-e 
not thing~ but • ciu 1 ent t1 s" o~ ~actt~l oec ion • 
which re org .nlzed into "ne us~ which comprise ~event ft or 
"public m tter of f' et.113 eal1ty 1 ot att r ~ F~p1ri.t, 
but rat er has a ment 1 and a p y~1cal pole.4 11 xperi· 
ence . which me n 11 e 1 1 t or re ling . lte-
h ed e 11 t~e e feeling "preh n ton . • 5 · 11 aotu. l nt1-
tte are in sense "together" and "prehend" one an ther. 
This prehend1n proce 1 kno n &. "conere ceneett nd eon-
st1tute tb ctuaHty o otue. ent ties . God :1 the "pr1-
mo~ 1al, non-temporal ecid ntfl or t e ult1m~te "ere ti~ · ty . "7 
God's natur 1. threefold, pr mordial, superjeetive, nd eon• 
sequent.8 1beaa statements, w le not an attempt to sum-
marize hi philosophy, m y serve to indicate the novelty nd 
1. or~1 , ST , 162, 
2 . it ad, ~R, 31 . 
3. Whitehead, PR, 32, 113 . 
4. 1teh d , PR, 170. 
e. 
a. 
.,. 
e. 
itehe d, PR, 2e . 
1tehe d 1 PR, 33. 
1tehead, PR, 11. 
1tehead, PR, 134-135. 
comple ty of 
nt in t 
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te. dt thought. hil the pr.v oun t t ... 
urve n 1ca·e thew yin 1h1 h he re upon 
n mode to ht und m ny thi1k ra n c ;;nt t!c 
con truction o hi philosopl 
1 el held opinion o~ it -
d' h1lo o hy h n he 11 · 
r e 
On 1nd1c tion th t uch synth 1 h en n od d t 
t ct that the vi w or cont mpor ry thinker~ do not it 
r dily into the cat gori or trad t1on 1 thou ht. Th r 
r y type ot 1d 11 mn typ of r 1 em. 
-
t1 t e 1fter nt fo overl P• For !net nee. DUl' nt 
Dr ke nd c. • Strong r u lly ol 8 d crtt1c 1 :re 1-
1 t • ey r al o classed np ych1 t , whiob 1 an 
1d 11 tic doctr1n • !d 11 t gener lly t vo th o jeot1• 
v1t or v lu , whil 0 t r uli t do not . Bow v r , E. a. 
p uldin 1 a ti-1d listie, but till hold to th ob-
j ct1v1ty or v lu • o t st t ent ut r 1 sm or 
1d lis ned to be qu, lifi d by n dj otive d notin h ch 
to or ide li s r ro 11 i int nded . 
will be d in C pt r vt , wh r th rol t on t 
1 . orr! • T • 18 • 
t t mont 
r on 
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an it h ad 1 dl cu e d . Fo~ th • p~e11m1na~y historic 1 
urv y, only gene~ l working det n1t1on 111 be 1!1 de . 
Ide 11 m, then, may b defin b lief in the ultlm te 
reality or signtricanc or mind, or of the ideal and v lu s 
ex1 tin~ in o~ rev 1 d to 1nd . l li i tb v1ew tb t 
~ ality cons t or omethin other than consciou n s, nd 
x1 tlng independently of it . 
In stimulating art1cl on Berg on, llbur Long ys 
that th que tlon before modern philosophy 1 · th mou 
d b te ov r th mlnd•body probl m, deb t that co p r 
in m n1tud nd 1gnif1cance to th t over universal in 
th 1ddle 112 • This d bat 1 generally cone rne with 
the 
bisection of the orld by the hum n mind ••• into 
the wo ph r s of 1n ido and out id • • • b -
twe n subjectiv d object1v , self nd not• elf, 
p r on nd thing, p1r1t and pace .3 
Th1 qu lon, which 1 prim r1ly p1 temolo !cal, b s 
it s counterpart 1n metaphysic 
nd aterial1st8. The idealist 
a debat betw en idealist 
ppe to h ,ve won the 
fir t round, b c us mod r cient1fic d1scover1e h ve 
pr ctically d t~oyod the po 1t1on of h crude m t r li m 
0 n arl1er d Y• w v r, notber r ther fo d ble 
philo opby, known r 11 , aro o to thr aten eriou ly 
th 1d 11 tic position, and r pr n.ts the r forming ot 
' 
I, 1'72 • 
48), 6 • 
48), eo . 
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the mAter! 11At1o o~ce in confoPro1ty to the new sc18nce. 
tn it simole t for , reali m means moly t t t re . a 
someth!n re 1 extettng 1ndeoendent of the ind vtdual mind. 
In thi sense o t philosophies y l y cla i to the title 
o~ r alis • Thus Whitehe d o 11 hi philosophy 1or n1c 
nd lewell ng call his person 11 u :rson 1 
r lis . " But many r 1i tic syet ms of thought in twenti-
eth century hllo ophy resemble the old r mater! 11sm in 
b 1n 1 person 11et1c. i~ie 1 true or natur 11 d 
erican neo•re lie • It 1 aleo true ot lo t 1 p a1t1v!sm, 
which exclude the po tb111ty of ny experi ence except 
e e expert nee, and :repud! tes the poae1b 11ty ot pecu• 
l~t1ve met p yaio •1 
od rn r lis stems tro the ee robin inquiries ot 
Lock in the sevent enth century nd the po tt1v1 of 
Comt !n the nln t nth. eber nd Perry refer to Comte's 
work the r listie eounterp rt, so to . pe k, o~ Heel' 
pbilosophJ of' mind. 2 Positivism, who e po 1t1on 1s ss n• 
ti lly th t of e ptrical real! , looks tt on theology and 
m taphys1ce aa mode of thought prior to the o it1vi tic 
or scient1 ic atage when phenomena receive their mo t de-
qu t explanation 1n th inv r1able laws of science. Twen• 
ti th century science h been oha 1ng Ao r pidly th t th 
law o~ science a:r no longer looked upon ae 1nvar1 ble. 
1. Bri t ~n, POR, . •5. 
2. eber an Perry, HOP, 493. 
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but the po 1t1on rem 1n logic 1 y unc n ed o th t lo 1c 1 
po !t1v1em till en ppon nt o the 1d lirtic, 
ubj ct1v1 tic pos t on by d nt1ty!n 
1nP. clue! ely wtt 
p c lo .1e. 1 
the 'p bl1c 1 
rtr nd R 
nd 1 
• owle rr. 
erson 
thi 
c 1 t a , ' holcU t t th worl 1 d 
nd e n-
r 1 or 
po 1t1on 
1" -
1 t1on nd t ct wh ch re istin u1sh logic lly tr-o 
on not er 11 e t e te~a of ro t1on.2 - re 11 
d pt 1!1 si 11 r po",i t1on. For t e neo .. :realf. t , r ality 
eon !et of r 1 t!on which e.x1 t betwe n . 0\ll> or 'neutr 
ent1.t1e It Th e e t el nt tie re d1 cover ble nly by • 
an ly 1 PJld re m ra r,.m t ve than it r 1 d or body . 
1 
Other re 11 te o t le a extre e position , but thev UBU 1-
ly a ree 1n ol n to the~r1 s or mind rel t1on or 
f'unet on f ent.1t!ft which re not m t 11 r h r t n by 
l n1 re ty in tet- r d d 1 ' ~ th 
1 et-t. c~l rogre s gy be ob rved in mo em ph lo -
p • ventee th ce tU!'y tnee ed enl . fl'_ te re• 
t on t the the!' b rt- nr t on 11 0 e 1 t c1 m. 
t tio 0 e rte nd L eke le to kept o1s 
w en lo te'llly tended, II. t e c t1 c s e r R e r v aled . 
s th nt1th. 1 tn e view , t e e pe ed chool 
0 errnnn d q11 m w feh, be! more e p r c 1 than seho• 
t .. . e n t k n th 1 e1en into ccount, 
1. Long,. rt.(l948), 60. 2 . eber nd P rry, HOP, 589 . 
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b o m known critical 1d llam. t the m1nd•body prob-
le with its attendant ep1atemolog1o 1 problem w a not 
aolv d nd count r-react1on then occurred, returning 1n 
p rt to pre•K nt1 n tho t 1n the development or modern 
re l1em, lt ougb dealing more erloualy with the m1nd•body 
proble as w 11 showing the effect or the new ec1enoe, 
the tic , and lo to. Long point out that both school 
ot tr ditlonal philosophy autrered from the a e major de-
r ot, the failure to t ke seriously the n ture ot t1 e. 
The two oh1et xpreae1ons or philo opb1o modernia 
b ve been those fot'mul ting in v riou w y the 
ter1 11sm nd m thematic 1 det rm1n1a of G 11-
le n• ewton1an•L Pl oe n co molo y, d those at-
tempting to stem fro the principle ot per ona11ty, 
notabl7 German 1deal1 m. While the tormer et nd-
point repud1 ted the ontologie 1 a1 n1t1c noe or 
value, nd the 1 tter ttirmed it, both dominant 
po 1t1on greed in releg ting time and the hie• 
torical world to the statu ot appe r nee or 1llu-
1on. This 1a the meaning of Berg on' tatements 
that G 111ean1sm and the K nt1 n tr d1t1on like, 
r pr enting modern natural! nd ide 11 m, re 
chola t1o1am • The reason is th t tor both • 11 
i given' nd •th totality ot the re 1 ia poetu-
1 ted complete in etern1ty.'/!er on, OE, ( od. 
L1b.)394, 402.7 fhia xpl ina why the attempts or 
poet•K nt1an tde 11 as a dootr1ne ot metaphy !c 1 
hi tory nd met phy leal will h ve proved to be 
tatlur .1 
Long believe th t the synthes1 between the e two 
chool ot thought occurs in the philosophy or rg on nd 
that the key to the real 1s, Peraon 11ty r ther th n Po 
Thi ia pr ctaely the view or lewell!n expres ed in hi 
book, 
1. Long, rt.(l94S), 64•65. 2. Lon , t.(l948). 70. 
• 
tt2 
4 
t rtl1ng t ct th t n o-r ali m nd ideal! re muoh closer 
to ther th n either would b willing to admit. 
The moment we as ume rel tion a the fUndament 1 
re lity. that moment we h ve begun th t proce 
ot 1ntellectu liz tion ain t which Bergson pro-
teats a 1e din way trom ctual xperience. e 
cannot et to rel t1on until we h ve gotten aw y 
~o the pr1 ry ct. which 1e lite, to n n ly is 
ot it, which is id 11 m. l 
8 ha been pointed out, p r on lie 1s one or the sye-
te 8 th t kes u e or the organic p~1no1ple in it inter-
pret t1on ot the un1ver e. Flew 111ng, in claiming tor hie 
vi we the eynthe is or modern philo ophy ie olo e to th 
pos ition or this di sert t1on, which ttnd 1n t e or an1o 
principle the key to the reconciliation ot !dealie 4 
re 11 • 
iteh d leo makes u e or in ight of both re lieta 
and ide lists. tt r the anner of the neo• reali te, he be-
11ev d that n tur 1 entities h ve xi tenoe th t does not 
depend upon the pereeivin ind . He believed in n to io 
plurali m. t he ubet1tuted for th •n utr 1 stutr" ot 
the neo• real1 t , teelin or prehen ions con t1tut1ng 
ctual entlti a . 2 In thu a in experience to be tunda-
ental 1n the r 11ty ot otual enti t1 1 he adopted an 
1de 11 tic view. ctual nt ties h v both phya c 1 d 
ntal pole , but both con tat ot teelinge•-the physical 
pole ot phy to 1 fe 11ng , or reel1ns or other t elinga, 
and the ental pol or preh neion or eternal object • , 
1 . lewelling, BPR, 203 . 2 . 1tehead1 PR, 165 . 
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the ·doctrine of th nt 1 pole, Pl tonie ideal! nt r 
into his yate ~ while the yatem s ol · ta olo r to 
the view or rkeley. In holding th t God 1 the upr me 
aotu 1 entity in who all v 1 e re con erved, iteh 4 
is very oloa to person 1 ; but in holding th t the r la-
tion of act 1 ooc ton to God 1a th r 1 tton or the parte 
to the whole, b dopted th .view or olute 1de 11a .1 
B t iteh d ~elt th t t the 'vi w represent tb 
truth only fro limit d .point or vt •• Th concrete t utb, 
h felt, w dynamic proce a, the procea 'through which the 
1nd term1nat ere t1v1ty bee e ctu 1 in the concr soence, 
or b com!n , or ctu 1 entitle • 
4. Th Theory of Relativitl 
Ph11oso by tend to beoo e barr n unle it 1 ren • 
trom t e to tim b n w dat , p rticularly from the f1 ld 
0 cienc • or this re on, philosophy durin the twenti-
eth century h a enjoyed a riCh owth becau or th gni• 
tude or etc discoveries in science nd mathematics. By 
t r the mo t import nt or t e disco er1 , one which has 
revolutionized both science and thematios, ha been in• 
te1n' a rel tivity theory, a discovery which ove · the 
c1ent1t1o p:robl into th :r lm of meta.phy to .•2 G. D. 
1:rkbotr, in hi bo k, The Ortsin1 N tur! and Influence ot 
Rel t1v1ty, a1nt in th t thl theory ba provided the 
1. itehe d, PR, 254. 2. 'Flewelling, t.l(1948), 641 
1 
n o ~Y con pt by w ch th nd• y ro 
ol d, nd h intatns th t it b d, or th n ny o her 
philo oph r, h 8 d 
t1on ot be theory. 
t1c1p te it h 
xpl1 it the p lo ophio 1 1 11c -
er on, nd o e ther , how v r, n-
at 80 e impo~t nt point • 
On import nt r ult or the m h 8i upon r 1 ti ty 1 
it app11o t1on to t th ory of truth. Viewed 1n th1 w y, 
truth 1 not b olute, but r 1 t1v • !t d pend upon one' 
point or v1 w, on • •per p ct1ve," to u it h d' term. 
us, 1 te d of cons1der1n th 
whole, 
coord1n to the p roach which on 
tt ~ ot natur nd in 
n tur - 1nd peotrumw 
k a.1 ThePe re t v 
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result 1n re 11 tic or mate:r1 11s.t1c philosophical theor1e • 
The psychologic 1 nd soot 1 pproachee are subj ctive nd 
interpret n ture and mind in te~• ot knowledge or con ciou 
experience. The biolo 1c 1 o:r n t\U' 11 tic appro ch oocu• 
p~ea n intermediate po 1t1on. In nothe:r d 7 these five 
appro ohea to the philo oph1oal problem with the 1"1 ve or 
~ore d1t'tere~t solutions would result in e!ldleas deb te aa 
to wh1oh theory wa ~true . 8 ut now pb1lesopher ar in 
the h ppy position ot s ying with Hegel , •The true ia th 
whol .• Or coordin to the relativity theorys 
E eh conclusion is true relative to the type ot p• 
p~aah to th problem. Just the r lat1v1ty 
theory de troy& the 14 or baolute space and t1me~ 
so lao tt de troy the 1 ea of ab olut knowledg .~ 
Birkhot~ 1lluat:r te the errore of the old r philo o-
phy by pointing to Lock nd ewton. 
Th psychologic 1 1 eae ot Locke nd the physical 
ideas or Newton , • • fixed n pp rently 1mpa 8• 
bl gul betwe n th knower nd th known . ever-
the lese, pac and i1me were till held to have an 
a er1or1 ch r cte~ . 
Th resulting conflict wa due to the introduction of con• 
oepte fro pby ic and m them tic into the ubject vi tie 
ppro ch o~ p ycholo Y• Hegel man ged to e~tect their ep• 
ar tton in tb. ucceaatve "moment tt of the d1 lecttcal -pro• 
gre ton in his Logic. nyone r m111 r with gel' Los1c 
w111 note at once that H gel' progress on from the lo 1 1 
to the per onal , ~o th b tract to the concrete, 1 
1 . B1rkhot.t, ONIR, 174 . 2 • B1rkho.tt 1 0 IR, 168 • 
~ollo d tn trkho r• n t e- nd" pectrum. 
d o ry a to h v on unnott , v n by 
follow ra, until r on a l o 
ne tro i 1 r tandp n • 
t 
!nee the chief ctton or philo phy 1a 
3 
t e 1' 
t 0 i 
lbl 
optic, 
th JIO h CO 
part1cul rly by 
0 t 
t 
r con t~ctton o Philo oph , ett cted 
d, which look t th un1v r e not 
any one ot th pp o ch a entton but 1n a yn-
th tic • y, ta 1ng tb 11 tog t ' philo -
op 1 p oxic 1 and co pl x, o time p 1n lly ob ur 
e h ha tt ted to con truot coher nt y t ot 
1 wh1 h includ 11 point ot ew. cor 1 to 1e 
pr1nc1pl ' 1t 1 0 1bl for n to loo t robl 0 
di ferin t n point with d1 e:r1 concept ult ns and 
t bl to t nd on d coop :r-at n 
it d esrch for truth. I 1 0 e hope th t orl" 
i on th t re hold o r con truct1ve p a a n P 11o -
ophy, with 1 a pol 1c nd polo otic , nd 0 eon truct-
1v tho ht r ee rch. 
J..: 81rkhoft, 0 IR, 16 • 
c R TI 
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1. Vi •• 
s.. rgson, 11 it h t -
d nt ot th tic a in hia outh. ut hil it h d went 
on to b co on ot th l' t t the t1c1 n ot h1a d y, 
g on, t th g ot nty•t o, to the gr t con t rna-
t on ot hia te cher ot th tic , d th eel ion t 
1 a ci no d th tic nd p cl liz in 1 tt r n 
p ilo ophy.l or thla r a on, th re c b no u tlon of 
tb tic • Y. t on ha in 1n£luenced 1t b d' 
on n ver lo t hi 1nt rl1el' t di a, d 
if he 1 n 1n c1 nc d the tic , h w an un-
u lly co p tent on • On the oth r h nd, hit b ·done 
r rk d to 1ctol' Lo tb t rgaon w s n 1 b r a m th a-
t cl n nor n th t c 1 phy lo at.3 • c l'talnly not 
in th cl • it h ad, but h w su f1c1 ntly 
oomp ten· to alyz tim and und r t ud •in t 1n1 th ory 
o r 1 tl ty. e w n t, how v 1'1 ble to a th t d -
velopm nta 1n th tic o which h 
w re de tin in th h nd or it 
p ly w r , 
ad to 1nv lid te hie 
gl!ah 
uot t1on t'ro 
1th th 
5 
own orit1o1 o~ th m tic nd o1 no • 
rg on t lt that one of th o 1 f troubl with hi• 
lo ophy wa th 11 1tat1on o thought du to math ti 1 
th1nk1ng. t 1 ne of a nitud nd 
q nt1ty, ooul ne r r 1 anythin bout quality . H 
r co niz t t ot th t moder th tics h d d aom 
t pa in th right direction, uoh o th th 
1nt1n1t ai l ca1culu , th oat po r 1 or t e thod of 
in t1 t1on at th di po al or th nd . ~ t e 
t 1t th t tor 11 it pro 1 e, m them t1oa, b ing th c -
no o m gnl ud , 
0 thing • 
Turning to th 
t t h d 8 
on 1d, but ith hi 
1ee could be 
r on er ttc z th 
u t eon in 1 t lf to th ou 1 n 
nthe t1 ot it h ad, it app l' 
eritici s of th a tic th t Ber -
great r uipm nt .. 8 ble to th t 
ext n e b yon it r11e bound • 
philo ophy of e1 nc 
eant tor h1 eort of un1 r 1 t1o which 
"pr otic lly un 1t r Pl toni m. "2 t 1t he d erit1-
c1z the t1ee ot ant b c u e it t d to 
1. er on, IT , 1. 2 . Ber on, I , .,. 
qu nt1tat1ve oono pt1ona . l it b ad' tir t book 
1n 
it 1 1 o t aeo nd n tur • 2 ~ t it h d o lla it i-
v r 1 bee u 1t o beyond tb boun of th r ly u n-
tit t1v • In thi work, 1t h ad y that h is 1nd bt 
p rticularly to ol ' bz- o~ log c nne 
c loulu or xten ion bee u of tb 1r bold xt naion b • 
yond th r dition 1 do in o~ pure q nt1ty. "3 il a-
aoci t d with rtrand ua ell, it h espec1 117 in• 
t r t in • on•m trioal oj ctiv Go try,' hloh h d -
~in d a 0 o try 
d veloped without ny r er no to ur m nt,•-
d thu witbo t ny reference to dtat nee, and 
without a y r rer no to n ric 1 coor in t 
for t indio tio t o1nta . 4 
• r latton of' ite e d d Bergson to 
pby 1c 1 o1enc 1 e1 11 r o their relation 1n r g rd to 
th tic • a1n, 1tehe d e a prot ion 1 who t ht 
t the I ri 1 Coll e ot .ctence and T ohnolo yin London, 
11 v ry comp tent teur . t ot them 
1 or t1oe o t e enoe of' their 4 y, but 
il r on deoid d th t ecieno could never deliver ny 
1 . Low f rt . (1941) in .cb1lpp1 
e d etut tio or th ide 
o1eno of' ma nitude in Enc . 883 nd 14th d . , v, 85•-wa•o-.----
2. Lo e, rt . (l941) in ohilpp, P , 32 . 
3. 1t h ad, U , viii. 
4 . 1teb d, r, 176 . 
78-
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k owle e t , ite nit -y eo eep by 
w h r form d 1 sci nee co d ade uat ly :r ent 
th world per! nc 1 e bl to do c u ot 
t r ic in ic thin 1ng wh1 h r 1ng 
r.rect d by ne dev lo ent n c nc , ueh e t eo y 
r r 1 t1v ty, t e oe r1n or. t1 ld ph 1 act1 1ty 
pl o1n the • e e t cle" vi w ot ce, nd t qu n 
theory 1ntroduoi th e nc t or h v1brn ory n ture t 
s . 
11 t te d' book :reve hi fund ent 1 1 r-
enc rr th y io or ton d K n • o jeet be-
ca e their hy 1cal 1de~ i not t e d q a ceo t ot 
t r ct ot biol 7 d p 0 0 0 ,, in no 0 tor 
r wth or e elution. r did they t ke co unt tv lu 
• 
r le ve 00 or re11 ion. 1t d ot ~ t t t 
-
t1c1 b ut r 11 ion in ' tural 
an 1 '9' t le o teo ot t wtoni n p 1 1 • 
lt 0 1t b fir t et ~ to t ot ewton 
0 t unde ot phy 1 1 e1 nee, 1t my 11 be t tth 
ject1on to t 1n d cy 1 rg~ 0 1ol y 
• e b reading r on . 1 , en 
e ot r 1 
cr1 1e1zed l e nc pt e u t 1 
not t Bdeq t eeount r otion. 
1. 1te d. R, 14 • 
oth1ng coul b more be utitul than tb abov 
!aeue or the claaaic 1 concept. 1t only w 11m1t 
ur elv to the con 1 er tion or n unoh nging 
rld ot p c • ~ntortun t ly• it 1 to a 
changing orld to which the oo pl te concept 
mu t apply.l 
tt mpt to understand apace h led to th introduc-
ti n or th cone pt of n ll•perv etve ther. But ite• 
59 
he d t 1 t th t this w c no pt th t not iv n in ex-
pertenoe and w only intro uc d to tit que tionable m t ~ 
physics. e lao rej cted th solute theorie or p ce 
nd time in ewton, for who p o and time w re obj ct1vely 
re 1. itehe d adopted a r 1 tional theory or space nd 
time. in whlcb he ubatituted fOr the •m terl 1 tb r• an 
•ether or events.• 1nce •the continuity or n ture i the 
continuity ot event '1'h work ot 1nkowsk1 nd Einstein 
on th theory or relativity led him to ass! il te both pac 
nd t1 e into lngle xten 1ve continuum. The new view 
thu dv no were el bor t d in Th Principles ot 
Jnowledse.3 
early ppe :red. 
1teh d objected to wh t h w later to c 11 • o1ent1f1c 
material! • 5 Re 11ty• in te d of be ng ult1m tely n -
lyz bl into b ts or tter. w a compo ed or events, wh1oh 
could only b an lyzed into other event • Object , which 
• 5. 
tetJe d, rt.(l 06). 
!t h ad, P , 25. 
He e rter rerer~ d to 
Hereuft ~ ~ererred to 
toe, :rt.(l941). 
4'79 
p • 
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1nalud el ot~ons nd mol cules, ere composed by ~1nt r n-
t1 1 con truction •. "1 Later, th concept or evE'nt wa 1m-
ro d upon 1n 1tehe d' m t phy 1oal book • n event 
then d ecribed a nexu or ct 1 ooe ions, hioh er 
11m1t1 typee or event o on rnemb r,2 nd 1n object 
were de !ned 1 their " 1gn1f1 co• or their " u jeet 
a1m• 8 or more ener lly, t eir purp ee, 
it head .round it xped1ent to n. lyz ap oe nd tio 
ceording to th ethod ot Extens ve b9tr ct1ontt into 
p 1nt , instants, nd other b tr ctiv ets" tak n fro 
. 
geometry. The~e ntities re not nctu 1, ho ever, but w re 
b traote fro actual!ty. itebe d thu gree w t rg-
on that re 1 ti e not d !s ble d t t mqthem t1c 1 
tim wa n bstr ct!on. ether or not Bergson ntluenced 
tehea in th!s re pect will be 1sou ~ed later. 
Both Berg eon nd 1te e d ere convinced of the inter• 
r=e a dne or the un1v r nd found a t1f'1e co 1 
t1on or th ir v ~ s 1n "vorte ~ina" theo~y t mat• 
ter nd day's vie th t 11 tom r 1nte~ n tr tins 
d 1n s nse, an 1 ot~1o charge is ve~ywhere.u3 o-
cc in ,o the e view , n atom ~ n inte~ ction r vor-
tex ring" or lin of f"oroe. cr vectors, thnt ext nd thl' ugh-
out the untver e 1n every r ct on. 
te e d• OOI, 1n E, 191. 
1te end, PR, 12 • 
it h d, 0 , 146; 1tehe d, 
, 265. 
t.(l906), 482; 
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B rg on 1 0 evere critic o the ph los of 
oat 1gn1tio,nt crit o1s wE o l· to n K nt. H h 
n ture ti e. e reject d th b olute t eor1es of paee 
nd time found in ewton u th 1 1 ty or 
p c round n ant . ut he n t d th t t 1!!8 f'! 1"8 1, 
0 t v ry ea ene of re 11ty. It a not th ho o neou , 
d v bl • 1 lized tit!l o ei nee, ut n 1v1 ble, 
cr t vely adv ne ng ea11t ; t is t1 
it r t v r1e with ifferent 1n ivi 
a 1 v d. uoh 
ls, e ee1 lly tho 
o d t er~nt peo1e • tt re 1 ty w!t1 th int n 1ty 
0 1 r uoed pr ot o lly to zero. Phy 1e for rg on 
w . Jl",ply ps ehlc v rt d."1 
1 t. th tie a d ph e , t -
h d r on's ter, ut p yo ology nd ph aiolo y 
up r1or. 11 his work , ut eopec 
g v . e d no o h1 e reful tu y nth. eld . 
Both h 1teho tte pt d to b their metaphy 1c on 
t e n 1 is o~ he evideno o experie ce. ooor ing to 
tuc: y ter th 
1ned X• 
J. equ s 
on o 
r t in, they both ppro ohed th 1r 
t e Germ n ~henom nolog1 ts, 2 nd 
peri noe w thout any ontologie 1 umpt1on • re u t 
a~ th t th m de s ~ro ng n ly e of n e-perc pt n 
w th rem rka ly 1 l r con lu o • e Fl-ench t1tl o 
ergo '· 1r t ck, nown to ng11 r der a n4 
th1 outa • a1 sur lee donnees 1mm~d1at a 
1. Ber eon, C , 221 . 2 . Mar1ta1n, P , 1xx111. 
e1 
de la eonse1enc • B r eon 1nt 1ned t at re· 11ty e given 
to e e w s composed of 1ma.ge ·, !n the mo of' pur p r-
c ption, experience 1s entirely p y teal. The ody. in 
eluding the br in nd nervous s-y tem. lch ar~ 1 o imo es, 
r in inter etion ~1th t e environment. Th need of the 
phy 1c 1 or an ism determine wh 1,ch 1 t n the env r runent 
111 be e:per1 need. There ul ir th moat elementary sen., 
at1ona6 ithcut conceptual me 4ing, e eept a thy are 
added to ~om "pure emory~" hich 1 e tot 1 eXp r1ence 
o the p st . greater part of memory 1 not 1n oon-
e1ousnG , but specific me ory 1mnge y at n~ ti~e be-
com eonsciou by fU 1o with pure perception. The purpoa 
of percepticn ao · on; thAt o ~emo~y s aontem lation. 
The tu ion f the t i'IO hich 1 "d1..t1nct or "oompl t " per• 
eeption give eonoep·t.. l ttean!.ng to th experience. The s 
total of t1e ~ orie or ~n nd1v1dua1 constitute m n or 
p r onal:tty. s sua !.t 1s 1 t1not tl"om atter, nd th 
mater1 l body is merely t c instrument th~ough 1cb the 
nd flCt ln th o.ter1 1 world. Conea1ous ~mory 1.c •the 
1 ter ect!on of 1nd and matter.8 1 The !nd 1 rre a, all 
t1me"' to choo e ' 1ch 1 e"' t rl.ll at npon, nn hero 1a 
no y or dotermin1ng b torchnn what nn es 11 b el'los n 
or the pr ciao d root!on o~ a cou~oe· of action . Fo~ this 
rea on, the un!ver~e 1o oont nu creation of novelty. 
1. Berg on, , x11. 
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rgeon thus r~p 1 t t e de o d term n_ 111. Sc rf-
tein point t tha't .cr ng th t the nt r p t 
l1a o ith apr on n my be bro ~t nto con c1ou ne s 
under the proper condition , B rs on s depth p chology. 
ter th 'ml r or ibot 0 ver, in uent1 1 n ~ 
d vclopment c Bergson' s p ychology.1 In ' • Borg on r 
on n xt n~i ve tudy of hypnot sm n 
2 ~P c!tll phae1 • 
normal .ycholo y, 
One o~' rg on' most ra.rnoue dea .. w ... h concept o 
intuition. along with the a llied 1d a o in tinct an 1n-
t lligen , a.c of th resents an evoluttcnar· d -
lopm nt by hich the in ividu 1 r lates him el to 1e en-
vi:ronm nt. In nt llig.nc 
lrectlon lr. hlch the or t· ve fore 1 d ;rogr s od . 
tinct 1 hl hl · d veloped i n nl l life, e p c1 lly t e 
soc1 1 ins ct , bu 1a ru 1 ent r in human 1 r • Int 111-
g nc 1 hi ly d v loped 1n m..lll , bttt r 1ment y n m 1 
lif • In til ct s th po·wer of t r 1 d pt t on to e, 
b hioh th n1m 1 1 oom lt.Jt 1 1tl 0 t r lect1on. may c n-
tin e to xi t. The intellect, on th o her and, c n-
cio s nd e p c 11 ad pt d to them ion t 0 
t r1 1 orld . But tine lL a gro tl and o n e , n(' 
matter 1 ta ic, th intell ct 1 1 1es :r 1 ty 1n th 
fJ'rt cti.c 1 !.nt re t t th 1ndiv! .1 ho 1s ad pting 
1. ch rfate1n1 RBr, 06. 2. ch r te1n, R P• 681 71. 
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b1 • lt' to th at ri 1 world. Intuition oe beyond both 
in tinct nd int lli enc in th t it 1 th oonaciou r -
ntranoe into the cr tive dv nee o~ lit • 
t the truth 1s that our int 111 nc 
low the op o it thod. 
inc r on telt th t intuition 1 ble to a p 
r lity whil th 1nt 11 ct t nde to tal ify 1t, h 1 o 
t lt th t t physic hould ke u e r the 1ntu tion 
r th r t n the 1nte11 ct. or t 1a urpo e, lt 
that th d liver ncea of' ayoholo y w re ore i port nt th n 
thos ot phy ic • 
taphy 1c 
In the fret ce• to PR, it he d 11ete nin "pr v -
1 nt h bit ot tho ht1 which ar r pudi ted, 1n o tar aa 
cone rna their 1n luenoe on philo ophy.•~ wo ot the oon• 
o l'n p ycholo Y• 
1. B rg on, IT , 50 • 
2. rgson, 0 , 22,•229. 
3. it he d, P , v111. 
(lii) Th ode or philo ophtc 1 thou t which i -
plies, d 1 implied by, the taoulty-p ychology. 
. . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (v) The sen at1on list doctrine ot pe~ceptton. 
F culty•p ycholo y wa reject d bee use ttehe dld 
not view expert nces of re ling, willing, de iring, and tb 
like, s pro u ts ot or nic or nervo tunctioning. For 
1tehead th y were "a bject1v forma" nd constituted l • 
~nts pres nt. in all pPehen ton , even negative one .1 Hie 
v1ewe repr ent to~ ot p np ychi tn which the ultimat 
unit ot r 11ty re termed ctual entitle which y be 
nalyz d into their "prehen ion , both po 1t1v:e nd nega .. 
ttv • Poe1t1v prehen on are teel1ng 1 negative preben• 
alon "eliminate tr reeling.~ In other words, actual en-
tit1e •prebend" every other actual entity, ither b7 d· 
tting it into .eignitio nee tor its ult1 te u tist ction• 
or 11m1n t1 it trom uch 1gniticance. The eeenti 1 
nature of xperienoe nd ot ex1 tence is reeling. In e ery 
act 1 entity the 1e both a phy ic 1 .nd a ental pol • 
Th physical pole con 1 t or prehensions ot other actu 1 
nt1 tie or prehena1ona ot other tee lin • 'l'he ment 1 pole 
con tat ot prehensions ot eternal object or "Forme ot 
Det1n1ten .•2 Conso1ou ment lity occ~s only when tbe 
ment 1 pole high degree ot e1gnir1canoe, but teel1ng 
coura 1n all ctu 1 ent1t1ea. 
ether or not Whitehead consciously followed Bergson's 
l• 1tehe d, PR, 35. 
2. 1tehe d, PR1 32. 
6 
eat1on in C - to or te a oo'smolcg7 1n p J'Cholog1oal 
in te d o~ phy 1c 1 term•• that · 11J actu 11y· what h did in 
akin hi tud7 an an lys1 ot reeling, 11 prehen ion • 
wb ther con o!ou or not, whether positive or neg t1ve1 con• 
alst o three f ctora which. or course, c n only b thought 
ot in ab tr otion from the tot 1 proce a: (1) the prehend-
ing ubjeeta (2) the "d tum prehendedJ (3) th " ubject1ve 
to. u or th nnw or prehension • The subj ot1 ve torme are 
ot1ona, valuations, purposes, dver ions, con clousnea ,• 
etc. Purpo ea are c 11 d •eubjectlv 1me8 nd bee use 
ctu 1 entities re tree nd elt•cre t1ve, they control th 
becoming or the •conoreecence. 
Whitehead a1 c repud1 ted the ens tion 11 t doctrtn 
·ot p roept1on. According to thie view the !ndiv!d 1, in a 
more or less p aatve manner, received 1mpreas1ons or en a-
tiona from the objective world, which were the d t or ex-
perience. !tehe d admitted tbis torm ot experience 1n a 
ener 1 w y "perception in th mode of presentational tm-
medi cy.•l more pt-1m1t1ve mode or pel'o pt1on 1 the "mode 
ot caua 1 ettic CY•" 'l'hl 1s PP . 11y emotion 1 experience. 
It 1s v gue while the other mode 1a vivid. Present t1ona1 
1mmed1aoy ~etere to the present only. 0 as 1 etttcacy is 
•v ctor t el1ng" Which h l'OOt ln th p at• memory, nd 
feeling fol' the future, as •appet1t1on•--aeaire or antic!• 
pat1on.2 
2. Wbitehe d, PR, 247. 
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rg on had pointed out th t in ot 1 experiene ther 
1a eldom pure percept1onw or "pur memory» but t t ordl• 
nary p roept1on 1 eo bin t1on ot the two. Likewise, to!" 
it h d perception ldom occur ln a pure od , but 
Virtually all con ciou perception occurs in tb !x d mod 
of " ymbol!o r t renee." n th1 mod , both pUl"e mode re-
fer to , th "p~ n ed looue and 1d ntie 1 
t rn 1 o ject 1ng 1ent in ot of' them. In le s 1te• 
he d1 n term t th two dee ot perc t1on re two w y ot 
e per1enc1ng th e obj ctJ t is co on xp rience 1 sym• 
bol1 e r terene • Th pur od re 1no p bl or error, but 
aymb 11o reterenc introduce ~or1ginat1v ~ edo , " and 
thus, bee u e 1t 1 tnt rpret t1 e, 1e the ource or both 
rror d p o e • 
In f'aot, enor 1s th ark of' the hi her or-
ganism , and 1 a th chool ter by who 
_agency ther 1a upw rd evol tion.l 
1 • 1olp5J• it h d telt th t on ot the ost 1 -
port nt dev lo m nt ot the nineteenth c ntury1 rivalling 
the d v lopment in physic , • s the developm nt ot the bio• 
lo 1o 1 eoieno • He felt th t tb y de mater! li and 
mechanism unten ble nd th t it was Bergson who had intro-
duced the e 1mpl1oat1on• ot biolo y into philo ophy, a -
tin in this way, philo ophy ot organ! m.2 The r ult 
t rg n•a work in biology ppe r mostly in Creative vo-
~ution, the book ot h1 which prob bly d the greatest 
1. tehe dt PR, 256. 2. 1tehead1 SMW, 148. 
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lntluenc on Wh1tehe d. The o t 'import t b1olo ic 1 !d a 
1n that book 1 the dootr1n or volut1on• . D rw1n1sm nd · 
oth ~ vol tiona:ry theort a:r er1t1e1z d and held to b 
in dequate beo u ot th habit ot thinking 1n term ot 
phy 1esl eeienc • rgeon t lt ~hat evolution could not 
xpl 1ned unl it w re m de fundament 1 metaphy 10 1 
principle. Reality 1 g~owing, eh ng1ng. tr , elt•cr 
tiv life. It ·easent1 1 nature S.s "real du.r tlon•" Dit-
ter nt fo or 11t hav different t mporal intensity with 
atter be1n lit . whose tempor 1 1nten ity 1 practic lly 
z ro, while the higher forms of lite bav incr~ ed 1ntenA1• 
ty. B rg on b ee hi eonclu ions upon re rk bly d tailed 
study of the dltferent form ot lite, and et forth pert!• 
nent xampl to !llu trate ditr eultie Which aPe 1nauper-
able on other grounds than hi own. 
The cr at!ve foro wbich ·r ult in evolution 1 called 
/ th 1 n vital • . ere it not for th1 torce. there could be 
no progt- s, ven 1.f thel" I'" But the elan vital 
1 present 1n all lite nd continually trtve to ore te 
nov lty ln with n 1nare 1ng amount ot 11-eedo and 1nten t-
ty ot lit • It t only the 41r ct!on ot evolution and not 
1 t outcome which 1 d term! ned. Berg on shows by ex pl 
ot r.ror 1 tal e tarts, nd blind alleya11 how 1mpro bl 
it 1 th t the outcome ot eYolutton 1 4 term1ned. He thus 
repudiate the r1 totel1an tr d1t1on ot a ttn 1 c u Which 
would hav destroyed the 1de of novelty and real ereat1v1ty 
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well a re 1 dur t1on, ~ r to po 1t f'!n 1 oau e. p-
n felt, • s to imply f'1n1Abed or t!on.l 
One ot th t important 1 ea which erg on 1ntro-
duced into philo ophy rrom b1olo • e the idea t or anic 
unity. Or ant e re not con tru.eted ot p rt , a.s cbine 
is manut et ed• but gro a by " i oo1atton nd d!vi ion~ 2 
1ther lit nor t1 e can be succe atully an lyzed into 
p rt without d troying the organic unity which ke th 
what th y are. 
1tehead does not make a much uee of biolo y s Berg• 
on, but findings or this oteno ar 1 plied 1n much ot his 
work. In gener 1, he follows Bergson 1n his consider t1on 
ot b1olog1C 1 t ct • H also tollow 1 xander nd Lloyd 
or n, who e idea were at 11 
evolution 1 s very !. pot-tant ror 
to Bergeon' s. The 1d or 
i tehe d • 'l'he Berg onian 
id a, tat d by 1teh d a the •creative dv noe ot n -
tmse, 
/ 
an rererencee to t~e elan ital with it relap e in• 
. 
to tter occur in 1tehead e early as hie Principle or 
tural Knowledse.3 
e. 
Both Bergson d or ted procee met phy• 
1c on p ychologlo 1 r ther th n physic 1 line • rgson 
tho ht that metaphysics "the o!enoe th t el tms to 
1. e~ eon. c • sa. 
2. rg on, CE, 99. 
3. 1t he d, PBK, 14, 61, 9~, 200. 
dispense with symbol •"1 etaphys1ce w t e 1sc1p11ne 
which followed 1ntu1t1on into 11tea 
1 bor1on 1 d eYen p 1nfnl, etfi rt to re ount 
the natur 1 .. lop ot tb wor or thought. 1n or-
der to place one elf directly, kind or 1n• 
tellectUAl exp n ion. w1th1n th thing tud1 t 
1n short. a p s ge trom re 1 ty to concept d 
no lon er o noepts to :re 11ty,2 
In ernorr, Berg on t t t the w d 
1 t1o, a ee:rt1n th re 11ty of both mtnd d m tter.~ 
b th tter nd nd are ref'erre to sin le r1nc1 le, 
re 1 dur t1on,. nd det ned ln term 0 th r r peot1v 
r ytbm rtempol"l 1nt.en ity. For th1 re on Ber son 
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1-
But 
soon 
ovee~ in C # t a ert the pr1 acy ot :r ce e with the r -
pud1 t1on or sub t nee prim ry. Be t u eo to 
lo opby or org 1e prooe e, 
1t h d' m t phy c • 
ich n t a re pect re embl 
Be!'g on tollowed I nt !n Aerttng the dea11ty ot 
p c , He 1 o repud1 ted th !de ot ho geneou m th • 
at1cal• t1 , ut held to r nl dur t on" the tund mental 
re 11ty. The intellect, 
po 1 sp t1 l1ze and thu 
tUition. 
und a it 1 to pr otto 1 ur-
ls1t1es r a11ty. Only by in• 
known. in th1a contention, there 1 ense 1n which rg• 
eon' et phy · cs 1 ~e ud .t1on ot the po 1b111ty of 
metaphy ice, 1.f' by th1 t I'm 1 s meant 1teh ad' det1n1t1on 
le · Bergson, I 1 24. 2. B r .on, lTM, 44. 
~. Berg on, , v11. 
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t ~P- eul tive ilo op y' a 
y -., tem Of general ide S II 
~eoher ntJ logic l, nee -
In t 1 Berg on hae mue S.n 
common 1th ·th ,pr at! t, w1th .whom he i somet1m -
soc1sted and who also h ve no !!yetem tic metaphy 1c ~ But 
he 1 t opp s1te pole with the poa1t1v1 t~ who P pud1 te 
etaphy 1es 1n favor o~ exact scS.ent!ttc knowl 
only kno able ~e lity. 
e a the 
!tehead t t d that on ot his tasks in Prooe and 
ea11 ty wa to r a cue eJ-g on, J mea and Dewe,- (all p~asma• 
t1sts ot a ort) tl'om th$ c rge or ant1-1ntelleotua11sm.l 
In reg rd to rg on, one ot the things wh1eh be has done 
ha been to cr te a ystemat!c metaphy ie that is not S.n-
cone1stent w1 th Bers son 1 s tJ-pe or thou ht. To do this 1 t 
w nee eary ror him to 41 agree w1th Bergson at only one 
pointe that the intellect neees a:r117 tal 1t1es the notion 
ot proeee , 
that th 1ntelle.ot in ot-der to Pepol't upon 
xper eno tntut tion st necessarily Intro-
duce an app P tua of concept which r laity 
t !.ntu1t1on .. 2 
Th t thie nla1t1catton 1 the u 1 oeeur~enoe, Whitehead 
dm tted1 but he felt that 1t wa po 1ble to exp!'es the 
del ver nee ot intUition in ~n 1ntell1g1bl mannet- without 
d tol'tion, • • Taylor ug est tb t it 1 the theor:v ot 
relat!.111ty th t 1ntl'oduees the concepts which 1t head 
ne ded to aceo pl!sh that wh!cb Be~gson could not do.3 
1. tehead1 PR• v11. a. Taylor, Feith or 
2 . 1t head, E P, 116. 111 M31*ln &:et, 
In FR, nitehead set forth an elaborate "cate oreal 
scheme ," in terms of which he proposed 
to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of 
general ideas in terms of which ev!ry element of 
our experience can be interpreted. 
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hi~ s ys em consists of a "Category of the Ultimate , " ei ht 
11 a · .... ories of Dxistence ," twenty-seven "Categories of Ex-
planation " and nine "Categorical Obligations."2 
'lhe "Category of the Ultimate" is "creativity." It is 
the most general notion possible, combining the ideas of 
"many" and 'one" into a complex 11ni ty. It corr sponds to 
Aris otle 's category of "primary substance," the one sub-
s ance of Spinoza , and the Absolute of the absolute idealists. 
I 
f 
also sug ests the ultimate principle that Bergson was 
/ ling efter 1n his notions of "real duration" and "elan 
vital. 11 It is the "univ rsal of universals characterizin 
ultimate matter of fact." It is the principle of novelty.3 
his ultimate is only "actual in virtue of i s accidents, " 
that is, it only has existence as it is realized in actuality. 
"God is 1 ts pri ordial, non-temporal accident. n4 
Among the Categories of xistence, actual entities and 
eternal objects stand out as basic, the others being of an 
intermediate character. Actual entities, or actual occasions, 
re th ultimate atoms of existence, of which all other 
forms of reality are compos d. In 
1. 
'· 
1 tehea<l, PR , 4. 
hi tehead, PR , 27-45. 
3. 
4. 
itehead's books 
h1tehead, PR , 31. 
1 tehead, PR , 10-11. 
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on the ph1lo ophy ot cience he r tera to vent primary 
xi t nts in sp ce•t1ce. In R ho :r :tin e th1 view, m king 
aatu 1 ent1t1 
ot on 
th 11m1t1ng typ o an vent, or n ev nt 
ctu 1 ent1t1 s :r ot 1n t ntaneous, but 
h v d~ t1on* tb xt nt d pending upon tb po nt or vi 
of the act 1 ntity but comp:r1s1ng tor each on 1t • pe-
o1ou px-esent." Th1 1 the t mpor 1 xtent l'equ1red ol' 
th .. caner cenc ' ot th ooea ion, it proce of becoming 
up to 1t final atisf ot1on" wb1cn 1e the r liz t1on of 
lt purpo or • ubject1v 1 which brought the 0 0 s1on 
into b 1ng. eo on 
t1ty p r1 be 1 becomins 
the t1 t ctlon :!s l'e ched n en-
datum tor ooncreeoence 1n nother 
ooc ion. It thu lo e it in 1v1d 1 ~1 teno but h 
obj ot1v tmmort lity in th t it y be pr hended 1n othe~ 
co tone. God 1 an otu 1 tity, but b 0 u or the 
n 11ty ot h1 specious pre ent, he 1 not ~eterred to 
a n ~aot 1 ooo aton, by which te is eant Qa condi• 
t1oned ctual entity ot th t mporal wo~ld.nl 
tern 1 objects, which oo~r epond roughlT to th Pl • 
tonic Id as, ha e u.bsistene 1n the pnmol'd1 1 nat\11' ot 
God. "The 'primordial n ture' ot God. 1e tbe concr cence ot 
an unity o~ cone ptual teelin , inolud1n · their data 
all eternal object te~n 1 objects are called "Pur• 
Potent1 1 01- the peo1t1c Determination or ot."'3 the 
pr1nc1pl or rel t1vity4 every b ina actual or non• ctual 1 
iteh ad, PR, 135. 
1tehead, PR, 134. 
ttehead, PR, 32 . 
1tehead, PR, 33. 
potential or eve:t>y becoming. Thus all eternal object 
ar prehended by every aetu 1 ocoa ion. . o t ot the are 
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ellm!neted from 1gn! icancc ln t oonoresoenoe by negat1~e 
prehensions. , , election of etern 1 objects 1s dm1t~ed to 
the 1 niftcano and o is a d to be felt o~ have "in-
gression"' in the ubject .1 Th s el ction o! eter al ob ... 
J ct give 
character. 
n ctua.l. ocoa 1on 1 ts dot'1n1 tenees o:r- speo1t1c 
11 ternal objaot are ideal'ly re l!.zed 1n the 
pr1mord1 1 n tur o God-
Thi !deal realit tion o potentialities 1n a pr1-
mord1al aotu 1 ent ty oon titutes the met phy 1o 1 
tab111ty wh reby the actual prooe s exemplifies 
g neral principles or m taphys!o .a 
Th et ~ 1 objects are a neoaaeary part o~ Whitehead' S¥8-
tem, yet Be~g on w expl1e1t in xclud1ng the concept of 
Fo:rm s conoei,ed by Pl to and 1 totle. But rsson 
thou t ot th m s et rnal copia or rep~ sent tion ot 
thing 1n th phenomenal world, and rightly rea oned that 
tb1 . xelud d novelty. But teh ad aa~~d no~elty for his 
sy tem by thinking o~ th et rnal object only ao "Forms ot 
Det1n1tene , " giving dete~nation to otual ent1t1e , The 
tern 1 objects in th$m elves do not correspond to any 
actu lly existing nt1ties, but r p~esent such nt1t1es s 
bare sen , logical or mathematical rorms, and tbe 11ke. 
in eternal obj ct 1 detin d as " ny entity ho e cone .ptual 
!' cognition does not involve a nee ary ret ~enoe to any 
1• itehe d, PR, 66. 
2 . it h d 1 PR, 6 • 
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e in! t c otu nt iti • EtePnal objects a1~ 1ng~ed1 nt 
in all act\\al nt1t1 • but other c..ctus.l nt1t1e !'e also 
1nvol v d in the concr cence. •· ile 'there are no novel 
tern 1 obj ot • nov lty i s pre nt !n ctua.l occasion 
c u or th "no l togethern 
oth r actual ooo s1ons in a proo 
ternal objects and 
or aoncresc no • Th 
on e uent actu 1 entity 1 novel because in the cono:r 
c no "th many eaom one. in ore a d 'by on • 3 
.All c gor1 ot xJ.stent xcept tem 1 objects a:r d ta 
which tt 1 0 be com I in the becoming ot aotu 1 entitle • 
the concept or etal'nliil objects ide lly :realized in the p:r1-
mord1al nature ot God. 1tehead av pe~aneno tor hie 
sy tem, Bers on' philo ophy does not do ju tice to th 
concept or p rmaneno • 
. ny tor ctual nt1tie in the unity of their re-
1 tednese du to their pl"Bh n tons ot one nother is called 
n xu • y two · ct 1 ent1t1e can comp~ise nexus, or 
the ent1r un:tver e may be consid r d a nexu • N xlia r 
ot v 1oua kind • The htghe t type ot n xua 1s person de• 
tined as set ot ctu 1 entitle in or an1o rel t1onSh1p 
with serial order. It th y are in org n1c relationship but 
without aerial o~er, th nexu 1 lled soc1~ty. nd 
the order is termed aoo1al ord.ea-. It the Pel t1onsh1p 1 
PR, '70-. 
~. 33. 
p • 32. 
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on o:r ner toget ern s • the et 1a ·t rmed a. mul t1.pli e ty. 
n ver \!t o a ct· .1 ent1 t1 .., 1 syntbe£l1 zed in or1e p.re• 
ens1on o t or t ~ b okg~ound of t r aetual ent1t1ee1 the 
re u t ng n e 
y bstPaCt ~0 the CO C~ eenae1 a t · 1 vnt1t1e 
y be malyze into ternal o j ct nd other otu 1 ntl• 
t1 a d ta- or an·lyzed lnto prehensions. o itive pre-
hen ion at-e known o.s eel!ng 1 tle neg t1ve pl-ehen ion 
l1m1nate 'fro feel ng.~ The modes or feeling 1n actual 
entity are known a the ~ ubj ctive torm." P~ehens1on ~e 
of' two k!n , ent 1 or conceptu 1, and phy 1e 1. ent 1 
p~eh nelons con titute th mental pole ot an etu 1 entity• 
which is con titute by the p~eh n ions of tern 1 obj ctsJ 
the physical prehen ions con tltute the physic 1 pol , wh1Qb 
1 con tituted by the prehen~1on of oth r actual nt1t1 a . 
~en the ntal ole c. 1n 1gn1t1cant, the a.ctu 1 ent ty 1a 
a part or th t whloh 1 ordin r y c -led matter. ctual 
nt1t1ee 1n w lob th ment 1 pr hension a~ signtrtcant in 
th :r1n 1 n t t ct1on" 11re culled 11v1n , while those 1n 
which the m t 1 prehen tone r tb h ghe t o~er ~e 
c lled conaoiou • 
The remaining co.tegory of .x: tenc 1 that or Pltopo-
1t1on • or Theori , which r datum fo~ •1mpure• prah n~ 
1ona# p e co eept l pre n ion ~1ng prehension ot 
n t :rnal object • 1mpur p:reh nston 1 the tnte t:ton 
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of pur conceptu 1 pr hension ~it hys c 1 p hen ton 
o~igtn tin in the phy 1c 1 pole !n other words, FTopo-
a tion f. by rid of n terna l o ject and n otu l entity, 
but w1 thout the at1sf' ct1on nd ubjecti f'ot-m" to make 
!t n ct 1 ooc ion 1n it lt. l 
The c te or1e of Explsn tion" d fine nd deaorib the 
prop ~t1 s o the "Oategorie or xiatenoe. ~ Th c tegor 1 
Obl1 ntion et forth the law which oper te .among x!at!ng 
lement when they contribute to ordered n tw- • 
One or 1tehe d 1 t 1 portant eta hy teal principle 
he c 1 th "ontolo to 1 pr no1 1 • 
o n b conceived except s 1t extat 
Th1A 1 that nothing 
n otu 1 entity, 
n xu or ot 1 nt1t1e , or n batr ctton from them. en 
thus traoted it must be recognize d tre t d s such . 
Vio a.t1on o this t>l'inoiple con t1tute the rtf' 11 oy or m1 • 
pl o concretene • and re ulta in the e~oneou notion of 
av cuous aotu 11ty, or ctualtty that ha no re 1 x1 tence 
in t world , 2 
The et hyetc or 1tehe d c nnot be conveniently 
plae n ny or the tradition 1 aohools 0 or philo ophy. 
H ~t :rted wit clo arr111 t1on to the neo• re 11 ta , 
but went o f r beyond th m that h s y tem u t e recog• 
a form1n new c te ory. the nhiloso hy or or n1 m. 
To th1. rou 1 o belo the ph lo o hy or Ber on . 
1 . itehe d, R, 280 . 
2 . 1tehead, PR, v111 1 27. 
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tehe d'• t 1nology is o nov 1 t t th6 re 1 no be• 
t en h a tho ht and r on 1 a · 1 not d! t ly a p r nt. 
t th r co n!ze the r oy or prooeo over ub t nc J 
both r cogniz the ele nt o~ reol ng neoe enry to come to 
an under t nd1n or e wot'ldJ tb ~~oo n ze the or n1c 
rel t dn or th un1v r eJ bot reoogn z the pr sene ot 
re 1 novelty) nd bo recogn z th t th proo a a or ... 
t ve to !" th enee o 1 her ore n! 8 
o e m nt inc't'e in ly s to n • 
3. I 
• 
p1 temolo y or er on !Uld 1t he d a lready 
touo ed upon 1n d1 cu ion or t e1r r p ot v v1ewa 
0 p ycholo y, d t nt will b t J'. 
tt will utrtce now to 8 y t both :r on 1 ehead 
n te t t r re 1 1 dg 1 th ubject Ot' kno r must 
b pr n 1 th o .1ect . Tb y th rt p1st mo-
loP-teal mon1 m, ~net rej ct renre ent t1ve or a 0 on-
t t1.c 0 ~ 0 n re pt • e rr orlties o n r11y 
en 1n ept te olog CAl re clue to w t h d 
c 11 t " 11 cy f' loo t. n," v e to. B ~g on 
1 eon . d r c 011 • coo 1 to e o n1o 1· 
lo cp y or reln vi y, t . e lementa 
o t e n v r e i terpe e r t nd Ft all r 11!! ed rn 1• 
Y• 0 ng t 
r r th r t be dir a t C'n t n n t e 
epat1 lly p P t d fro on not er. I 
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itehe d, oth 
mod ot p rceptlon, p~e ent n 1 1 1 oy nd e u 1 
tie cy, 1v dlr ot knowled e, n con• 
qu ntly th po 1b111ty o rror co i to 1 tho ht 
in t ixed ode ot ymbol o r r r no • Lik w1 , in rg• 
eon pure perc pti n 1 d1rec knowl d e n o c nnot rr. 
It 1 only wh n it 1 1v n n1 by elem nt dded ftoo· 
memory t rror ari • 
'• Philosophy o 
r on' book on The Two ~olU'oee ot 
11g1on did not P e r until 1 :54. y thi ti 11 0 it -
he d'o import nt orka ex pt or 'fho~ht :1 d ppe l' d. 
nd a lar p rt or th1 book h d ppe red e :r11 r. In th 
work or Ber on th t m ht ve in uenoed 1te d, the 
theory of v lue 18 rdly d1 cue d. 0 th1 re on there 
1J prob ry little d1r ot in lu nee on it e d' 
theory of v lue tr r on. 0 
B r on' re rk on the t eory or 
v lue cona1 t or t w p ge on ae thet1o 
nd h book ughter. In CE, h do 
v lu theory explicitly, but th th or1 
re 1 pl1o1t. 
nd ethiee in 
not dl eu 
xpound d 1n T R 
In T e thet1e nd ethic rietly d! cu d a 
p rt ot t e t'ect1 p yoholo y e 1 eu e in 11lu -
tr tin the th 1e t t pp rent v r1 t1on in th 1nten ity 
7 
of p ·yc io te i otu 1ly cce ion of ditt r nt 
p yc 1c at • The bj ct of rt, e:rg on 
' 1 i i1 r 
to that of th :roo se u e to induce hypno 1 ; t t i • 
t :ri g t individu to ch t t of r pon 1v n 
th t t de 1r d t el n myb ested. n th1 oc-
cur in rE:spon 1v 1n 1vldu 1, symp thy with tu:re 
r1 • Th rti t thu uoc de in s e t1 , or nduoing, 
n intuition out th t oh e o nnot XP'r s to the in-
t 11 ct. 'Fh ymp thy 1 f lin of be uty bee it h a 
th rlchn 0 th ti'U 1 1n n tu:re, in te d of e t tic 
ur of c1enee.1 
due 
t, wh.eth r p 1nt1n or culpture, 
poetry or mu 1c, h n other object th n to 
th ut111t r1 n ymbols, the con• 
d soot 11y ooept d gen r 11t1 1 in ort, ver thing th t v 11 al1ty fro 
us, in order to bring u t ce to t oe with 
real,ty it r.2 
The e i true ot the mor 1 te ling • They r in• 
by n e p r1 nee ot hum n ymp thy, toll by 
n t kin h p 
p r1 no .~ 
th other nd d lr to h re th 1r x-
In oppo 1ng 1ntu t1on to int 11 et, r on ape k o~ 
1ntu1 1"n tnt 11 etu 1 
on eon 1 t 1n n intuitive 
proo 
r 
ot n tur • o lo 
r.~ d d, 1 eki 
on, T · , 11•1 '7 • 
on, U, 157. 
pathy."4 Thu , v lue or r -
perlence of p rt ki in th 
on 1 ut ide ot nature 
in u 11t ti e r1ehn e 1 
3. Berg on, T , 18-19. 
• r on, iT 1 so. 
th d te:r in 
from oU!' 
oom o. 
2 dom. 
11 t 
te d 
rr dom nd t 
with r on i to t v lu or 
1 • In c 
· 1teh d 
v lue or n 1n 
y ' 
ot natu:r ~ per 
aynthe 1 of ex1 
1 otly t 
e writ hi 
into d a:rt1o p tion in 
e k y to t e 
t euch 
tte p ng .3 
t phy.1oa, h till • 
11 v tha t v lue w e h k y t c x1st nc • In hi t -
physic 1 Wl'1t1 1t 18 h !ftc noe t d te n th 
1. on, L u, 87-aa. 
2. Ber on, L u, 7 • 
3. it h d, 0 , • 
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1nt n 1ty or t ct 1 ty. •v t 1 t e ord I tor 
t ntt-1 1 re n t."l 1nd1v du 1 
1 eont1n o e pr e "' 0 Cl' t on e oh 
ae 1 t ty r lt in • t et1 or 1 n 
-
t tic v er bo for !.t e d c 1de1' a 
tro e de ot b uty. 0 1 of" life t or te e d 
ut f"ul, 
1,. 1t m 
o me t d ep• r eh, v ntur om 
bo t t x er1 no r armony. the eli 1 -
t cn!ou w 1v tt n ion to very 
v r! t7 o 
on, 1n 
depth ot 
r e 1• 
lao ex-
qu site .a 
1 0 ree w· th rg on 1n 1 1ew or di -
v u t. t oh 
1ng t t1 or r g!d . 
1t. er 
velue. 
of 
11--
tehe d nor 
urteP1ng ta reco n!z 
ture ot lite, but not 
• • 
ly, d lin 1 d 1ned by be-
• • •• 
' 1 y, 
• ry.S 
r on ent1on 1 
by !t 
the 
1 
• 
f1 d v 1 • 
a p rt of' the 
evil no:r a 
:ri ty nd the tex-
prob1e • th h 
n a betic view or v lue. 
itebe d does not onoe ention B :r on 1n connection 
. 
95. 
83 . 
202 . 
• 
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th 1 e • 'Yet he v ll . o:r1 0 th tw n r • 1n 
r npeot 
• 
1 r. 1 y e t 0 ~ :np y e~u 
th n loo _d t re in 1 n t th r 
nd, the d y h v n innu6 01!) in 1tJ 1 t'-1 ory 
t'I·o l' ding B r on , u t 11 av be n 
or in it 1 • co n . t r 0 
oth r itt n, e ti t e i of m 
id • Pro bly th l !' 1 or :rgson1 n i n• 
on ~it d t t po nt . b t . ry l' bly hie 
.. 
Yie d1 :r 0 1 re n 01"0 nt r 1~ e 0 r -
on th whleh ymp thy. 
5 . Ph11 ion 
B rg on did not d1 ou r 11 ion, e eept f, r 
1n de t de 0 in t e lc"'op. c . ,.r '"it 
n 0 boo until T 
' VI t ch c e out t oo lat 
luenoe t d . If t er n n 1nf'lue .c 
on on it ad' phi l o p r r l!e; on, 1t mu 
by i 1 e tion, fo:r root or the in 
th rl!er book • r t r 11 , on 
Th1 1 u 1 b .ed in 
R 1 gion 1n the 
m nt in t v r 
1. 1tehe d., RIM, o. 
God, 
te 
1n e 
ad thr .. orm 
t 1r 0 ieh 1 
ent ty her by t 
t1v1ty 1 tran~t 
om . Th non- tempore 
t n call Ood••th pr o e 
r e11g1on.l 
rt tn 
('In, in 
to in-
by r -
v com 
ere 1n 
do • 
n 
v 
8 
er on rej cte t od r 1 totl nd t t r 
-
c rt p noz , L~ br.iz ec RO e .t t t 0. R 
od de :re 1 fro dom ~poEi bl .1 
on l o:rt t o t'ent1 1 n <' e 
orld 1. o1•c t th · ereat v \11' /' e 1 n VCt 
• 
-
t 1, tunn1n t"' 0 11 1 0 
ueu lly b ed n od, lt ugh omo mod 0 or v 
-
t1onary nutur 1 o not nd 0 •or or t1on. 
ite e d doe not unt o e .v1ty it 
' 
t p 1nt 
out th t ty e nnot om d t na. e without Go 
~h~ creativity with 1nf1n1t 
t:re or for s w1 th 1nf1n1 te poa 1-
bil1t1 ; but t t 1 o nt1 v t~ _nd th se forma 
:r together impotent to ch1eye actuality apart 
fro. t e complet lde 1 harmon~; w o 1 d.2 
B r son do not ay t at tnt t c t vo ro 1 
1v1 1 but t ybet h tho ht or it 1n th 
• 
cau or t tn lu noe of Plot1 us ch r lly eo e b• 
v1ou in R. 
F nally, in th p 1lo op y o on, "re 1 dur t on 
1 thin p r1tu 1 or 1 regn t d t ep r t n 
ltho a quotation 1nte ok; t d 18 
und n hl 1n 1 t e op o t o m tter; 
it goes in th op o te d :rect on. 
no org n1e :rel tion ith t e 
, 3 3, 387. 
RI , 11 -120 • 
• 37. 
, 
yor 
ory or nd 
tt r. e dy 
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1 mel'ely tt instrument or action. en the body, 1n• 
olu 1ng the br in and nervou y te , 1a injured, then the 
po · 1b111ty or the mind being expre ed in natul' 1 dimtn"" 
1 hed, but there 1s no vid nee th t the mind it elr 1 1m• 
paired, Indeed, thel'e is evidence to the contrary. On uch 
view thel'e 1 no objection to view of 1 ort lity. Fur• 
thel'l1lore, · Bettg on cone ived of n "infinite numb r of d re 
between matter and tully devel.oped sp1l'1t. •1 Each high r 
de re corresponds to o growing intensity or lire,. • " 
higher ten ion o~ duration." In this w y Berg on sert a 
th ory ot the p1r1tu 1 lite wh1eh only want a doctrine or 
God to complete 1ti such as be fin llywol'k d out in ~SR. 
1tehead' philosophy ot rell ion, in eontr t to 
rgson.' , w s well worked out nd it i quit 1mprob ble 
th t h owed any ot hi vi w 1n th1 dep l'tment to rg on. 
Whitehead worked out a doctrin or religion in R , . nd 
metaphy 1c 1 ccount ot God 1n R , Iii , and PR. In b1a 
metaphysic 1 account, God 1 thought or a potential, the 
•pr1mord1 1" n ture or God, s imm nent 1 the " up l'jeet1 • 
n ture o~ God, nd tr neoend nt 1n the a n e ot be1 
ttcompleted ideal h l'MOny,., the cons quen·tu natur of God . 2 
In addition to the topics lH dy d1scu e d., 1teh d 
expressed h1mselt with 11 the wisdom ot hie exc ed1ng1y 
rich nd decisive intellect on th philo ophy of eduo t1on, 
1. Ber son, MM, 296. 
2. Whitehead, PR, 134-135. 
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the philosophy o~ history, nd oo1al nd po11~1c 1 c1 noe. 
But since Bergson did not express himaelt on the e atter , 
their oon 1derat1on lies beyond the scope ot ·th1 d1 serta-
t1on . 
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CH PT III 
T ROOT OF D' PHILO HY 
1. Form tion 
lthough itehe d h 1v n y 1ntere t1ng 11 p es 
into the seen ot hi e rly 11te, they give little 11 t on 
the ubject or th1 d1 ert t1on, and ao will be t~e ted 
br1 ny. 
ltred o~th tehead w born in Kent, Engl d 1 in 
1861. His family h d been concern d pr1 ar1ly with eduo -
t1on nd hi father nd gr ndtather w r choolm ter • B1 
t the~, how ver, g up hi ohool to become a ele~ n1n 
1866 o~ 18 7. The cult~ed atmo phe~e ot h1a home lite p-
p ~ to hav b en jor influence tow rd turnin hi to 
c demio work, while the b~e dth ot it ol a 1o 1 oultu~e 
resulted in wide 1 ami on his own part. 
itehe d' torm 1 education was prim rily the cl sat-
cal duo tion provid d by the Engli h echoo.ls ot the m14• 
nineteenth century.l In 1875, Whitehead w e sent to ohoo1 
at h ~borne in Dorsetehire. The school d the ur~ounding 
country had ~ot deep in the noient pa t, and this t ot, 
coupl d with the clas ic 1 education, g ve itehe d n 
bid in intere t in hiato~y. These t ctora ppeared, in 
r troepeot at le at, to have been a import nt the 
1. Th1 b1o ra hie 1 
" utob1ograph o 1 
ter 1 t'1-o 1 tehe d' 
otea," in P, 3•14. 
9'7 
cad 1c w rk in w ich he e ge • This work a cl 1c 1 
in the extreme. lthough typic 1 o~ the due tion 1 pol c1e 
o~ th time. 
On th intellectu 1 id • my educ tion 1 o con-
~orme t the norm 1 stand rd ot th tim • L tin 
b n at the a o~ ten year • d Greek t 
tw lv • Holid y xcept , y recollection is 
th t d ily, up to th ag ot. ninete n d a h lt 
7 r • some pag ot L tin d Gree utho~ w re 
construed, d their r r examined. to~ o• 
1ng to school pa e ot r 1 ot L tin gr r could 
be repe ted, all in L tin, and exempliti d by quo-
t tion • The cl sale 1 tudl wer inter pera d 
with them tics . 0~ cours 1 ·uch tud1es included 
bistory••n ely, Herodotu 1 enophon, Thucydlde 1 
. allust, L1vy, nd T citua . I can at111 teel the 
dullness ot nophon, llust, and Livy. • • • 7 
r collection 1 that the ol sica wer well t ught, 
with n unconscious oomp r1 n ot the older o1v111• 
zat1on with dern 1 re . • • • e re d the Bible 1n 
Greek, nam ly, with the c pt lnt ~or the Old Te ta-
ent. • •• Th r however spare t e ~or pr1• 
v t re ding. Poetry, ore e peel 1 y ordsworth 
nd helley, bee e jor inter t, nd al o history. 
In 1880 it head went to Trinity Colleg 1 C bridge, 
nd tud nt nd te c er, remained there in unbroken re 1• 
dence until 1910• Hi lit in C brid e me nt re t d al 
one can tell by the nner in which h writ s ot 
I c nnot xag r te my obligation to the Univer tty 
ot Cambridg , nd in p rtioul r to Trinity Colleg 1 
t r ooi 1 and 1ntellectu 1 tr 1n1 • 
1tehe d admit th t the ch ngea in education 1 poll• 
cie oocurrin inc his day in school h ve been all to the 
ood nd that the yatem w out oded v n in hi d 7 . 11 
the s me, th y tem seemed to be ideal tor itehe d' own 
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ent 1 developm nt, and app rent y there wer le ent ' in 
th 
h1 • 
trainin that brought out th t est that mnn h d 1n 
Th fo 1 t t 0 mbrid e w a comp tently 
done, by tntere tin men o~ f1rst•rate b111ty. 
But co~s ed to each under r duate 1 t 
cover n rrow r nge • or x mpl ,. durin y 
hole unde.Pgradu t period t Trinity, all my 
lectur er on th m tie 1 ure p lied. 
I n v r went in ide anothett leotur room. Bnt 
th lecture w r only one ide th eduoation, 
The missing portions were suppli d by inees ant 
con vel' tion, w1 t o\1!' · 1 nd 1 under r due. te , 
or b r of the ta.tt. 
Th "1ne e nt eonver tion" w th men or exc 11 nt nd 
m tur mind , a with 'Willi t tudents like hi 
mo t import nt f ctor 1n it he d' e rly 1 te. 
In 1685 tehe :r ce1v d tell wship t rinity nd 
with it te ch1ng po 1t1on. 1t fin 1 po t t 0 bridge 
wa th t of ~ en1or L eturer which he r in 1910 when 
h o ed to London. He w 1 ct d to the Roy 1 oo ety in 
1 s 8 lt or the public tton ot hi tise on 
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o 1 11 until 1 241 ite d h 1d r1ou academic 
p 1tion 1n the Univer 1ty o London, whe:r his due t1on 1 
view d veloped oons1d rably. 
Thi xp rience or the p~blem of London, ex-
t nding or .t'ourte n year , tran tormed my v1.ewa 
to the problem ot high r due tion in a mcdern 
1ndu tr1 1 ' o1v1lizat1on. It w a then th taeh1on--
not yet exttnct••to take n rrow vie o the runo-
t1on ot Univer 1tie • There w r th Oxtord nd 
C br1 g type, nd th Germ n type. ny othett 
typ w e viewed with i norant cont mpt. Th seotb• 
in s ot ~t1aan a e lng 1ntel1 otual enl1 ten-
m nt, ot yo p opl from eve:r7 octal gr de 
erav ng tor deq te kno ledg , th Y riety or prob• 
lema thus introduc ••a11 th1 wa a new t otor !n 
oi 111zat1on. 
!ow rd tb 1 tt r p :rt ot the war, in London, 1te• 
he d' work on th philosophy of physic b g n to appear, 
In whiCh he exp nded hi views into wider philosophic 1 
cont xt. In 192 1 at the e ot 1 y-thl'ee1 b wa 1n• 
v1ted to j in the t culty ot Barv rd in the Dep :rt ent or 
1lo phy. It w s whtl t H rv :rd th t his or n1c phi• 
lo ophy became tully m tur d, he will , lways be remem• 
b red as one ot the mo t brilli nt or long lin or d1s-
tingu1 hed Ba:rv rd philosopher • B becam Profe or er1-
t in 1937. e led D c mb r 30, 1947, th r ault or 
shock. 
2. Th Genesis ot ttehead' 
ttebead' creat1 o r er y b d1v1 ed into thr e 
period , corre ponding to hi field o conoentr tion, nd 
corr epond1 
nected• 
al to the 1n titution to 1ch e w con-
le at Cambridge, he w s not d fott hi work 1n 
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t em tics; 1n London, hi work w in ci no • prim rily 
he philo ophy or phy to J t H rv rd, hi p y to , 
th crown or hie c r er, w co plet • The e thr p rio 
r not to b tho ht of s 1 !not, bu v r-widening 
circl 0 the cop of is min , the 1 t r peri d 1nolud-
1 th 0 zt, d xi ting d v loped in the for er, In 
addition, ther was a human! tic 1nt re t which w s evident 
in hi yo th, nd which e~eat 
c r r. Th1 1 wh t 
en 1t h a v nty-.t o, 
th t entieth century. 
itehe d' b n1 1 
ust not b ov rlook d, It b g 
d th tho t or hi ntire 
one of the wisest book or 
t ndency in hie tho ht which 
1n his ho e 1 r a the 
son or ohool t r turn d cl ztgym n, nd oont nued a a 
1t of h1 ola to 1 uc tion. be n noted, wh11 
1n chool 1n • "po try bee e m jor int re t." 
Th poet t t lnt r ste him mo t were the ngl sh Rom ntio 
poet ' nd bot a tudy or h ritin nd the t timony or 
it he d' ~lendA r veal th t th s inter t never 1 ft him. 
Furthermore, he not only njoye th m, ut wa intluenc d by 
their ide • Victor Low 1 who 1m w it he d w 11, ., , 
• om ot tho e who know itehe d wond r 1t lllta ord • 
orth did not tnrluenc him mor than ny otb r m n. 1 
it e d ote t t with the o ntlc poet and oth r 
Lo f rt.(l 1) 1 
t. 194 ), 272. 
n ('>ohtlpp, , 118, (or. 1 0 Lo e, 
rtiet or like mind. ~the !mple 1 di te r ct ~ th 
to 1c or 1ntere t, · n thes r pp r 1n t thou ht or 
c1e c th '1rr duc!bl tubborn r cta•."l 1t1n on 
o~dsworth, itehead 
in 
ord worth in h 
c!oue reaction 
it hea ' hu 
history. It will 
y = 
1 
not b 
1 0 tteve le 
nece ary to d, 
con-
the 
ci nt1• 
ln h int tte 
t rm1ne wh t 
t 
1 
writer form d the b is or hi hi torte 1 owle • Let 
it u ie to y t t it w compl t ly ad I 
w ely re d r7 roiod of hi tory. hi wr1t1n bear 
bund nt t t1 ony. H w peel lly f mill r ith th 
no! nt Gr k nd tin hi tori n • B had n oxcellent 
r p 0 the fact of hi tory, and hie work r v 1 an e rne 
nd not un ucc ful tte pt to co pr hand the e nin of 
th e r ct • ott iteh ad• th 1ne1 ht th roc a 
tb r 11. ty, 1 d tum of hi tory 
id .. 1nt re t in hi tory 
hum n! m wa dev lop d by his 11 lon 
t1on nd by hi !nt re t in r 11 1on. 
n 
et>th h n r u rt!cle d ddx-e 
1. 
ell s phy ic • 
poetry, 1teh d' 
oneern w1 h eduo -
e import ne nd 
on he ub ect 
1• 
t 
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r edue t1on re 1 that he w a bl 8 t 1 ker in th a 
f1 ld tic nd philo ophy. In 11 hl w rk in 
th ield, he rote tP. in t n r 1d 8 nd a rely in• 
for tiv chin ,1 iteh d cites no aut or1t1e on edu-
c tlon, uch. He 0 y t t h • " re tly indebted 
to John ew y, lo 1th rg on nd 11 i J m , ut 
thi 1 1 o t cert nly to Dw y aa philosopher 
rsth r t n a.a n flCluc tor.2 1t d' due tion 1 v1 • 
wer develop d al t w olly fro ob rv tion and critic 1 
reflection u~on i t t oh r. 
1 h u it he d' philosophy r r 1 on 1 n i -
por nt part or h1 hyaic , 1 inter n :r 1 ion wa 
uch mor t n pee 1 t v • 11 hi philo oph1e 1 w rk how 
d ep a n 
t e phr 
or the 1 port nee 0 r ct c 1 r 11 on. 
th p 110 tion ft w s dd d to he t tl or hi 
1te a d not n 
c on "' r h rell ou phil ophy, H1 wr tin 
ap 11-
how n 
xc 1 ent equ p ent ~o~ tudent o re on, He w 11-
i r ith th C ri t! c 1pture --t Old n Te tament 
n h poery h • H mil ar 1th t e his ory o the 
Chri t:t n c well he r hie-tory or the 
v ri u riod • In dd t n, h ill w th the 1 -
e dlea to tory nd lit r t 0 th r re t rel1 ion • 
y, he al o studied the works or th reat philo opher of 
r 1 gion, but th1 ill b t ken up h r the in luenee 
1. 1tehe d, E, v. it h d, PR, v 1• 
upon hi philo op 1o 1 1 ea re con d. 
One ot er tor in d' hum n1 m mu not b 
verloo d. T 
'· 
th re, h -r rmer 
elyn 1 lou by 1 o. 
The 
has 
• • 
It now re 1ne t n e e the k nd m n t t 1n-
fiu no t1 , e tho ht :r 1t ad or or th t 
p r1 e m nt1 ned bov • 
1t he ' 1nv r.t ton in the tie 1 Lo to h1oh 
fol"med tb b 1 r r ' · a e fro t re 
ouro . or m r1ly, ooord n to 1 own e 
0 t t nt wer Gr e 
1ntlu nee we 
ole' 
1y H • 
1 1 
t e 
wo ok • the 
ten 1on) o 1844, nd the u deb-
r11er. Th other two 
11ton' 
e e 1 t tw were • 1 t u 1-
y , wh le u quent work 
on at e t 1 o 1 Lo c 1 d r1 ed. h. ee • e 
e pee 1 y nt r te n the , d v 1 p ent3 in m the-
m t o 1n t t eld or eo t y, w er t e non• etr1o 1 
th t1o 1 -view w r t fr 1t 1. wit t d1 eov ry 
1. 1tehe , E P, 6- • 1tehe d, . P, 10. 
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r the rel t v1ty ot eometr al ey te n t nvention 
of many no ~ elide n eometr • mon 1nf1.u-
enced eld wer Lobate 1t y, S ee~ ert, 
Gau , _ lya1, 1ern nn, n 1 tr mi. itehe d m de h1 
own d1et1nct ve contrtbut! u to eometry in the elabora• 
t on ~ on• etr e 1 ject1v He ubl sh d 
The or Pro3eet1ve 1906,1 nd he ~ourth 
volum o~ -P~r•t•n•e•l•p•!•a_._._.._._._ hich never ppe red, w 
to h v be n rttte by 
jecttv G ometry. 
te d lone, d 1 with Pro-
In 1 03 Sertr nd Russel publ1 ed his Pr1nc1ole or 
nd 1te ead decided to wor 
fn y beea ~e t e r intere t~ 1 
clo~e y h t e eh pl nned on 
th mat e co nc1d d so 
d volume whtch w re 
on 11 p:ra.ct o 1 y 1d nt o~l top1o • e reeu t w t r e 
co :r e 
or ht or n1n ye r • ile 1t Ay e sume f\t t er 
der le tu 1 1nf ·enee b t e n th two ph1los-
0 !' J t ob le t a d d n<:> t e:'ftend f e bey nd th 
r ~ld or ~n hem~t ic • !n other the r v e a e:re too 
dtv r .e t, 
U 1ver ty t the be inning 
• Like the r t of the 
111ance, r r t a y pupil 
eolle gue nd friend. He w e :re t 
dur n our Cambridge p • 
1. 0 mbr1d~e Tract 1n themattoe, o. 4 1 0 br1 ge 
Un1ver tty Pree , 1906. 
ut our tund ent 1 point or vi •--philo op ic 
In 1910 
1 1o •• er d, n ·o t f ~ent 
our oollab r tion o e to n tural end.l 
iteh d ved to L ndon. om 1 11 to 1 1 
he ta ht t Univ r ity Coll 
1924 at th r p ri 1 Co leg o 
, Lond n, and f'ro 1 14 to 
oi no and ecbno1o y.2 
5 
Hi work in th p o ophy or e nc d t tro thi period, 
lthough or eouree the influence upon h1 tho ht wer 
any or th m t o dent to ht t y in London. On th-
tio 1 Co cept or th at r 1 orld, eh, Low r -
port , w cone!d r by ehe d one or i be t p p r , 
cont 1ne hi 1:r t cr1t1e1 0 tifio m ter 11 m. 
Th 1ntlu nee or :rtrand Rue ell 1 ry rominent in thi 
me oir. Hi diaou ion 1 lo 10 1 r t r han e 1 t o-
lo io 1, nd 11 h w with Ru 11 n 
r t ny point , lw y re d th t Ru ell' w :rk in 
lo ic w nd e t 1." t had t n i tht emoir to 
L ib 1zian n1 d w 1nflueno by Leibntz' theory 
of th rel t1 ty or p 0 • nd y t wo of hy ei t , 
such a a rted that t 
otion.6 1 info 1 n ut Leibn1z 
ell nd Coutur ~- The moir 1 
mark by c utur t an 1lton on e P 
/ 
and tudy of th work o Poinc r , 
• 
tter 1 
u ented by 
ow orr -
lo r nt, 
well 1 7' e 
, 0 , :tn 
, t .( 1 
, 
e), 1 7. 
G 
group of' other mathematic! A nd phy 1e1at o many n t1on-
11t1es.1 
n 1911, 
publ 8 d. In th a book he pre ent dmir bly the ene~ 1 
1d underlying math m tlo 1 concept and leo hew a 
thorough under t nd1n ot the ht tor1o 1 devel pment of the 
ubjeot. 
1tehead 1s o t 1~o~tant or s ~om hi n"tur 1 ot-
~c p r!od a~e _P.r._~.-~--~---.--~._n.ow_.l_e_d~g~e nd Concept 
of ature. In t books the great t 1ngle !ntluenc w s 
the theory ot ttel t1v ty• H 1 de ply apptteo1 t1 ve or the 
work or Einstein• al t o h b 1 not n complete agre ment 
w1 th ell f' hi conolu 1on nd o.t ere , :revt ·a d theory. 
'In my jud ent," e 1d. Wh1 tehe d 1 "he ha ~a ped th devel• 
opment f h1 br1111 nt m thod n th n rrow ound of 
very oubtful ph1losophy.t2 Tn th retaee to P , he c1te 
two work wb1c e ound very hel fu1, espec1 lly ottet-• 
1ng d1 ergent nterpttetation of the theory. They t"e, 
Theory of Rel t1v1tz, by D:r . L. Silber te!n, ~ d memoir by 
E . B. 11 on G. • is in t Proeeedi!!S or the 
1912, . p oe-
Time n old ot 3 Hi· de 1n1t1on or aongruenoe 
w 1n.f'luenced by th s m mo r.4 
1. 1te e d, Art.(l 06), 3. 1tehead, Pl: , 11. 
468~ 4'?6n. 4. 1t eatl , I .41 . 
2. tehe d, c , vi • 
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1 n n by 
n pon 
• 
• 
0 .,. 
'; t 
• 
1 • 
0 t 
-
t 
~ 
t c 
c 0 
A n n 
' 
• • 1 ! cb lp ,. • 
• • 
ga 
Cb pte~ It ot C ,1 In dventu~e it d ~ere~e 
to the impo~t nc of t , e Poynt1n Flux of En r 7, nd th 
t ot th t he ~ t he rd or 1t in 1 cture by ir J. J. 
Tho on, bout 1886.2 Victor Low point out th t th "two 
re t n 11 h l>hY 1o1 t " m nt1on in the 'Pr tatory x-
pl n tion " o itehe d 1 Principle or RelatiY1ty re th e 
two en, Poyntin nd Sir J. J. Tho eon.s 
th ide which th bove n nd other contr1-
but d to the th1nk1n or it head, Lowe note sev r 1 
beln e p c 11y 1mpol"t nt • Th 0 t port nt m them tic 1 
dev lop ent, he tho ht, w 
eometr1e • 
Th or 
not on 
ide 
ht 
The m n o t intluenti 1 f"or 
th d1 covery of altern ti e 
th t 
1tehe d 1 m them tic , Her-
m nn Gra nn, w e lso 1ntluent1al in hi philo ophy t 
cience. Gr e m nn' 0 lculu or xtension aid d itehe d 
in the 1nv nt1on or h1 n ethod or ten 1ve b tr otion, 
nd 0 ,6 which 1 n i po~t nt p rt or both P 
Lowe fin 1 dev lop nt in hys1e o g~e t 1 ~or-
t noe tor it h ad.6 Thre dev lop ent 1nfluene d him 
very e ly, while the other thr c m to hi the 
wr tin or the 1905 moir. 
1. !teh d, c;, v111. 
2. it he d, I, 238. 
3. Lowe, rt.(l949), 2~4. 
ep c1 lly 1mpo~t nt w 
4. Lo , rt.(l 41), in 
chilpp, P , 33. 
a. Ibid., 2s-2e. 
6. Ibid., 41. 
th 
gg 
dev lop nt o vector hy to • Ot er t or! wh1c n lu-
enced 1m pr1o t 19 er t eor r 1 oul r 1 ub-
1 cu1ar er t c ibr tion, .nd t t I"Y' of t ~ -r d" 
a b cone t for n Y te . • L tar, 1toh c1 b 0 in-
ter ted 1n no to or p y c l 1 w , th 
t ory o r 1 t v,_ty, n the qua tum th ry. 
Dn1'1 th er1o er e r1r t der1n te pp r-
nee or influence by Bergfton . n t e ref- ce to 
th t " m n t he d not 
t e e tin 0 t ri tot 11 n r on wa d1 cue e 
oc1 ty 1n London.1 nth me b ok, on th 1 t page e 
ke r terence t Ber on's el n v1tal."2 tb 1 p 
1tehe pe k quently or the 
of n tu.r or or e t ve dv nee." In C e t t 
that h re 1 th1 v ew to b "tn 11 ccord t Bez- on. :5 
Thee ok~, while d al n mo tly it the t o 1 p y io , 
how t t t e rlootr1n evolution nd t developme t o~ 
th biolo teal cienoe were beg1nn1 to affect h th nk1 
In 1 1 itehe d c me memb r o th ndon r1 to-
t 1 n ~oe1 ty, n the 1nut of th t or antz t1 n, well 
a 1tehead's own t nt, reve lth t h w ot1v d 
frequently enter into t e cu on • r no doubt 
th t the e cont ct pro oun 1nflu oe on b t 0 ht, 
p z-t1eul rly on h1 t physic , but 1 0 on 1 hllo ophy 
1. 1teh d , Df. , vJl. 3. 1tehe d- c , 54. 
2. teh d, p , 200 . 
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ot oience. However, d1 C' eion o~ th group belen e 
with tre t ent of 1tehe d' et phy io 1 period• bee u e 
!tho be wrote hi work on the philosophy or eo! nee 
th1 ti e, t t th ide h d come to him previou ly. 
. 0 t or th 1nt"luence that c thro h1 London 88001-
te w r on the mor met phy 1oal portion or the book , 
and he confine him elt mostly to the tudy of n ture, ex-
plicitly refU ing more than once to di cue met phy ics . l 
In 1924 1tehead moved to the Unit d , tate - to join 
t 
the aoulty o H rv rd Dn1ver tty in the Philo ophy Dep rt-
ent. t. there th t h mo t d1 t1nct1v philosophical 
work were pr oduced . Yet ror the mo t part, the ide which 
he cam to expres were alre dy formed, t le t in part . 
cience and th 
Reality appe red in 1929, nd 
out in 1925. Proces and 
1tehe d t te , h n n• 
de vored to co pre the m ter1 1 d 1'1 ved f'l:'om ye r or di-
tatton. 2 1tehead owed ucb to the cont cts he de 1n 
the London tetotelian Society which included n lt mem-
ber h p most or the i ort nt per one 1n Br1t1 h philosophy 
s well s any continental and mePic n philo ophers . 
y p 1losoph1c wr1tin t rted 1n London, t the 
The London ~ .totel1 .n 
centre of d1 cuss1on, and 
latter ena th 
Society w s ple 
cloa f'r1end hip re f"ol"m • 3 · 
1. 1tebead1 PNK, v11J CN, s . 
2. teh d 1 PR, :x . 
a. 1tebe d 1 ESF• 14. 
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The 1 tt r 
tter ph1losoph1c th oblig tion of n 
to others u ually art f'l'om echool ot 
e 
o ole or re m nt. 
t1on to eknowledg to 
Carr. • c. chiller~ 
cT gart, J me rd• 
1mportc-.n for br1 n ut th poi t 
tn t 1teh d in that 3 we sre no le ~ in-
(tebted t tr nk r he opt t e lte t w eh he 
er di a reement w1th a thinker 1s no 1 n 
or 1 e or influence, t le t n the ca e or 1tehead. He 
modified an stam ed with . is n e 1u ve y e neept w 1ch 
he used. 
mn t e m ny other . wit whom it d " s oct-
ted 1n London w re P .muel lex ndel"', .r • K re . tephen, 
r 
' 
Duddfn ton, Norm n . p ~m!.tht nd • • T ylor. r • 
Duddin ton a t e pupil sn tranFl tor of the Rue 1 n ph1• 
losopher , • • Lo sky. 1tehe d mak one ref' renee to 
the irr.:t ora I·OS. ky' works to ppear in tr n lation, The 
-
Intuitive B · 1e of' Kno 1 dge.3 Thi in le reference, which 
quot ~ch lling r ther th Lo ky him elf, 1 neverth£1e 
tnt re t1n b e u e Lo ~ky ere ed c philo ophy that 
has many pointE of s1 1lar1ty tc the philo o te e d, 
part1oul ~ly 1n th r ject on f A • bjeot• ~ die te or 
eubj ct-obj et ntlthe a, t e Le1bn z n o 1em, he er1t1-
c sm of nt, the mcd1f1c · 1on of 
1tehead1 PNK, vii. 
1tehe d, PR, 16. 
1t1 h e p1r1o s , and 
.Y.: cm111 n 
19191 cited 1n 
c ' 4'7. 
nd Co. 
1teh ad, 
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th l' 1 1ntu1t1 n in lmo 1 dge. th1~ la et 6"' ot 
Lo ky' Bleo quite 11 r t r on' t-. ! 1 
0 1. 1 t 1t t d ws hly 1nfl enc y th1 
ok. It mor n vt th r ct 
t t e ak rt er r er e t t or to other ot 
L work t at PP"" red, t found t tereRt1n 1 
but 
" t noth1.n new in it t at h not 11' dy occurPed to 
h m, or t t b d not re el e e e. 
mng t e ther~ o hi L ndon e t , 1t d 
e t on ee1f Cally ro e.so:r • • unn :t.n elm ledg1ng 
n obl1 Merta n n Bttit . h re'lli t 1 e work • 
0 orman emp ... th 'W p portont to t h d r r hi tudy 
or t. _it h a .l. o n o .. t t e need 1n hi 
p1 te lo y or;y: or 
( cm1 1 , 1 ).a n d t1 n to \ per n 1 
udy to nd ot er Gre k p 1 o oph r , tt e 
11 h avily on e w rk o • · • Taylort p ~t eu r y h1 
tnt pretat1nn n " :ref e " to , he 
y : 
en 1n the erace to It he say : 
• 
• 
t ead, R, 111. 
1teh d, PR, 185n • 
it d PR, 1 n • 
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e ~ n tes 0 . 1C'totel ln ... oc1ety r v 1 t• t 
r ng t lC ye r wh n iteh a in Lond n, th p. ilo -
ophy rg~on 11 equcmtl d1scu d, . ong th .. act1v 
mem'ber who wer particularly intet- at d in Berg on nd who 
nt uenc d iteheu ere r • Karon f.: teph n and H. 1ildon 
C rr, ho Pre 1d nt of the r1 toteliun Soci ty from 
1~15 to 1918. C rr' influence 1 sp oially tmport nt. 
Dr .. F • . • C. Northro maintains thnt B rg on's ph1lo ophy 
one of the tbre in influence upon h1 r con truot1on 
~nd ph steal sc1once that prepared the w y o~ 
Re 11ty, an that tbi influence c e to him in 
mea ure from n. ildon Carr. 
1 ge 
Tne third was B rg ont n influ nee ~11c~ c m 
to 1teh ad through hie per onal fr1 nd, the 
.1 te • · 11 on Carr . During tho e tmpre sion bl 
war y ar , when 1tehe d's philo ophy ot science 
wa taking hap , Carr was rtt1n a book on 
rgaon and ontlnuou ly conv rein with 1te• 
cone rning th French philo opb r. ~om 
o~o a e th doetr1n or the r!maoy of 
proeo , hich is ic to ··lh1t head' philo -
ophy o~ eo1eno a 1t to hi taphys1os. 
orthl-op then go s on to s y th t the Bet- on1an in-
nuenee •c n h X"dly be ex ;r te ." 
1 v!1!. 
.. 
It ore ent t 
ite e d' ent1~ 
tloo • 
1th only on 
r!. e d1 te 
contention t t 
f'l f'eto. 
ic eonce t nd do tr n o 
a1 nt1 1e ~nd hilo ophie 1 
e • II e t e e • e t II • e • t • 
con ,. 1 t 
follow Be:r 
~ pr1. 
concept 
t the c 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
on i ed ate intuition 
a "lti r e 1m le 
w renees.l 
1 .. 
Victor Lowe t ke exception to orthrop' contention 
t t th :r on1a.n 1n lu no could uh rdly be ex ePa ted •' 
H felt th t th in lue.nce w 1 s nd occurred earl! r 
than o thro cl 1med.2 orthrop r pl to tb1 in a r -
c nt lette • 
back 
th r or n t th in lu nee 0 Carr s as import nt 
Northrop bel1ev 
• 
1 1t wa con ider ble. n 
t 1t' riting PR._ be nt b ck ten ye r to mak u e 
or c r-r • P:reeid nt1 1 ddPeas to the ri to tell n roo! ty 
1. orthro , rt.(1941) in t:'ch1lpp 1 , 168•169. 
2 . Lowe, rt.(l949), 278. 
3. orthrop, Letter to R. t hl, Octob r 24, 194 • 
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tn 1917.1 The ide or eaoli rityfl wh cb 1tehe d t ke 
from thi add:reae • while not coming f'l'om Ber son, ppe r 
to be development fl'om the philo oph1cal pos1t1.on ot C • 
Mo t of Carr' idea were rg on1 n. ile 1t may be po • 
1ble to exa gerat Berg on' 1ntluenoe on tehe d, it i 
probably not poesibl to x gger te Bergson's influence on 
Carr. Flew 111ng, who w oolle u.e o C Pr' t the 
Univer 1ty ot uthern 0 11torn1 , y that 1t mounted to 
a 
The Bergeon1 n influence on 1tehe d' doctrin ot 
proo e was reinf'o:ro d, Northrop e ys, by muel lex nder, 
He w nother very import nt influence while itehe w 
1n London. The import nee ot thi relation hip 1 brought 
out by Victor Lowe ln referring to oonver· at1on which he 
bad with te d in uet, 1942. 
I h ve known 1tehead. in a conver tion bout 
rgson, to inject th re~ rk that the eontempor ry 
fro Whom h otually got most w s Samuel lex nders 
he and lex nder ttconoetved the problem ot m t -
phy tee in the s way•n In part1eul r, lexander 
had th import nt tde th t the unt ty ot the un1• 
verse (dev loped most p:ztominently 1n ~ Sp1noza' 
metaphysic ) and them ny indiv1du ls (Leibn1z's 
empha 1 ) had eomehow to be reconciled~ other 
common lement which I h ve he rd -1tehe d men-
tion 1 the t ct th t lexande~ almo t lone mo 
itehead 1 British contempor r1es• did not, 1m-
pl o!.tly t lea t, a . ume th t our experience 1 
b 1c lly n exper1 nee of en e-d t .~ 
lthough Whf.tebe d ape ka appreciatively ot Al x nder's 
Wh1t he d, PR, 65n. 
Flewe111ngf Letter to R. ~t hl, October 201 1 4 • 
Lowe1 rt. 1949), 291. 
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0gene~al ase1m1i tion or space and time, 1 ve~y p~ob bly 
Whitehead was not · g~eatly influenced by him 1n his philo-
ophy or ctence. Beto~e lex nd ~· wo~k appea~ d, 1te• 
be d had l~e dy to~mul ted hie philo ophy of c1ence tram 
hie work tn mathematics nd m thematioal physic • Alexande~' =1 
influence appe ra pa~t1oul ~ly in Wh1tehe d' dootl'tne o.t 
t &ling, his interpretation or olut1on, hla philosophy or 
religion, nd his philosophy or v · lue . tn the "Pretace'' to 
8 1tehead sayss 
There h been no ooo s1on in the text to make e• 
t !led reterence to Lloyd organ' Eme~;nt EVolu• 
t1on or to lexand.e:r• s Spac~ T1tne an~ -1t!. t\ 
wl11 be obv1ou to reader t at I have loun them 
very euggeet1ve . X am e peel lly indebted to 
lexander's rat wo~k .a 
Both ot the e work show a con 1derable Berg on1an 1n• 
.tluene , o tba t even an influence tl"om the e wM. ter would 
be er on1 n influence one• removed. But ttehead had 
lr ady r d erg on by the time Alexander and Mor n wrote 
their wo~kst so th t any Bergson! n influence from the e two 
.. . 
men would have been but reenforcement ·or an ear,l1er B r • 
on! n influence. In referring to h1a doctrine of "proceasft 
in PR, 1tehead says that i'every nlt1mat aetu 11ty em• 
.; 
bod! !n !tR own essence what lexander te s t principle 
ot unre t,' n mely, it becom1ng . •3 He f"urthex- says that 
hi "u e or the term 'feeling' h e a olose nalo~y to lex-
ander• us ot the term 1enjoyment•.u4 Like lexander; 
1. Wh1tehe d·, CN, v11! . 
2. itehead, · • 1x . 
a. 1tehead1 PR. 42•4a. 
4 . Whit he d1 PR, 65 . 
10'7 
org n, and Berg on, Wb!teh d' tnt rpretattons or evolu-
tion a a ere ttve process le d him 1nto the philo oph,y ot 
rel g!on and v lue. 
to my own views of p rm nence and tr n 1enee, 
I think the untv rae h e ide wh ch 1 ent 1 
nd p rmanent. Thi sid is that prime eoncep-
tu 1 r1 w ich I call the pr!mot-<11al n tur or 1 Go • It 1 1 X nder'e n1sua conceived a actu 1. 
1 tebe d 1 o finds in lex n r the concept or th con-
a qu nt nature of God," Referring to ·Al xand r h yes 
gr t philo opher ha aid th t time 1e the 
mind ot pace. ln re. peot to on& particul r new 
trth ot one centre or xp r1enc 1 th1 novelt 
o !d 1 rorm w 11 b term d the "con uent. 2 
In oiiooiiiii,...tu: ..r-.e..,.,...,e..n..,d._· _L.,..!.,.f' ....... , later ppe ring a p9.:rt ot 
Thosght, 
lexand r' 
ttebe d ha mo t pprec1 tive ummary of 
_... ....... .....,...,.iiiOiiioii.._.. ... n.,.d_ . .,.n ... e .... t ... tz .., in term ot his own 
thought • Th re he d 
tran oen ent v 1 a 
cr1bes ideal nd 11 expert nee or 
t e exp rtenc ot D tty in th world.3 
Lowe rize his dtseu ion ot lex nder•s !n lu-
nc on iteh d by e y1 * 
Thus we h v her , one ore, c ee or ncour e-
ment nd ympathy1 r ther th · of indi p n ble 
1nflueno • Th1 encov · e ent hould not be m g-
nit1e into th pr1 ary o u of tehe d• o!n 
in for et phy lc : more pro bly it imply re1n• 
forced the nat 1 cau e wh1ch were suggested in 
the di cu ion ot itehe d nd Bergson, bove. 
ether or not Lowe i right, 
1. 1tehe d, E P~ 117•119. 
e. 1tehe d, R I 11 • 
3. Wh!teh ad, OT, 139•142. 
4. Lowe, t,(l 49), 293. 
1teh. ad con 1d rs 
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1 an e~• philo ophy o 1 po~t nt that, in determi 1ng 
th 1ntlu nee of Ber on, xtre e car u t be x rcise to 
d1et1ngu1 h betw en the two 1ntlueno •• 
Th 1ntluenc ot dl y u t ot be o rlooked. 
te ead y , he 1s f"rt quently t v r1anoe w1th dley, 
but ince .h t1nda it nee 
out pr c ely wher h a 
ry in 
nd whe he 
1 ce to point 
gr e with 
dl y, t th t . he g ve hia work oar 1 con 1d ration. 
tn the Pret ce to PR, h a yea 
Th rttth p rt 1a concern d with th final inter-
pr t tion or th ult1 t w y 1n which th co 
1o 1oal proble 1 to be conceived, • • the ap-
rox1 t1on to adley 1 vident. Inde d, if th1 
cosmolo y b d m uoo atul, 1t co e n tur 1 
t th s po nt to sk whether the type of tho ht in-
volved be not tr n form tion or o m in doctrine 
ot b olute Id li onto a r 11 tic b te.l 
In ('IP , it he d di cu e th notion ot p rishin nd i -
mort lity. 1 , he ays , the ftone k y tho ht" round 
which th d velo nt or PR is wov n, nd ft1n ny w y I 
tind that in com let a'"~ee1ment with r dley. ite-
h ad conclude by yi that adl 7 et into ~eat 
muddl bee u he accept the lan e which i dev lop d 
t.ro other point ot view.•2 
robably the oonclu ion y a rely be dr wn th t White-
h ad wa not r tly intluene 
hi• en!u n e1nce Br dl y 
ley, but recogn1Eed 
con 1dered o important 
during itehe d' London p riod, wh n h noted ome 
1· itehe d, PR, v11•v111. 2. P, 117. 
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1m1lar1t1e in their complet d y tems, he thought it wi e 
to note th m .• 
B do 
it he d does not mention many mer! n philo oph r • 
m ntton hi . obl1g t1ons to th English and erto n 
Re list s "obv1oue . •l lmm dtat ly following in the Pr-
tao " to PR, come th tatem nt, "I 1 o gre tly in• 
debt d to rg on, 1111 m J 1 nd John Dewey," In 
ke great d 1 ot u ot pbr se ot J e •s wh ch he 
noted 1n a letter from William J me to hls brother Henry, 
where he r ~ r to 1~ duo1ble and tubborn r ote."2 The 
ame "r dtcal mp1r!c1 y b noted· tn · rsson n Dewe7 
1 o, but J bad the fao111ty ror- th · h ppy phl' ee. 1 0 
it he d consider J ea• ese 7 "Doe Con o1ouane a Ex1 t?• 
aa or primary 1mportanc • comparing 1t 1nflu nee with that 
Th eo1ent1f'1c mater! 1 and the c rteaian g 
w re both challen at th s oment, on by 
c1ence and the other by philosophy repr ented 
by 1111a Jam with hi p yoholo cal nt c dents,3 
it h ad ~ qu ntly m ntlon the import nee tor m ern 
thought ot new develo ent in physiology and psyoholo Y• 
H may hav learned 
He w s 1 o quite 1mpr 
Dew Y• 
good d 1 of h1 psychology from Jam e. 
d by the plur 1ism or J m e nd 
In spite of' Whitehe d 1 symp thy with the e men, how-
v ·r, Lowe 1s undoubtedly quite correct 1n his b 11 r that 
it head , PR, •t1. 
1tehead1 S , 3. 
1tehe d 1 8 , 1 3. 
1teh ad• cbnt ct with Ja 
eno h to h in luenc d 
1 tion o h1 philo ophy. 
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and wey w s not e rly 
~7 p~ofou dly in th to~ -
1tehead1 in eonv ~ t1on with 
Low . in y, 1 41, ad tt d th t "the~e w no qu stion or 
J a t ct!n th d1r etlon ot h1 think1ng."1 Lowe do s 
d it th t Dew 'I m1 t 0 ve h d somet in to do0 with lt -
h d' s oetrin ot dir ct xp 1 no of c usallty, which 
fir t pp r d n 1 27 in it h d' lectu on 
6 
,e 
tehe d him 11' say re 1m ort nt tor bi 
tnrluence and tt1tude tow rd philo ophy th n fo:r any doc-
tr n th t he eet forth. 
w y 1 to b ol s ed a ong tho en who . 
h v d philo oph1c tho ht :r lev nt to t e needs 
of their own day. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 
John Dewe 1 th typic 1 tt otive mer1c n thinker. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • D wey h never b en p lled b7 the novelty ot an 
ide •3 
Th pre 1ous d1 cu ion h a b n n x m1nat1on of t 
m n and book most 1gnit1o nt mon itehead• conte po-
r r1 in h b ck rou o his tho ht. !t now r in to 
d1 cus bri fly ad' r 1 t1on to th philo ophic tr -
d1t1on. ltho h ltehe d w !dely r d 1n 11 p ~1oda 
ot philo ophy, the~e ar t o p r1oda hich p rt1~~1 rly doml-
n ted hi thinking. Th r th periods of Plato and 
eh11pp, The Philo ophy or 
SP, 120-121. 
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rt totle, an 1t1sh mp1ric1 m of the v nt enth nd 
1 ht enth eenturie • 
~ 1n PR ~ ve ls th t 
1 no at th "Index of Prop r 
ven n me dom1n t the di ou -
on. h y ar Plato nd 1 totl , c rt 
• 
ant , 
Loc e , n ewton. To th1 1 t ould b dd d th n 
nfluent1 1 1 lthou h th y ot thr n who wer lmost a 
r not quit eo frt quent1y r f rred to. They re rk le • 
L 1bn1z, and • 1noz • 11 it h d' philo opbto writ! 
boun 1n f rene to the t n names. 
Th influence o Plato on it b d 1 exceed! ly 1 -
p rtant. 1t h ad is ~ pons1ble for th f moue t tement 
th t tb Europ n ph11oaoph1c 1 tr dit1on •con 1st~ of 
er e or rootnot to Pl to."1 He o s on, after tating 
th t th tr in ot thought in th e 1 ctur is Pl tonic," 
t xpl in what ne. 
In t 
I en t t 
point or v1 
p te d 1 
ner 1 
n ce -
of' 
xpre sin t e vie th t hi 
dootrin of etern 1 obj ot 1 doriv d ~om Pl to. L ter he 
1. 1t e d, R, 63. 
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t t expl1e1tly · th t by th ter t rnal obj et' h 
n "Pl tonic to ttl • 
Ret rene all" dy n e to 1te d 1 s in-
d bt dn to • E. ylor• 0 Pl to, peo1all y h1 
rz on p~ h1ch it h ad d 'con-
t nt use" in th ction on 0 ology or I . COOl' ing to 
1 , th ro hav n two co ologi wh1o hv om1• 
n t uro n thought , t t of Pl to' 
te 1 11 tie 0 olo ot wton, Lock , so rte , and 
Ga eo . att pted to fo low th olu th t p r p t 
t e olu ion con 1 t in a ru 0 t tb tw pr viou 
ch me tt2 In the Timaeus, • it b d w a tnt of v -• 
lut1on ry che !oh would fit but • ardly into th 
wton1 n co olo Y• r 1s th 1a1 u c1 lly 
for it 
n et th 
t i 
bee 1 • 
tap y teal e r ct r ••• i ts end avor to con-
vi our o~ thing w1 th th 
11 • 
11 th e ide r t 
by Pl to' 
ch better into 
ot 
n ly 1 ot 
itehe d 1 
doctrine of r oe th n 1nt th id of th venteenth 
century science. 1 t r f Pl t , of which 
the Tim 1 on , 1nf'lu no 1te d mo t . In I, he 
cite ven a1n n tion 1n the thou ht of P1 to . Thee 
ar , .. I e ,Th to 1 1 ment , The p yo e, 
Th Th th m tic 1 lat1on 1 Tb Reo ptacl • n5 
1 . t '70 . 4 . R, 1,4 . 
2 . PR, ix . s . I , lee . 
3 . PR, 14 • 
• 
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ch or th h ve 1 port nt pl c in 
' • 
h i r apon 1bl tor the inclu 1on or 0 
t m, but, in Y1 or teh ad ' con tnt tudy or Pl to, 
Y rioua 7 11 h v 1 pre & d h!m to 
dmit th t it i mo t 
x-
t n t n rydt. c ol r• 
ly to id ntify our odern notion with the oh ic thou ht 
1 to. or u btle dift rene • 1 ~ t 
he r pe t t li t o en notion four ti d 
y , I hol th t all philo ophy i 1n t ct n ndeavour to 
obtain cob r nt y t out ot o mo itic t!on o t 
not one, 2 I a r , ot cour e, itehe d 1 ' tern 1 
o j c •" Th y r not the ran en nt Id or th e rli-
r dialo u , but r ther repr 1 to•~ 1 t r criticiz d 
vi •• yale 1 El ent r the phy ie 1 1d or t -
lity cone 1 roce • Th P ych r 
lite and otion without whioh th univ r e 1 
Tb P ye 1o the r 1 z tion or b de 1n 
t t1 .s 
livins 1n-
t 111 ene • 1teh d 1 1 portant dootr n ot app ti ion 
1t ouree, or t 1 t it c unt rp rt, n t 1 tonic 
ro 6 • notio t uty d o -
ne , ue ~0 in nt pl e n t d ' theopy 
0 lu not!o of t m tic l 1 tion 1 clo ly 
• :5. • 2. 35 •• a. 
3. 35 • 
"· 4, , 3 • 
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c nn ot to t ot rmony be1 , .n p rt, its xpl -
on . Th two to eth r orm th cone pt or "the gen r 1 
1nte~oonn ct dn se ot thing , which tr nato~ th man old• 
n ~ or them ny nto the unity of th one.~ Th1s 1 ro-
c 1 • Fin lly~ th R c pt cle 1 lmost ex ctly the 
p e -time ot modern m th mat1c 1 phy 1es. conce1v d in 
abstr ct1on tr m the p rt1cul r mat matio 1 ormulae hieh 
pplies to the b _ppe 1ng 1il 1t. 2 The eceptacle as "th 
ro tel'•mother or 11 becomi " 1s analo ou to lexander' 
concept or p ee•tim • 
it h d l1nk r1stotle with late a one r th 
founder 0 atern tho t.3 Two jor 1d s of' 1 totl 
tunct on in 1tebe d' thou ht, one po 1t1ve nd on ne 
-
t!v • On the neg tiv ide, h reject ristotle' logic ot 
ola s, and p rt1oularly t e ubject•object olas 1 1oat1on 
that ha p a d into epi te olo Y• gin nd 1n, in hi 
cr1t1 i ot tr d1t1on 1 thou t, it e d rem rk on t e 
m1 chief don by this ide • H r ject 
tion ot pr ry a b tance lway 
a pr 1c te.•• For th1 he u atitut 
totle' d t1n1• 
ubjeet n never 
the 0 teg!)ry ot the 
Ult1m t , or Or at1v1ty . 5 B pointe out, howeYAr1 th t 
r1stotle w t r then hi error • 
I, 192. 
I, 1 2, 
PR, v, 
1teh d 1 PH, 239. 
Tbi creativity 1s the mo t ab tr ot Oftte ory imaginable, 
comparable in this re pect to H gel's category or etng. 
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Th1s dom1 
r ' 
On the oa1t1v 1 • lh t hea o t 1 pr ed b 
otle' s analy 1 or becom n • • y e m ee a 
m rly n ly 1 or th notion or ' en r 2 
totle, o ev r, do s not o r r enough c u 
r! -
e o it th 
l. 
2 . 
!de o pe te els 
in philo o hy or or an m nd proo s • 
thoU17 
n lp.1 
Procens 
1s 
11 
a co ele.t 
t h 8. ppr c t 1 totl tends to 
c rJ:t ct he d· 11 r t by sugg the pRl't c1pat1on 
o~' th arm n actu 1 ent t1 
' 
tho h the ter 1 to 
th am to s me xt nt . · t he d ' octr n 0 p-
p tit on 1 o o e ometh1ng to r1stotle, e pee lly s r -
lated t 0 • 1n which it 1 th lure r .1 ng, th 
tern l urge of de re . " 
n t he d 1n London t t ing me 1ng 0 t 
r1 tot l1an oa1 ty he njoyed much sou s on o p lo -
ophy . e once tat d th t " ong oth r n thy 1 cu d 
rk 1 y,. , X nt, 111, mel y, rtr nd nell, n 
rg n . 4 w part cu aJ:tly 1nt re t d n the cu -
on (' on the en r th for t1ve riod o mo rn 
thoug t, .en f t sev nt nt and eigh th eentur1 • 
This t e p r'od of gr at ElClent t. 11 p 11 s-
oph r , m p r on 1nt 1• ted n th ro ormqt em o 
phy 1c , te e d inevitably ent b c to h fount 1nh d 
0 
1 
o ern phy o 1 1 • 
canst c 1v cr1t_c ot t e 
fbi t h a , 
116• 117. 
it h ad, 
i tehe d , 
r . (1 32) , 4 
P , 31 and 147. 
PR, 522 . 
• 
p 11o oph1cal 1t1n 
d a , both hy 1c 1 
1t h d , p , v11 • 
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r. met phy 1c 1. u 1 oar fully G lil o, ·ewton, 
D sc rt¥ , ell a. the o criticized nd modified 
th ir id a • uch rk le , Lock 1 um , nt, nd 
Spinoz • ny o-r hi . po 1t1v 1d com fro the n or 
t 1 latt r g~oup, ltbough in 1 o~ th e round c rta1n 
b 
cr1t1c zed as umption 
th con tructi n of 
h1eh he t lt ne d to be corr cted 
philo ophy or organ! which ub-
tituted in m ny r p et 
th od rn co olog • 
th older co olo or lato ror 
. !teh ad' r 1 t1on to e ton 'I pr r11 critic 1 . 
ton' chi t ult, it h d thought, "th 11 ey or 
mispl c d concreten wton h d yetem or phy 1o 
which had proved ad r bl tor phy 1oal so1eno for thr 
hundred ar , but it w con truoted on high level o b 
str ct1on d t ere ore eoul not e t n true de-
cription or t e un1v r • 1 wa made v1 nt by c rt in 
mod rn aci ntitie d cov rie~ t.at e~ 1ncon let nt w~th 
wton' phy 1o • te e d d d ecognize that ewt n ' e 
view h d a gre t deal o truth 1th mite pp11e t1on 
n tr e to t his th ori . to it th etA w ch 
wton de cribe , but in ~ y coherent with etA r w ic 
ton ignor nt • ewton hel d to theor o b olut 
p ce nd b ol te time . it h d e o rel tion 1 w. 
H cr1 lciz d . ton a guilty or the tall cy ot pl c d 
1 . lt e d, PR, 142• 143 . 
! ll , nt r v ry ,ou r. nd 
r 0 e 1s or , b t mo t or th 
rt'tt r r.c t r nee te 
. l o • e 'P 11o op y 
1. d , R, 123. 3. it h I p , 146. 
• d , R, 42. 4. 1tehe , C"P, 7. 
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' ot K nt' ophy. • the inver ion phil o By t e a:lt 
t t n 1 ph los hy P 1d1 !{ t• thort 0~ 
r . ~on ctiv d t,a. . 1 led t A. bj ot 
own only s e • d t' rr n 
t l' t e t en tel' 
!. -r ence .1 II nt," eh t' wed e 
t c enc e neo l t ~'• tt2 • 
1 Cl" t C 0 1 ~ ry elo e to Berg• 
n' • eeti nd v ted l r el to or tie 0 nt, 
r 0 h t p y ie to p ch1os 
. vert d • u3 e u A ted t t ta hy oe, 1 e d o tol• 
in y 8 1n t e o 1 hope r o1n , further in 
t 1reot1 n, t• n the 0 e <Hr ct1on 
n build p p o re 1 co 1 y 1 be • • 
rev :r yoholo 1teh d e lsr e • 
nt n e ,.d: 
Both te d and r on 1 o ro nt's 
tic the part or nt' ork clo t to t e r o 
vi • te e d' d1 eu ton of K nt 0 1 to 
rg on' t i point that it v ry prob b e t t 
it h d , ett r con e1o 
---------------------
t41! • ' • 
1tehead, R, 49 . 
erg on, C , 221. 
ly or uncon ciously, d t 18 
• 0 • c , 22?-~?. • 
• 1t he d 1 PH, 172- 173 . 
6e r geon, 0 1 223J f te• 
he d 1 PR, 173. 
• 
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ctton or . c~e t1ve Evolution in hi mind. 
ttehe 1 not d t a tr!n :tn 1t1on wa 
the rev r ot ant . ~nt m t t 0 o n ture 
w phenomen 1, th t on" W9 roduct1ve 
of th order world. , o~ he ot r hPnd 1 el 
th 1ntu1t1on ~a th , th t 
in a Bez• o ian en , 
ff up ~j ot rather t n 
n felt one elf wtth.n it 
jeet.• 1 
K nt' @l' t no 1t1 
a that he 
nsi~h , eco 1 0 1tehe d, 
first, tully nd xpl o1t!y, 1 t nto 1-
losophy th oonce t1on an act ri nee 
con truct1? nott n1nR:1 t-r n rmi u ject_ ... 
vit into objectivity_ r obj ot v1ty into ub-
ectiv1t .2 
t for nt the proo wa fro su ject~v ty to obj ot1v1• 
ty, ·wbtle 1n th p 1 0 h or r n1 
v rted. 
th1 . () I'! l" 
In sp t t cert in 1 t n t n 
h d nd Leibn1z 1 tehead doe t aokno ed 
ind bt d e to th 1 t to 
Victor Low y t t 11Le!.bn' z 1 " m n i_f.! m re 
h d th n 
Plato . n3 
th t 0 y other 11 opher, xoept 
e s y th t t 
tte pt to con@truct the n 1 ve 
1• ih1tehe d 1 F >R, 4 J PR , 112. 
2 . 1te e , P , 236. 
3. Low , ~t.(l 41) 1 in e ilpp, P , lB. 
n-
of lte-
r at n 
on 
er • 
1te-
1bly 
san 
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which hae been Leibniz' dre m. Prob bly, however, teibniz 
• not gre tly inrluenti 1 on Wb1tehe d' logic and the-
m tie • " 1 knowledg of Le1bn1z' inve tt t1on , " 1te-
he d admitted, "w entirely b sed on L. Coutur t' book, 
L Log1gue d Leibniz."1 
itehe d 1 panpsycbistio tendeno1e h ve some re em-
bl nee to Le1bn1z' onadology. Whitehead point out that 
re e1 il r to Leibntz' monad , but hie otu 1 entitle 
that the 1 tter were be t oonoeiv d ener liz tion of 
contemporary notion or ment lity,n nd th the intend d to 
rormul te better b 1 need view by iving more adequ t 
ecount or physic 1 bo iee.2 Ful'thermor , itehe d pointed 
out th t in Leibn1z 1 view th monads chang , while 1n the 
philosophy of or ani m they only beco e. 
In s it h d ehows considerable 1ntere t tn Berke-
ley bee u e "quite t the commencement or he epoch, e d 
11 the ri ht or1t1c1 ma, t le et 1n principle."~ It 1a not 
B rk ley's ubjective ide lim th t 1tehe d is intere ted 
in, altho h he is close to Berkeley in hi doctrine th t 11 
aotu 1 occasions are or the n tur or fe ling, but in certain 
cr1t1o1 m which erkeley mad of current ide • He criti-
cized the ide of imple 1oo tion, nd l so in r i ing the 
question of the mean1n 
ugge ted iteh ad' 
or thin s being aotu 11zed in n ture, 
doctrine or pr hen 1on •4 leo 
le 
2. 
itehe d, P, 10. 
itehe d, PR, 29. 
itehe d, 
Whitebe d, S ' 67. ' 68-'70. 
B rkel y' e philo ophy cr1t1c1zee wh t 
"bifUrcation or natur •" Whitehe d 
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1~ehe d called the 
ys th t Berkeley' 
cr1t1c1 m 
i r t 1. to any ot the traditional type or 
'm1nd-wa.tching•th1ng 1 philo ophy, even 11" 
tho thi~ be vents nd not subet nee or 
m terial.l 
The three men ot the venteenth century to whom ite-
head owed the mo t in the con truction of hi philo ophy wepe 
Descartes, Locke, nd Hume. n indio t!on ~r the relation ot 
Locke to itehe d ha lre dy been given in the di cu ion 
ot the organic princ1pl , where Locke is chosen e the repr -
ent t1ve or British empiric! m who suggested. this principle .. 
Tb three men, De cartes, Locke nd Hume, m y be treated to-
ether, lon with Sp1noz , whose work w 
tic tion of Descartes. 
n important od1• 
o t of the idea or itehe d'e philosophy or or n1sm 
were t ted fir t by either De carte or Locke but, White• 
head ay , neither work d out coh rent system nd th y 
tailed to emph ize their most valuable (to 1tehe d) in-
1 ts, beo u e ot certain p:rev lent h bit or thought ~om 
which they could not break w y.2 Deac rtee and Locke both 
suttered trom ubject vi m, th doctrine th t the n tur or 
experience is due to the "perceptive peculi r1tiea of th 
ubject enjoying the expet-ienoe."3 The C :rtee1an dualism 
1. Wh1tehe d, PNK, 9. 
2 . itehe d, PR, 196. 
3. Wh1tehe d, · M , 89. 
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the Newton'1 an teriali "combined to et r 1 oal 
betor philosophic speculat1on."l '!'hi du 11am, expl cit 
in D so rte , w 1 o i pli d 1n Look •2 Both D eo rte 
nd Locke rely ner lly on an ep1 temologically dual! tic 
theory o~ repres ntation, lthough both t times 1ncons1 -
tently st te n ep1 temolo 1c 1 monism that 1 close to 
1teh d' own v1ew.3 The chi t o~~ioe or Hum w to 
criticiz th philosophy of Lock nd bring it into re ter 
logical cob r noe. Yet he 1 o could not br k aw y ~o 
the h bit or thou ht of hi day nd did not que tion the 
eubject- pred1o te form ot thinking that i totle had be-
QU th d to the world.4 R consequently saved wh t White-
h ad consider the wrong ide of Looke.5 The chief value 
in Locke for itehead 1 hi " d quacy" r ther than his 
con istenoy. e ke "ole r stat menta or the obvious d -
11v r no of' common ense."6 the ide th t it -
be d ot rrom Locke wa th t of time "per etual peri h• 
1ng,"7 the doctrine or "power," gest1ng itehe d' "on• 
tologioal prinoip1e,"8 nd th cone pt or "idea of p rtiou-
1ar thing u which 
feel1ng.9 
itehead ya !a like hi own concept ot 
it he d considered Locke quite import nt nd e ta 
th t be i in British philo ophy "th e.nalo u to Pl to."lO 
1. itehead, R>R, 48. s. Whitehead, PR, eo. 
2. 1tehe d, ·PR, 29 , ' 7. 1tehead, PR, 43. 
3. 1t he d, PR, 118. a. ltehead, PR, 28. 
•• itehead, PR, 80-81. g. ltehead, PR, 65 • 5. itehead, PR, 114, 10. Whitehead, PR, 94. 
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Be lso a y that Loc~e and rf!. on •wer th o t c}'\ :r c-
t~:r1 tic philosoph ~ ot the1P :re p otive epoch . ft l 1nce 
Pl to w the most import nt or th ancient for Wh1tehe d's 
thoug t nd Locke th mo t important or the event enth cen~ 
tury, then it a log1o 1 to ume th .t Whitehead give Berg•• 
eon an extre ly 1 port nt pl ce in modern thought. 1le 
th1 indicate v ry high r ard, . nd 
influence ot rgeon on ltehe d, it does not prove 1t be-
c u e d could hav co e to this opinion about rg-
on tter hi own view were ~ormul ted. Coupled, o ever, 
with other evidence or rg onian tntluence thi pprecia-
tive et t ment by 1tehe d m kes the o se con ider bly 
tron er. 
One or the chief obj otlons which 1 tehe d round in 
the Britt h emp1rto1 t was their sene t1on 11 tic doctrine 
of perception. Fbr the n lys1 or pe~oeption, it head 
r 11e o tly on , beoa of h1 ••unrl v lled ole ~-
nes • 
•2 itehe d f'1nd hi instructive becau e ven 
the detect 1n his st te ente r eminently n tur 1 
d teet which e er e with gre t cl arne s, owt 
to the excellence ot hie present tion. 
1tehe d also find Hum 1 examination ot expert nee usefUl 
bee u e 
Hume ditter trom the great majority ot hi tol• 
lower chiefly by the w y 1n which he t oea u~ 
to th problema r 1 ed by hie own philo ophy.3 
1. 1tehe d, w. 147. 
2. Wh1tehe d, PR, 198. 
1tehe , PR, 206 . 
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The ensat1ona11st1c peyoho1o y of D sca~t s, Locke nd Hume 
emph sized the p~1m cy of wh t lte e d called pe~cept1on 
in the "mode of p~esent t1onal 1mmed1acy. 0 Hume•e pole ic 
respecting c us t1 n wa s1 ply• 1tehe d believed, ~ con-
vincing rgument th t pure present tion 1 immediacy doe not 
d1sclo e ny c u 1 1ntluence.•1 
the mode ot "cau al ett1o cy. 
1tehe d refer cau e to 
In on re pect 1tehead t lt that Hume wa conside~a-
bly superior to Locke. Locke lett no room tor growth or 
evolution. but Hum ' train of thought unwittingly emph -
izes 'prooee '."2 This takes place, aocordin to Hume , 
in th oul. 
h ean by 
lteh d note 
tu 1 entity.$ 
th t by soul Hume me ns wh t 
The chief ottice ot Spinoza, ccording to itehe d, 
wa to brln the hilo ophy or D c rtes into ~e ter co• 
h rene •4 In thi ~e pect he did tor De c rte wh t Kume 
1d tor Locke. But, like Bume, he tended to e ph 1ze just 
t os portion of Desoarte which th philo ophy or or ni m 
r jeot .5 1tehe d elt that as hi hilo ophy wa n in-
v r ion or t, 1t • leo 1nve~e1on of Spinoz • In 
n 1noz sub tance 1 the prim ry ctu 11ty1 with 1 tertor 
ode • In Wh1teh d' philosophy, th 
com the aotu 1 ent tie while p~oce 
odes of Spinoz be• 
is primary. 6 
ttehe d, PR, 188. 
1 tebead, PR, 212. 
1tehead1 PR, 213 . 
4. Whit he d, PR , 10. 
5. 1tehe d 1 PR, 11 • 6. 1tehe d, :PR, 125. 
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3. Common Influepce on both Sere son and d 
The que tion natur lly arise , how much of th iniil rt-
ty between the philosoph of nd 1teh d com 
rro 1ndep ndent l1n or develop ent pr1ng1n .from co on 
ource • Th ~ir t n wer w 11 b that both n wer very 
ori 1n 1 in their tre tment o philosophic pro 1 m • The 
oond newer 1 th t a study ot the b ck rounde of their 
tho ht reve 1 th t, ide troo gener 1 acquaint nee with 
th philosophic 1 tr d1t1on, they rr1ved t the1~ v ewe in 
dif:t rent w y • tehe d 1 ph11oeo y of or n dev loped 
from hl tud e in m them tic an thematical physic ,.1 
rg on's viewe were develop d primarily from p ychology nd 
biology. ltbough them tic and phy ics we:re not 
tro his b c :round. 
Tb r 1 one intlu nee, however, in the b ok round ot 
both Be~g on and 1teh d that 1 qu1t sign tic nt, This 
is wh t itehe d c 11 "Th Romantic Reaction," that re• 
action. primarily 1n literature, again t th r t1onal1 
and m ter1al1 ot th e1 hte nth century.2 h ben 
noted, it b d 1 hum ntsm in rt d ri v d from th1 
sourc • The ch ptel' in s by this t tl how how much 
1te ad w influenced by th1 ove ent. Be felt t t 1t 
" e c ed by a natur 1 d sir to r turn to the del v r noes 
ot common ense. In f ct, t t w the ~ea on tb t be liked 
1. t he d:~ SY , 153 • 
2. 1 tehe d, .. W, 0 pt .• V 1 75-96 • 
12'1 
th philosophy of Lock J he combined ole r xpo 1t1on with 
common sen e.1 Hi t~ouble w tb t t ulty pre upp 1t1on 
r sul te 1n wron conolu ion • tehead plac Ber .on at 
t e top of the 11st or od ttn philo ophe:r who have be n abl 
to away r.ro the s umpt on of the eventeenth nd 
e1ghteent centuri • 
H h mo t eo pletely m ved aw y from the t tie 
terl 11 m o the venteenth centu:ry.2 
Ber on w thu not only influenced by thi rom ntlc 
re et1on, h w p t or it. Sch rtstein how th t Berg-
on w very uoh product of th French culture or the 
nineteenth centUl"y.3 Ch rle 1111san m lnt in th t he 
•ts best under tood tb culmln tlon or period, not the 
radical innovator or a n w one," nd point out hi :rela-
tion hip to the rt nd mu 1o ot th 1 te nineteenth century. 
/ The empb i upon l!te force, e1 n vital, was 
much old r th n Darwin, w 0 e Or!s!n or peo!ee 
ppe r d th ye r rg on w ft born. It was a 
t m 11 r them with orda:tWorth. rg on' em-
phasi upon the flowing ot reality and the tn• 
ocuracy ot t tic concept w the pr1nc1p 1 
conv1ct1on ot Renoir nd the Impres lonist 
painter • • • • He w a to ph 1oeophy what Debu ~ 
7 w a to mu 1c.4 
er on, unlike it h ad, dep nded very 11ttl upon 
nc1ent Gr ek philosophy. In and T he ke lmost no 
r f'er nee to Pl to nd riatotl • However, in CE h has 
• 
!tehead, PR, 80. 
1tehead, s ' 1 e. 
ch rf.t n, RBPt 128-138~ 
1111gan, t.(l 49)• 10 • 
• 
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ection on Pl to and i totle that h w he w ~ qu te 
r miliar with th ir type or thou ht. Be r fer ny time 
to riatotle p rt eul rly, v n to uoting hi 1n Gr ek. 
B rgeon tho ht th t Pl to' ndepend ntly 1 tin Ide or 
h d elped impo e t illusion o e ngele ent1ti a 
upon 11 sub qu nt h1lo ophy. This, h felt, w a an ex-
ple of th w y the 1ntell ct f 1 1f1e re 1 ty. 
To reduc thi to Ide s s therefore to re-
olve beco i into its pr!noip 1 m nt , e ch 
of th e bein , oreover, by the hypothesis, 
acre n d fttom the laws o tim and, it were, 
pluck d out of eternity. Th t i to y t t we 
nd in th philo ophy o Id when w pply the 
cin to r ph c 1 m c n m of the intell ct to 
the an 1 of th re 1.1 
r on tho ht more or ristotle than he d1d or Pl to, for 
Ar1 totl reco nized the f ct of becoming nd tte pt d to 
1nclud lt in hi philo ophy. istotle retu d to ad it 
tb t the For • ex! t d ind pendently, nd o e included 
them in unity, a " 0 orm , " or od • The Form then 
i suing forth fro God mix with m tter, with ubecoming the 
re ult. Bergson' de cript1on t this prooea is 11k 
it h ad' -ingre 1on" or eternal objects into ctuality. 
It is v ry prob bl th t itehe d ot thi ide fro ria-
totl ; he ape k h1 ly ot r1 totl ' analy i or becoming. 
o ethln neg ttv , or Eero at mo t, 
dded to Ide s to obt in ch n e. In 
Pl tonic "non•b 1n , " the r1 to-
met p ys1oal zero w oh, joined 
the arithmetical zero to unity, 
1. Berg on, C , ~42. 
multiplies 1t 1n pao~ and tim '• By it the motion-
lese nd simple lde is rerPaoted into ovement 
sp~e d out ihdefin1tely. In r! ht, there ought to 
be noth1 but tmmut ble Ideas, immutably fitted 
to e ob other.. In f'aot. m tter co s to dd to 
them 1t void, d th r by 1 t · 1o e the universal 
b eoming.l 
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Berg on, howe er, re1t that ri totl t 11 d to xtr1• 
o te hi selt f'l'om Plato 1 di 1culty,. be uae .tt w nee a• 
s ry to po tulate God ~unmov d mover," 1n o~der that 
th ovement could be unb gun and unending. 
perpetuity ot mobility is po sibl only f t is 
back d by an et rnity ot 1 tab 11ty, w tch 1t un-
inde 1n a chain without b ginning or nd.e 
1tehea s 
ble to eave 
th s ~e difficulty in r1 totl , but he was 
1 totle•s gener 1 principle or sub titut!ng 
cr at1v1tytt for 1 totle' e "primary ubstanoe" and oon-
i ring ere t vity prior to God, in who e pr1mord1 1 n ture 
th Forms or ' tern l object " aubsi t.3 
rg on felt that wh t w moet valu bl in Plato and 
1 totle wa oarr1ed into the y tem ot Plotinu • Who was 
eert inly more or an influence on B rgAon than any r th 
ncient Gr eks.4 In t ct, er-son 1tted th t Plotinu 
" 
one or the three men who 1ntluenc · m mo t proroundl,-,. 
the other two being aine de 1r n nd Rava1s on.s 
Be ides sin le r tereno to t e p y 1es or chimed e, 
the only other ancient thinker that Bergson m nt1ons s Zeno, 
1. Berg on, C , 344. 
n. Berg on, c , 353. 
3. it he d, PR, 11, 32. 
4. r on, C 1 351. 6. Seh rr te n, R P, 101, 
quoting fro the rem1n1e-
c nee ot Gilbtrt ire in 
Bergson mon maitre, 222. 
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o ~R oxe he tho ht 1 u tr ted the b urd1ty or 
th nkln th t ov ment 1 de 1mmob111t1ea,l ttehe d 
l"'o ex ned he r oxe ot Zeno, but took hem or 
e~ usly. ~ter po nt1ng out o rt n ath t1o 1 11 -
c n Zen , h h~n s o d ow t e n~ ent mi t b et 
by twe n ct f beco 1 wh1 oh 1 . w th• 
o te por 1 exte ' n, n the ctu 1 entity h1ch 1 ex-
tended te r lly,2 
n the philo o er o he ev nteenth nd ei hteenth 
oentUP1 , th mo t import nt common influence er Dea-
e rtes, X nt, Le1bn1z, p z nd G 11leo . G l1leo, with 
K pler nd Newton, 1 1ven the credit of 1 y1n the round -
t1on or ern c1enc 1n strono y nd physic • The e 
1 w bee the id 1 or · owled e wh ch w re gener 1 y e• 
eepted by philo pbers, w1 h the re ult that all philo oph1-
o 1 views 
11ty."~ 
d t p a through phere of 1ntel lectu• 
De c ~t , L 1bn1z, nd plnoz re tr quently referred 
to, e ch ro~ he sam r on t e ot er , usu 1 Y• 
eon lt th t all of them negleete the import nee or t me 
an evelo ed m ch n1 m tro which 11 c ntlngency 1 X• 
eluded. 
c 1 id he 
c rte 1 it 
e:rte 
undecided, On the b 1• 
t n the s de o thou ht 
h tr ed to f1 d ~o tor tre will . Tbu , 1n the philo -
, two direction ere o ered to the 
3 . Ber gson, CE, 250• 251 . 
1 . rgeon, OE1 335- 340 . 
2 . itehe d , PR, 107. 
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history o~ tho ht, mechanism nd determin1 , or evolution 
nd treedom. cau e of the prevalence or the modern 
ac1ent1ftc thought, philosophy took the first lternat1ve.l 
Leibniz nd Spinoz brou t the ide of De cartes into 
gre ter eon 1st ncy, but by movin t rther from the truth, 
cco:rdlng to rgson, although he admitted they did d1 pl y 
a good deal or geniu , e peel lly Spinoza.2 Spinoz and 
Le1bn1z both po !ted an underlyin unity, or God, 1n which 
truth and reality both were etern lly g1ven .3 They needed 
to introduce God into their sy tem , rgson thought, be-
cau e they could see that the notion ot cau 11ty would 
otherwise lead to contingency, since it cannot be proved 
th t the aame ntecedents w1ll lway neoess P1ly bring the 
me consequents. God, then, w tor pinoz and Leibniz 
only 
final e u ation, or mechanism nd determ nlsm.• De c rte , 
p!noza , nd Le1bn1z leo tailed to con id r the true 
nature o t time • They ccepted. an "1n tantaneoua phy 1 c a , " 
uch th t the dur t1on or the univer might h ve been con-
fined to the pres nt moment.5 Tb1 1 due to the tala1t1-
cat1on of :re lity by the intellect, which oohce1ves or 
re 11ty s t tic. 
In gener 1, rgson telt that the philosoph rs and 
1. Bergson, C , 375, 
2. Bergson, C , 3,7. 
4. Berg on, TF , 213-214. 
5. Bergson, T , 208. 
3. Bergson, CE, 384-385. 
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.scientist of the eventeentb nd eighteenth centUl'ie 
brou ht the m taphysio 1 ide of Plato nd ri totle one 
ag in into p~ominence. only t t1ng them in terms or c r• 
te ian du 11am. 
Berg~on t.requently peter to Kant. One reason for th1e 
ta th t when Berg on wa writing hi philo o hy, nt' in-
tluence w ao widely felt th t the ftregul r w y ot rormu• 
1 t1ng theei was to sk how Kant h d appro ched it and 
how K nt' theory mi bt be surpa ed • ttl rg on point out 
that the cr1t1c1sme e akes of Le1bn1z nd p1noz pply 
e lly to Kant. xcept th t K nt w s o utiou eno not 
to o r!'y hi do tis too f, r • Th bum n intellect con-
ce1ved or r ality s mechanism, but the ultimate n tU!'e ot 
re 11ty w unknown. 
Kant stops th1 dogm tism on tbe incline that w 
kin it ltp too t r tow rd th Greek ta-
physic J he reduces to the strict minimum the 
hypothesi which 1 nee sary .in order to sup• 
pose the phy 1e ot Oa11leo 1ndet1n1tely exten-
1ble.2 
r on points out. nt al t On th other hand, 
w nt h d to deTelop th ide ot Deac rte th t th 0~-
te i n had b ndoned. K nt had d1ecov r d n xtr •int 1• 
lect 1 oP1g1n to the terms b tween which th 1nt lleot a-
t bl1 hes r 1 tion • r son telt tb t K nt could h ve een 
th t reality b two torm , matter and mind. The reason he 
did not w that he telt th t the 1ntu1t1on le s th n 
the intellect and th t it could never go beyond the intellect. 
chart te1n1 RBP, 130. 2. rg on, OE, 388. 
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The poat-K nt n id ali t did attempt to d velop thi aide 
ot K nti n1 m, but th 7 t 11 d becau e th y were un ble to 
ab ndon the idea that c1enc is the same or all type ot 
re 11ty. In adh ring to the chan! tic, them t1o 1 idea. 
ot c1ence. th y pp led to rat1onali m, 1nste d of pp 1• 
in to ex er1eno .1 
Ber on d 1teh d thus ppear to u e their ources 
in the s m w Y• They oknowled e indebtedness to m n ot 
import nee 1n the philo ophic 1 tradition with whom they di -
agre • by show1n that these m n h d a ide to the1r tho~ht 
which m1 ht h ve been developed in ore fruitful nner 
th the e de which w 
ltbo h rgson' 
ctually d Teloped. 
c1ent1tic atud1 were ostly in 
the t1 ld or b1olo y nd p ychology, indio tion in hi 
work s ow th t he 1 o kept up with development in phy ice, 
so that any import nt phy 1c1 ts re included mon those 
wh influenced both Berg on nd 1tehead• rg on f're• 
quently ive e ct ret rene to so1ent1f1c p pers be baa 
con ulted. Kelvin, F r d y, and Clerk• xwell influenced 
th Berg on nd 1teh ad 1n their theories of the inter-
pr t tiona ot tom • One of Clerk- :x:well' p per th t 
Ber on re ere to, tt ct1on t D1 tanoe,":S 1 one that 
it head ret r to y time • Ein te1n' tbeo~ ot 
Berg on, OE, 389-395. 
o~. r on, , 263n, 265n, 26 n. 
In ~ c1ent1~1o Pg; r , Cambridge, 1890, ti, 313-314, 
re~erred to !n rgson, , 263n . 
r lat1v1ty h d a pror und 1ntlu nee on 
itehe d.1 
rg on well as 
B.f tar the greate t n or in luence on ergson 
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w r French. any of hi !de 8 had been hinted t pr v1oua-
ly by en who re n t well known to n 11 h- pe king p opl • 
Rav 1e on, L chel.1er, Oournot, Delboeur, L 1 nde, Charcot, 
Ribot, de iran, and Gu,au re tew ot those cited by 
oh rr t 1n being import nt. Thi gre t Fr nch trad tion 
was by no e n olo ed to iteh a • The 1 nguage p:rea nt d 
no problem, d he rre uently r r r to French writ r --
/ Poincare, to:r instance, who intlueno d Berg on. But, ner-
lly epe kin 1 th co on influences on Berg on nd 1te-
h d in th F.r nch tradition r not a1gn1f1o nt. 
1. chartate1n, RBP, 42. 
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OH PT IV 
LE DING BERG.ONI !D c- ND T IR INFLUENCE 0 
1. Creat1y Evolution 
• 1ldon C rr' book d1 cue 1ng "the tund ment 1 pr1n- . 
ciple ot the ph11oEophy of rg on" 1 
Tb1a t1tl w ested by Berg on h1 selr.l 
Th prlnc ple 1s vldent tn ll . Berg on• writing but 1 x-
pres d 
on an exten lv study ot biology, 1tb pec1al e ph 1 upon 
vidence ot evolution. Berg on w or the op1n!on th t 
philo oph had erred in the p t by tt mpt.1ng to come to a 
basic under t ndin or t-eallty thl'ough tudy ot . th phye1• 
c 1 ciencea, which view d r 11ty a static, cutting eros 
r al1ty nd v1 wing it ab tr ctly t instant neous oment • 
B r on telt th t th1 re~ulted 1n a t ulty under t nding b -
cau e re 1 ty a experienced w never tatlc but in const nt 
tlux. For thi re on he felt th t the proper subject m t• 
ter or et phy · C was lite ren led 1n tudy or bio• 
lo y nd psychology. uch tudy reveals th t re 11ty is 
mo ent nd oh nge, but ore than th t it 1 th conet nt 
creation of novelty., In other word , th1 con ta.nt chan is 
not oont1.n 1 l!"e rr n ement or p rt1cles in themselves 
ch eleae, but reality 1 con t nt proce e or beeo ing. 
1. Carr~ POC, v111 . 
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nd m nt 1 ch r cter t e of th prooes 1 t at it oc-
cur a ureal durat1o ," not ucc s ion o 1mult net-
tie • n in tant n ous vi w of the w rld rev 1 it 
t tic, but xper1 nee nev r in t nt n ous. It n x-
p rienc of durat on, nd re 11ty e n only be under tood 
truly when e n in it liv n dv nee. 
study of th biolo 1c 1 science reve le an evolut on 
b!'o very 1 pl ro:rm o lit to exo edingly complex forms. 
ut, rg on felt, evolution c nnot b expl ined by the o er -
tion of th 1 w of trad1t on 1 y 1c and chemi try b o us 
they resup o unch n 1ng ubject of c ng • r on felt 
th t the th or1es of evol t1on ourr nt hi day er 1 ade-
u te to ccount tor th p e r nee of nov lty nd tor th 
production or ver higher nd more complex org nism • He 
thought that the evideno requir t e ntroduction of new 
principle which h " call d the elan vital, or vit 1 i petu • 
Thi v t 1 ur lw .y move in one direct on, tow rd the 
creation ot nov lty nd of treedo • It move upw rd ro• 
ducing or aniem of re ter enait1v1ty nd reat r in-
ten ty of duration. Thi ur e 1 completely t.ree nd 1 1n 
no way determined either by ntecedent event or by in 1 
o use except th t the direction of the move ent ia iven in 
/ the n ture of the 1 n vital nd 1 lw y toward the crea-
tion o mind or pirit. This is b c us "dur t on meana in-
vention,"l and in dur tion "the p t pr s in t the 
1. B r on, 0 , 14. 
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pr sent," 1 cau !ng the invention or new toNe. The teneion 
or duration which hold• the new toNe oaueed by th ccumula• 
tlon and synthesis ot p at experience in unity is mind. 
11atteza is seoondar7 production oauaed b7 the relaxation ot 
tbla tension. Physical bodlea, o~ forme ot lite, are made up 
ot matter aniJDted b7 .S.nd oP spirit, which require the t-
ter in order to act. There !a a large gount of contingency 
in th torma invented, re ultlng in a gr at deal of varlety.a 
Some forme of life are aaore auocesatul than other 1 the 1110• 
auooeeetul being human lite, th only to~ thua tar produced 
that is atlll capable of oontlnued dev 1opment. 
· t the end ot the vast apring•boazad f'Jtom which 
lite ha taken ita leap, all the others have 
stepped down, finding the cord stretched too high, 
man alone baa cleared tbe obataole. • •• 
Lit appears in its entiret7 ae an 1 enae wave 
wbioh, etarting troa a center, preada outwards, 
and which on lmoat the whole ot ita oirouaterenoe 
11 stopped and conTerted into oacillattona at one 
single point the ob taole haa been toroed, the 1•· 
pulalon ha paaaed treel7. tt la this r.reedo• 
that the hwaan tol'll regiater • BYerywbere but 1n 
man, oonao1ouaneae baa had to come to a etandJ in 
man alone 1t ha kept on 1te way.l 
Bat the evolutlonar7 proceaa 1a not unoppo ed. Evolu-
tion at every step ot the way repreeente a cGntliot, wh1oh 
accounte tor the lack of aucoeaa ot 1110et of' the to:rme Pl'O• 
duoed. '!'he oppoat t1on 1e supplied b7 an inveree mov ment• 
which i the production of matter. atter 1 the oppoalte 
o~ lite. It ia the diminution of the vital energ7, the re• 
1· Berg on, OB, ~2. 
2. Bergson, OE~ 278. 
rgaon, 0 , 289, 290. 
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laxation ct the tenelon wb!oh i oonaclouaneaa, the paaa1ng 
r.om freedom to m chanical neoeaalt7.1 Tbla oppoeit ten• 
d nc,- does not :rep:reeent a contrar,- force, but onl7 the taot 
that the vital impulse la t!ntte, and •gtven oace toP all.wa 
In atr1k1ng tiguPe or speech Bers on compaNe the twofold 
production ot lite and matter to a firework diapla~ in which 
the vital impetus shoot upw I'd through deaoendtng -tte:r 
like the tler7 path torn b7 the la•t J'Oolret ot a 
tireworka 4iepl&7 through th black cinders or 
the apent 'fiOCkets that are talllng dead.& 
In CB, Berg on ada1tted that hi Yiewe were a depaPture 
from traditional pb1loaoph7• Tbia waa bee use hle appeal 
was to intuition in te d of to the intellect. The tntel• 
lect• he aa1d1 bad tor ita purpose th under tan41ng an4 
od1t1cat1on ot tter and ao followed its dtrectlon, vi w• 
ing Peality a stat! and bound b7 mechanical necea lt7. 
Time vi wed a bet co poeed ot @!multaneitl a after 
the manner ot ap tlal exten ion which wae com~oeed ot point • 
Time ~or the tnt lleot, then, waa spat1al1zed and ~• lit7 
wae et t1c and mechanized. In thle ••7 the intellect talet• 
tied r alit7 and coul not under tand 11te. But lt the 1n• 
te111gence w re to ln-r rt 1t e~ lt' and plao lteelt w1th1n the 
ove nt ot lite and appeal e1mply to the paychologioal ex-
perience thu received, it would be able to experience lite 
1n the 11v1ns or 1t a a growing, os-e tt. •• and. b-ee. It waa 
1, rg on, C 1 58. 
2. Bergson, OE~ 27Y. 
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the buain a or a1 noe to an l .yze ·:r a11ty tor p~ otic 1 pu.-
poaea ae though it were composed ot 1aert matter, ut the 
purpose ot metaphy to was to und~etand lite in it true 
n tve. !'he proper ph!loaophtc method ie thel' tol'e tnt\11• 
t1on.1 
When Wb1tehea4'a PIE appeared ln 1919• Proteaaor ~. 
de Lasuna ea14 in re..-tewl 
ll:r. Whitehead eeeme to bave 1'e1t Yel'y 1feenl7 the 
t'oroe ot Pg on• a ar1t 01 ot nattl!'al ae nee 
tnoapable ot expreealn the continuity ot 
t ln • t h r d t e c:rttloi m to a ply not 
o a 1enoe a 1t ay be, but to ec1•noe lt 
• and e ulterior at or hi w 1 r 
ta to retoPm aoienoe that 1t a all no lo er 
b n to uoh or1t1ot .e 
V1cto:r Lowe m1n1 tzea the value o t 1 report and 
c1te it n xam le ott e 7 ~the rel tion ot 1te• 
e 's thought to ph7 ioal aoience eaa1ly taco ceived." 
pe kin ot de La a's ~ev1 8 idt 
Th ~Y1e r t have ln ide 1ntormat1on, 
!nee t . e only l'ete:renoe to Be:Pgson f.n the book 
is a etatem nt th t lhi tehead belt ••• hi d •-
tP! ot th "p a e of natu.Jt " 1a "S.n tull ao• 
eord with Pga n.ft On putting t e PeVie.e~•· 
opinion eto~e itehead• aeYePal years a o, I 
ec 1• the r ly that he h d P•ad Pgson, but 
was not uch worz-ied b7 hi .J what d14 WOPrT hl 
t that t1 was tbe ·. le geo tr1 had g t 
into" (in r lat1on to the phyeto 1 world).3 
Vet-7 robably Lowe haa gone t o tal".. In the flrat 
plao 1 Whitehe ct' reply 1 ambi uoua. Be 1\d 1te having 
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r d rseon, but one would w1eb that he had explained what 
he ant wh n he aid "be w a not much wol"r1 d by h1m." !t 
1 ¥1d nt f~om reading the book that b s pr1m rtly 1n• 
t Het d in geomett"y1 but ino much ot Bergson' cr1ti 1 
or c1 nee w e a oritio!sm. ot the mathematic 1 w 7 ot look-
ing at the world, it 1 not t 11 1noona1etent with Pro• 
te or de La un8. • s remark to say that he wi h•d to show th t 
the cop of tb mat1 could b b~oad ned until it w s -
te f'ot'" ph: 1ea1 science • it he d h s td th t h1e ohiet 
obj ction to Be~aaon 1e his opinion that the intellect n o a• 
aar11X t . e1t1ea the notion or prooo s.l It 1 poe 1ble that 
"the muddle geometr7 baa gott n 1nto• wa the tact that geo-
meter had tall d to exten4 themattoa beyond the m r no• 
tion ot magn1 tu4e, and had been I low to tollo• the theory ot 
relat1 1ty lnto the conatruotton or tour•d1mens1onal geomet•7 
that could a count properly to~ t!me and motion. 
In the aeoond place• lSlUCh ot th fore of' Low '11 o~1 t1-
e1am v po~atee when 1t t not d that he erred in ay1ng 
that the rev1 w tn qu.e•tion wae a r view o.t ow. instead ot 
PH, and the single Jtetel'ence to Sersaon i• hom C • '!'here 
1e moP evidence ct rga:onlan !ntluence in Pft. Wb1 tehead 
admit there that ectence bad been prone to error. 
odern speculative pbyatoa with 1·ta nvolut1onary 
theories cone rn1 th n tUl'e of tteP nd ot 
1. V!h teh ad, P,. 116 . All Peterencea tn tb1e chapte:r will 
be to 1 tehea.d. unleee otherwia 1nd1oate4. 
leotricity baa mad urgent th question, at 
are the . ultl te dat of solenoe? It 1 in o-
cord nee with the nature r t 1 s th t ank1nd 
should tlnd 1t lt acting nd hould then pvooe 
to d1 OU8 t 1' ttonal of 1ts ct1 itt a. u 
b ore t1on of ao1 nee p~ o dea the an ly ia ot 
1t ta and can ven be ocompan1ed by the ac-
cept no o~ faulty n ly a, though uch rrore 
nd b ~ rp1ng ac1 t1fie 1 n ti n.l 
1teh d al o propo a to n r t e qu t1on, "Bo 1 
p c root tn ~P ~1 no ?" nd aya t at t e t eory ot 
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r lat1v1ty has opened n :rld of tho t e to th re-
1 ticns ot p o and tim to t . ultt t dat or perc ptual 
e p ~ien~ ."e H th n go on to ay th t this e ph ia upon 
t d duot1on of o1ent1t1c eono pt tro "th 1 pl t •1•· 
nt of p rc ptual knowl dge" bring t e dt ou s1on Into 
the rt ld ot philo ophy. 
Ber 1 7 1 , ant, 
uaa 11 nd Ber son, a 
nd sustained rel nt 
rt~ nd 
1n1t! t d 
iteh a4 tu.Jtth r points out th t h gained a r at d al 
~o th philo ophteal 41 eu ion which was pr v lent ln 
ngland at th t1mo. ong tho e •ho he cit d s being 1n• 
tluent1 1 w a • 1ldon Ca r. study ot th p;roceedlnge ot 
t 11an Soc1 tz; !'rom 1914 o 191 , which 1e th 
p rlod :from lteh d' rr1val in London fro C bMdg and 
th pear nee ot PH, reveal that much ot the d1a ua 1on 
wa on • r1ous phas s or the work o~ r on. ortthrop baa 
ot tb t C rr tn u nee 
du~tng th1 p r!od. 
1. tR, •• 
s. PBlt, ,-v1. 
3 41 PJtlt., Yi1 • 
1t head in favor of Be~g on 
4. trorthrop• At-t .(19"1l 1n 
Sebllpp, PAW, le9. 
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t • t t~ee 1nd1cat1o 0 ... non! n f.n• 
fl n the • 0 1 the tr· uent of' the 
t "or t1 ot n tur , .. e 1 t e p l ie t 1on ot 
th pt'inot:pl boo 'It to 1 J t th :1' 1 eon• 
clu.d1 ap o 1o · ter nee 0 rg o nd do t1"1 e t 
1."' 
e t .,oreat1 'f/ no " 1 o rta nly r aon1an 
ide , altho h t e preo se t oe not ppeat' in rseon. 
ny co ntatore ha e noted , ho ver, t t ' s t 
!s rg ont n 1d nd g nera117 aum that Berg on 
th ourc o t e e • T 7lor; 1n hie 1927 r ticl , a e ed 
t t on ' "elan vital and 
t'ao ically 1 entlo 1~ nd th t 
1teb ad ' •or at1v1ty~ were 
1tehead as r t rr1ng to 
t B ~g on1an concept. tz , in hi tr atment o lte e c! 
aert d t 
1teh ad had gained much fro rg on and 1 x nd r, 1n• 
thiteh tanda in 
tio ship to thea two 
y, to mh • • • 
esp o1 ly in the 0 or 
tur • 
• tz g on to yt t l X r' r nee th ol!y 1 
" :r ly vatt1 t 0 Pg on' oe it h ad d re d 
118 on ore 1 xan ex-, 1 y ass that , though e 
1. Taylor, .(1927), 3•• 37. 
2 . tz, BYBP, 60 •610J or. alao 621•622. 
3. z. - ' 617. 
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might have been 1ntluenoed b7 'Alexan4 r'a t~eory, tbe Be~s· 
eonlan influence w e prior. RecentlY; Boger Hazelton haa 
nt1one4 Whltehea4's "oP at1ve advance• with the aaaumptton 
that it 1e a Bersaonlan 14ea.1 
'l'be te!"ID "ere tlve ad.Y no ," or OPeatS.ve advanc into 
novelty,• waa probabl7 lhltehead'a own. Bow ver1 Bergson'• 
whole OE 1e1 ot oourae, a 41scuaaton ot the ereat1ve powe~ 
t.n ture and he frequently speaks of it ae advancin • 
Duration 1a the contl oue progre• or the 
paat wh1 ch paw a lnto the tu.tue and wh1 oh 
sw 11 e it advanoe .s 
Whltehe d noted that everal tePm ot h1a, 1nolud1ng •o~a­
t1v advance into novelt7," were • Xpl1c1tly toP.MUlat d 
either b7 De oa.:rtee or b.y Loc:Ure .•a The exact term. howe•er, 
4oea not appear in either or the • Th oloaeat retereno 1 
to Dee arte • B_ deeor1be4 Ood'a OPeatlon ot the world 1n 
the volut1ona~r m nner ot the t1rst Ob pter ot Gent 1•• 
and in the coUPee ot thta deacrtption, spoke or "oe qui ar• 
r1Yera1t dane un nouv au."' Bersaon ment1one4 that D aoartee 
spoke of 0 oonttnued c:r t1on."5 Th!a paesage tn Bergson 1a 
also quot d by W1111a Jamee.6 Bersaon doee not o!.te th 
:re.te:rence !n Delulal'te and hie allu 1o'D is not det1n1t 
enough to be t•aeed. Whitehead• however. tound a atmtl :rity 
'between the v1ew ot De oartea and Bettgeon at tbie point. 
1. Hazelton, Art.(! 50), 4. 
a~ Bergaon, OE, ~. 
~. PR, 1 6. 5. 
4. Deaee.rtes, Dl ccUP.e de la &. 
metho~e, 1n a and Tan• 
n ry, OED, Vt, 42. 
Bergson, OE, a~. 
.Tamea, :PU', 236. 
Deeoartee ln his dietinc~1on between tim and 
d t o • d 1n 1 w 7 · r und 1ng t 1 upon 
otion. and in ta cloee r lat1on tw en tter 
e te 1~ , .nt1 1p t e tar it w 
posalble at h~ll epoch; modern notions ug te4 
y the tr n ot re1 vlty, or 7 p ct 
ot rgson• doctrine ot tb ener t1on ot th1 .1 
Wb ther Wh1 ehead fir t round the 14•• ot 8 ere ttY advance• 
111 De oart a ol' Bergaon, it 1a cert !n that he waa 1mpr ae d 
by Bel'geon' dootr1ne nd Tery prob bly it intlu need hie 
theor;y ot •oHat1vlty . " •ereat1ve. advance• t. uauall7 
ooupl d 1n Pmt wltb th eo:rrelatin phraee 8 pasa ge or na• 
tu.re." n pt wb1 h, 1t e d t tea 1n 0 • 1e •tn tull 
a cord w1th r on.• The oontex~ of 1h1a paeaag ebowa that, 
Wb1le it 1• th onl7 reference to Bersson in ow. it 1• an 
! portant one tor determining the Beztgaon1an !ntluence be• 
oau e 1t states one or Whitehead' mo t basic 14eae, one 
Which recur frequently in all h1a aubaequent work. 
The proceaa of nature oan alao be termed the paa• 
a • ot ture. I 4et'1n1 tely retr 1n at th1e 
etaae tro ua1ng the word 'time, • alnoe th mea-
urabl tim or eo1eno and or c1v1li ed lit' 
enerally m r ly exb1b1ts eome aepeote or the 
ore fundamental t at or th paa s or nature. 
I lie...e that in th1 4ootrlne I m in tull ac-
cord with rgaon* though h• usee 't1 ' or the 
fUndamental tact which t oall tbe 'paaeag ot 
natur .• leo the 8 s• or natur 1a xh1b1ted 
equally 1n apattal t~aneit1on aa well ae in t 
poral tJ- n 1t1on. tt 1 in !l'tue of it p e 
that nature 1• always moving on.2 
1tehe d here aocepta Beraeon•• orit1o1am that the 
• ea time ot ac1 noe and ot oiv111zed lite" doee not 
1. ' 145. 2. 0 ' 54. 
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rev al all t t 1 involv d in th id ot tim • Then lte 
be d or1t1oiz s B rg on ror con 1n1ng his d1 cu s1on to t1 e 
when it should h v b n ppl1 d qu lly to p ce s al o 
in olved 1n the pa a ge o nnture. 1th th1 correction 
t he d' doctrine o the paasas or natur 1 what • 
son e n by •r al duration," tb run ental t ot in th 
cone pt o •oreativ olut1on. nature 1 v 
origin t ng ts own develo ent, b ca se tim 1 1 ye 
ovi forward, perception oannot be pas 1~ contemplation. 
saentt lly perc ive our relations with nature 
bee uae the7 are 1n the m king. b aenae ot ac-
tion !a th t • nti 1 t ctor 1n n tur 1 know• 
1 dge. • •• The torw ov1ns ti e exhibits this 
ch raoteristlc ot e per! noe, t t 1t is a n-
tially action. Thie p s g ot n tur --or, in 
otb r ord 1 tt or t1v dvano ·-1~ ita tun 
m nt 1 char oter1st1o, the tr 41t1on 1 cone pt 1 
n att pt to o toh n tur 1thout its p g .1 
-rhla r1t1o1 ot th tr dition 1 concept" is erg o '• 
crlt1 1 ot tb 1nuelleot v1e 1 n ture tatio. 
rg on xhlbit n ture a un1v rs 1 eooming. Th a 
al 1 involved in it he d' ootr1n of the c at1v 
v nee, lthough h go s b o dB rsaon to 1nd1o te p c .... 
1 • t 1. co ing n wh t haa become. r e .. 
a nti lly elm nt ot aotualit nd 1 nts ot ec ibg-
n • • 
2 Oh actual • ent 1 oomplet ly actu 1 nd evo1 
ot 11 1nd t rm1nat1on, but th p a g ot n ture. 1te 
•ere tive advano .• involves the " comtngneaa ot n ture.• 
1. 2. PB1 e1. 
-
l' 0 • v w 1 t 
y t t t 
n n 
e 
1t -
The biologtoal 4eTelopmenta. the 4oct~1ne o~ eTo• 
lutton, the doot~ine ot ene~gr, and the lecula~ 
theorte were rapidl7 underatntns the adequacy ot 
the orthodox m ter1al1 • t until th oloae ot 
the centu.y no one drew that conclue1on.l 
But b7 the turn of the centur7 the ooncluelon wa drawn 
that the •orthodox ater1al1a." had 
14'1 
n w ao1 nee, and Whitehead telt that, in the tte14e ot b1o• 
logy and peyohol 7 at leaat, it w a Bersaon and 1111 
J ee that ade tb1e clear. Whitehead considered Berseon 
the • oat ohar oterietto• philoeopher ot hla epoch, co par-
ing b1 p attion 1n the twentieth century with that ot Locke 
in the a Yenteenth, 
at least ao tar aa concerns their relatione to the 
acienoe ot their t1 •• • • • Bergson introduced 
into philoaophJ the org n1o cone pt1ona ot phJa1o• 
lost al actenoe. He baa oat co pletel7 moyed 
awa7 ~o• the atatto ter1a11am ot the ae.-nteenth 
centUPJ• Bla protest ga1nat apatia11aat1on 1a a 
protest again t taking the Newtonian conception ot 
natur aa being anJthlng except a high abatra tion. 
Hia ao•o lled anti•lntellectuallaa should be con• 
atrued ln th1a aenee. In aome reapecta he recura 
to DeaoarteaJ but the ~ ourrenoe la aooomp nied 
with an 1natlnot1Ye g~aap ot odern blolo8J•I 
P ia prtm~ily con erned with phJaical ac1ence. But in 
the laat hapter, entitled "R!qthBla, *' Whitehead point• out 
th t atnc •nature 1noludea lite• the wa7 ot conoeiY!ng 
nature 4e.elope4 1n the book "baa ita bearing on biologic 1 
ooncept1ona.•3 Thla 6hapter show• many lntluenoea of rg• 
on. 1tehead apeak of the d1aouaa1on ot lite in nature 
oo ins "oana11zed• along certain conTention 1 llnee.• 
3. PH, 195. 
4. PH, 195. 
1 
Wh1tehea4 u es th1s term many 't1'" 1a PR. t tins s he 
does so, th t 1t 1e B r on's t rm.l Be~gaon us a th term 
frequently in OE to indicate the w 7 o~ niem directs and 
11 it it et1on along p o1t1o lines or ~ lev noy.2 Tbe 
t ct tba t in PlfK 1 teh d u. e the t 1-m tn a genettal e n e 
p tber th n a a pe 1f1C teohn1o 1 tel'm• 1nd1 tee t at b 
d already r a 0 with autti lent 1nt r t to m e the tePm 
hi own. 
The oh pt r t1tl •Rh,t a• 1• import nt rg on1an 
oonoept al and 1 tehe d' di cu 1on shows th t 1 t 1• us 4 
a uoh. Bezt on's idea ie that conactoueneea h a 8 1te own 
dete~ned ~hytbm" ot duration. and that there m y b aa 
aan7 different t n ion or dur t1on, or rhythms, tb ... 
are d of conee! usneas.l Berg on t1JW t ue th dea 
in TF wh re h uae t am.e logy t t 1tehead ue a, 
that or a us c 1 pblta , whic !s a unity r qu1r1n du!'a• 
tion ot p o1t1c ~hyt , uoh th t tt the dur t1on is a1• 
tered 1 the phPaae oeaeea to be itaelt. SUch 1a al o the 
nature ot li~ • This idea ia a t.Pequent theme in OE.5 In 
PIE lite is deec~ibed •• haTing •ore complex, subtler 
rhytbm•" than matter. 
Furthermore in the ph7a1oal objeot we haYe in a 
en e lo t th rhyt e !n the maoro cop1c aggre-
gate whloh 1a the final au•al character. But 
1. PR, 163. 
2. Bergson. OE, 104. 
s. 8es-geon, VM, 2'12 1 275. 
4. Bergson, T , lOOJ 
Whitehead, PHI, lVe. 
5. Ct. Bergson, OB, 1,1. 
l 9 
The 1 t pag or P cont 1n an 1 portant r t P nc to 
r o ' 
/ fJ!9 v1t 11 but th n 
o xpr a h1 own 1 a ot obj et1 
tar 41r at ob rvatl n i concerned 11 
that w know or the easent1al relatione ot lite 
in n tur 1e st t 4 in two bort poetic pbras 
The obvto aapeot by Tenn7eon1 8 Bl w, bugl 1 low- t th w!ld ech ee 
tlytns, 
d n w r, · ohoee. 
d7inge 8 
swe:r • d7ing1 dylng, 
!tal ·and tt r lap • in• ly. r eo ' 1 n 
matter. 
d o:rd.swo:rth wit 
ide t 
tn Th t 
1t wa he r 
ter noe to rg on' 
1teh d k a t 1t a b etc on pt d uae t e •~ 
an ti • e 1 o m kea u ot nu.b P of figure ot 
ape ch that expres the a ide • 
Ther 1 1 n t~e, some tendene7 upwarde, 1 a 
ontr ry ditteotion to th aa ot ot pb.yalcal d .. 
c 7• In our exp r1enc t1 d a pet1t1on, t• 
t ot 8 n 1 o 1 t1on toward td al ends wh1 h 
11 out 14e tb re phyeloal tendenoy.a 
Wh t d1at1~1 b a men fttom tbe antmala, ome 
h ns, 1 t 1nolus1on in th 1:r at a, 
waveringly and dl 171 ot 1etUl'b1ng element, 
wh1c tl g t att r th unatta1nabl • This 
element 1 tbat touoh or tn 1n1t7• • • t:rop ... 
to th eck ning light.• 
1. p , 1 7. 
e. P , 200. 
3 • FOR., '12 • 
•• ft>R, 51. 
on 
, 
'1'h whole point of th mod l'll doctr e or ev -
tion ••• r q ire an underlying activit --a 
t n 1 1 activ1ty•~expr 1ng it lf in indi-
vidual e bod1menta, nd volvi in aohle nta 
of or ni • e ors n1 1 unit ot rgen 
v 1 .1 
o ly noth r name 
teno • • , • Ita 
urging natuz. 
bout th whol 1 
at 
P rhap lao 
ro a b 1 t own 1 pul 
• • • Th r ativ t.• 
o within. 
Life act a t ough 1t w r cat lytic nt.4 
'l'b can liz 
ti in it 
is for co 
power ot 
tion or th or t1v ge, e e pli• 
ae1ve r production or aoo1 1 n xu , 
n n e th fin 1 illu tration ot the 
tubborn fact. 
Th e uotation do not oonat1t te all th 1 p11o1t 
reterencea of Whitehead to thi• baa1c idea of Berg on'a, 
. 
but they abould auttlce to prove that it w a recurrent 
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theme ot Wh1tehead'e• bam times Whitehead, a at the end 
ot P , uaea the idea or the /lan vital with ita correlative 
notion of relapse into atter. Thia ia to be expected 
inoe itehead adopt Bergson'• view ot lite as oona1at1ng 
ot a definite rhJtbm, lacking 1n matter. Like PIX, Religion 
in the Maklps alao close with the 'lan vital and ita re-
lap e into tter. 
'l'h paaa ge or time 1 th journey of' th world 
tow r th g ther1ng ot n w 1d into c 1 
1. s "· 110. 
"· 
PR, 162. 
2. C 1 '73e 5. PR, 19'1. 
3. t.(1923) in B, 61. 
f ct. Th1 adventure i s up TB and ownw rd s . 
a teTer cease .. t o e.Peend , _ 1s to pre erve it-
self and ent er s upon it 1nev1t bl path of 
decay . It dec ys by t r a . mitt n t nat ur t o 
slight er oco s1on of actUal ity. • • • The 
un1vottae ho u t o aapect : on on id 1t 
i phy~1 onlly w ting, on th oth r ~1de t 1e 
spiritually ascending. 
t 1s thu passing w1tb a lown s , 1no n-
oeiv ble in our ure of tlme, to new cr a• 
tive cond t1ons , amid h1ch the physic 1 world, 
w t pre ent know 1t, will be represent d 
by rippl bar ly to be d1et1ngu1 h d ~om 
non•ent1 ty .• l 
1tehe d does not 11 however, ace pt the !de re 4y-
made f'leom the hand of Ber eon. 
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~ecogntzea 1n the •lan •ttal eometh1ng ot an •unsolved mya• 
t ry." 
1 
But lt w survey the un1veree of natuPe, mere 
tat1o urviT 1 m to b the en z-a.l rule, ao• 
companied by alow d ay. Th ln tano a o th 
upw rd trend ar rep~eeent d by apr1nkl1ng o~ 
x eptton l oaa s • • • This mp1P1o 1 et 
co titute on o~ d 'e t un ol ed myate~1 e ••• 
e all r cognize ~gson doot~lne ot the elan 
it 1 and it r•l p into m tt r. Th doubl----
t ndency o advane nd r lap e h ~e plainly 
stat d. But w not giv n any pl natory 
!ns1ght.2 
a e hee1t t1on to o all the w y with 8 r ron 1 ~-
e ted 1n d1 s cus ... ion t th '41'1 tot 11 n ~oe1 ty in which 
1tehead took rt. 
at I :really doubt 1 whether t :r-e 1 any term 
autf1c1 ntly comprehen ive to e brace th ulti-
ate QOncrete ~aat. • • • ur naly 1 1 alw ye 
by way or abstraction' tbus we haTe Berg on•s 
urge or 11~ ' e. ld ne s knowl dge, l'kel ,.. 
1nd, nd o on. So e of th se t mtt r b ttet-
I , 159•160. 2 . JOR, 23. 
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In PR:~ tehe d o e to r p w t t e ~ yate~" and 
aol ed it a 1 8 by the uee ot the te "crea-
t1v1ty• ~or B r eon' t / elan vit 1, t 1nclud1n ! the 
1d :r t rgeon h d xp11e t 7 1nolud d. In , 
d eveloped. or lly t n 1l'tot or r eon bad 
on , the eone t or r1sh1ng" nd dde t e cone pt ot 
"object1v 1 ty. 
o 1d a ot evolut1 n tor both Whitehead nd 
Berg on !s thA it 1e cr t!ve, t t tt result in the con• 
tin 1 erg noe ot ovelty. '!'he un!Yera 1 always row! 
d b o uae th P ult o the growth •re th ulte ot 
creation, the otu 1 r at!on ar not .et rm!n d. either 
te ther lmag!n bl a t1n1shed creation because the proc se 
1 the 1111ng ot a void, but is r .ther 
ba n ver yet been.~3 
"paee!ng into ~at 
' 
() 
ide 
oal 
t1 • 
GO e 
n 
. t\ll' ! e n ver eo 'Plet • !t ~1 y p e " 
yond t elf'. Tb1e 1e the er tiv advance ot 
tur • 
r . on 1 1 t t t "t rol r 11 1 to 
ind t 1natSon into tt r ... ~ te e d h e 
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t 
1lal" 
e b r. tea t t n tu:r-a le.we ve only etat atl• 
a d1t nd t t ey h ld only t t- in r ni oeie-
If 
"ln a living cell, the t t1at1c 1 bel noe baa 
be nd 
ault 
•• 1 n e t on o e o always re• • 
:ze otly in e er ent ~t v lu • E oh etu entity le 
lta lt oreattve, In 1 r pect it n j oy tree-
do • nd thu ia subject to error. Her Wb1 he d a eea 
wit rg on 1 tb d a that th a4van e a not 1 7 suo• 
ful or value•produc1n • ror 1 the price w ~·7 tor 
t 1 point 1te e do s o be70nd rg n in ae 
e n1oa 17 
e much 
aerti h t, 11 1 t'e o nnot be xplained 
by nteoedent et o.ient o us , 1 ther 1 t re 
oont ngenay n na Ul'e s Rer a on ee t find. Lite needa 
1. • 
-2. • 
!. 0 ·~ 13 .. • 
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to be xplained by •ttnal oau.e.~ 1 Tb1a t1nal oauae 1 to 
be tound in the aubj ot1ve toPB ot eve~7 actual ooo aionJ it 
1e also to be toun4 ror e't'eJty aotual oecaaion tn the conse-
quent nature ot God. God doea not oontrol the cr at1v1ty be-
oauee e't' n he may be tranaoende4J ln taot, a •auperjeot" 
God growe with the ad't'anoe ot nature. 
The oreat1v1ty ie not an external agenc7 with ita 
own ulterior purposes. All aotual entitles share 
with God th1a characteristic ot eelt-oauaat1on. 
Por thia reason e't'erJ actual entity also eharee 
with God the oh raoter1et1o ot traneoen41ng all 
other act al entitle 1 1nolud1n Go4.2 
t God 1e a power working tor the emersenoe ot 't'Alue, 
and 1n tb1e re peot there 1• lea oonttnseno7 in Whitehead'• 
•7 t m than in Bergaon'•• 
The novel tact aa7 throw back, 1nh1b1t, and de-
1&7• But the advance, when it doea arrive, will 
be r1ohe~ !n content, more tully coDdit!oned, 
4 aore stable, ••• The categories governtns 
the determination ot t 1ng a~e the reaaone wb7 
there Should be evilJ and are alao the reaaona 
why, !n the ad't'anoe ot the world, particular evil 
tact are t1nall7 traneo nde4.a 
The probl m ot evolution 1a the developaent or 
enduring harmonies or enduring ehapee or value, 
which merge lnto higher atta1naente ot thins• 
beyond thema 1 vee •' 
Berg on !n CB 1e anxious to avoid the 4ootr1ne ot t1nal 
oause, but later, 1n T&MR, be appPoaobea lbttehead' dootPine 
ot God more olea ly. 
One o~ the waye Talue 1 produoed 1n the world 1a the 
adaptation ot orsanta to the1P environment. Thia 1e a 
3. PR, Ml. 
•· s w, oe. 
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tnt in Darwinian evolution. But o~e 1 port ·nt t ct a 
t at or an1hl 7 od1f7 their envtr nment • !'hi a i ... 
p o1 117 tru or higher o~ nt a who r o pable ot thin • 
tng, a torm ot p t!tlon, in lh1tebead 1e terminolo y.l 
The o~e otng d1 a ion of rs on'~ dootrtne o ftorea-
t1ve volutionM 1n th philo ophy or lhltehea4 indio tea oon• 
a14 r le 1ntl enoe or rg on on lteh d, It ne de to be 
point d out g tn t at thls doctrine lao received l"eentor e-
ment t.Po Llo7d org n and s u 1 lexande~, nd th t White-
head c me to the ph11oaopb;r ot organism through the atud7 ot 
mathematics and mathemat14al phyaioe. But atter this haa 
been aaid1 there attll remain 
tbat tht• doctrine ot .Berg on• 
Whttehe d's nd nd helped h1 
auttictent evidence to how 
round readJ acceptance in 
in de•elop1n h1 b.tloeoph• 
leal ayat • ~$ lntluenoe, e c1 117 of Or•at1v volution, 
w 8 quite m rked 1n P , but the book lao tnfluenoed pro-
foundly hi 1 t r thought. 
2. T!m Duration 
rgaen'e !rat book, Ttme n~ ~ee W111, called in 
French, E•ea! av lee donnees 1aned1ates de la coneo!enoe, 
•An Eaaay on the ~ediate D ta ot Cone~1ouaneas." The 
re eon tor this title 1 Berg on'• oonv1ot1on that the st rt• 
ins point in philosophy Is experience. He w a convinced that 
traditional concept may 80 color thinking that errors are 
1. PR, 165•1158 • 
1 
p ~petuated 1ndet1n1tely. · ne aucb error is th ntr ~uct1on 
0 the d or ep t1 1 xt n on 1nto t idea of' t • '1'h 
t~ad1t1on 1 concept, or t b olut t or t paG n time, 
w both Peal, homos neo , nd 1nf1n1t ly d ibl 1 to 
point .w1thont gn1t de and n ta t 1thout dur t!on. 
g on cont n4 d t t an p~ejudie~ n ly 1e of xp r1ence 
s o th s 1 w o t p ce • t no of 1 • 
t1 th t o ndur nee. e pre ent 1 
The xper1 noe or 
tro · th p except ab t~aotly. n tante, or a.a h te:r • 
1t, • 1 ultane1t1 ," are nevet- exper1 need, but e ch blend 
with on noth r 11k t e n t s ot tun • 
Pur . the torm 1ch th euc sion ot 
ov oon t s aasumea when our eso let• it-
elf' 11 • when it ref'l' ina from parating it 
present t te ~om it to r stat s. • • • Nor 
ne ~ 1t o~ et its form r state : it t no h 
that, in r calling the t tea, it doe not eet 
t m long 1d ta ctual st te e one point long-
aide ot r, bUt torms both the past and th re-
ent tate into n ors n1o hole, h ppen when 
e zteo 1 th no.te of' tune, mel t!ng1 o to - p&ak, 
into one anoth r.l 
Thus fol' rgson time w n e n a pure dtll'ation, 1nd1v1alble 
1nto parte excep by ab tract1o • 1s pure urat1on 1 not 
ho ogeneou , b t oompo d ot th vary! ).'tb,.thms or life it• 
elf; it 1 the rorw ~ moving creative advano 
., 
or the elan 
Th! concept 1 ndamental to all of Bergson's 
thinking and 1 pr supposed ba 1c in ~verJthing which he 
ha wr1tt n. If Wbi teh ad wa. to find uch of value 1n 
1• B rg on, T , 100 .. 
rg on, it would n ces ary ror h1 to 
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c pt rgaon' • 
v1 w or pul' dll.t' tion, 1 prino1pl t lea t. Tht . b Y1• 
d ntly 1 ' ltho b h& od1f1 d rg on• vie • 0 h t 
no eP t bri the into gr t r ooh r no • 
l'b1t he d th t1c1 w 8 ore ad pt h :rg-
on 1 d alin with a tr otto J t le st, he wa ox-e w1ll• 
ing to d 1 w tb them and eon 1der d th 1 portant tor ola 1~ 
ty of' tho ht, B had ao· th lighte t d1tt1c lty 1 aep -
r t! 1 hi mind b tr etton ~o h r ct or ·p 1 nee 
and ha suec eded admirably in k pins th m eparate~ 1n hla 
wr1t1n s. Th1 t c111ty in ab t:r ot1ons ocount tor o e 
ot hi pp rent diverg nee £rom rg on in tb dis uea1on 
or t1 • n he diacusae •the 1mm 41 te data or con o1o~•· 
1 very clo e to r on. it hea ' d1 tinction 
tween in t ntaneou n s nd 1mul.t ne1ty, whtoh Bergs n 
us a s on ou 17, 111 tr t this. it bed 
to m ke b1 a 1ng ol _ r because w a •war that h1e u a 
w at variance with tr dit on. t n 1ty a propertv 
ot elem nt which a e t co ponent of dur tlon. It 1a 
thus ~ lat1v t ~. - vent whic ~ uc aa1 • ~or 
b 1ng would b e1mult n ous for b 1ng w1tb 
of dm-a t1on ~or his pea1ou pP nt. 
tde:r s n 
duration r t ina within 1t lt th pal ag ot 
nature. There a.:r within it ant cedent · nd oon• 
uents h1ch a:r al o du:r tion which 7 be 
t oo ete apeo1oue presents ot qu1o er oon• 
aciouanee ••· In other words a duration ~•ta1n• 
tempo:r&l th1ekn aa. Any concept ot all natur aa 
in antan ousn 
1te 
ord1 ~1 y a n eived 
pree 1v 
1~ 
• 
OR, 5 
, 
n U!'a 
• 
-5'1. 
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ctor 
ts n b r ct on. 
t tht s r bl t1m • 
n t r ~ound 1n pe 1 noe noP x-
n t\ll'e to m nd not the 
n n n 
• • • ut he q tty 
sur be 
Th~tt i.e to 
tt oo-
• • •• Th 
from t e 
the er 1 
n n t n e.4 
r ~ ron o 
at In tantaneousl7 
r but . of. e etr clty n 
to expreaa our expeotat1ons. 
p tat on or ev a ecoll a-
and tb!a taot, which 1e iron, 
A er o • r n 
Olf, 55. 
o , n , 1 
on 
Whit 
ad a b olog CAl o~ n . m re on 1 v 1 in ~o­
qu1r1 g time tor tun t1on1ng.l 
Our p ro ptlon of time 1 aa dur t1on, nd th ae 
n t nt . h ve only on 1ntro uo d by rea on or 
auppoa n oee tt,- ot thought. In taot baolute 
t m . juut a mue etaphy teal monstrosity 
as b olut s oe.2 
1 9 
ne ta t that sugge ta possible erg on! n intlu noe 
it he dt t eo~y t t1 1 that 1n 1905, in th o1r-
1t head had eept d e· theory ot 1 e aa 
ta.nta. 
~ompo 
111 to 
xtatents ot 
dy 41c r1 1 relation havi 
n t nt of ti and these only 
as ry 
... 
r 'r'J' 1n er st in th 1 
ma tie 1 nd not met p io 11 ut stnc h 
hf. v ew 
lr wa mathe-
eters to •yn .. 
etant "ult1 st 1 taken 
a a met ph 1c l s ptlon well. pparently 1t was tb 
oonalde at1on ot th natve ot chang th t ua d lm to al• 
ter h1 position nd 1noe, b be n • own, tb writing 
or PO w a oona14 ably unde:r the ipfiuenoe ot Bet-gson, it is 
ery 11k ly th t r on• vi wa o oh ng du:r t on were, 
in p rt t le _ t, n pona'tble f'or the ~hange.. '!'he t"ollowtn 
. qu.ot t1on 7 
• 2. 
J. 
n be a rete• not to his to~er po 1t1ona 
46'7, 468J or. Lo , t~t.(104l) in cb11PP• 
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t ur t1onles 1nut nt 1 
a con eptton. It 1• !mpo a1bl to 
d in v loc!ty , ithout o ~etel' nee to the 
Thua ohanse 1 eaaent1all7 
p st and of' th rut 1n· 
d1 in t rn 1onl • 
oord wtth Bergaon.•S 
u e a dur t!on i cl 11 o n t e throughout 
1t ep 
' 
d b 0 u the I' I- nt ur ion cont in lement 
fioo th p t flltUl' ' it ad lt y h t r eon ia 
in rror 1n attrl 1 • ti 1 t .. t d:t to:Pt ot 
th world 1ntr d o•d t 1n 11 ct. at er, wapat1a11&a• 
t1on 1 1 f et r 1 p y c 1 n tftution rev P1 
• 
p , 2 • 3. c ' •• 2~ p • • 
1&1 
aotu 1 oecaeion."l The reason tor this c~1t1ciem or Bergson 
was Bergson's concept or space. He a oepte4 the X nt1an 
v! w ot ep oe a a form or the under tanding • Aa auoh it 
was 1nt1n1tel7 dlvie1ble into point without magnitude. 
This static view ot apace Bergson reje~ted ae expreae1ve ot 
anything but distortion bJ the intellect which conceived 
ot space !n th1 way for praotto 1 purposes. But Whit head 
thought of space as real in conjunction witb time. 'l'be ultl• 
mat ex1at nts are events, ot which the limiting type 1 an 
actual entit7• Spatial exten 1on is ot the same order aa 
duration• in th t tt ba spati 1 thickneea. tn tact it in• 
eludes the whole of nat~e, lthough ercip1ent e•ents elect 
only small part ot natur a relevant. 
One or Whitehead's cbtet divergence ~0 the view or 
Bergson is that while Berg on usually ape k only or dura• 
t1on, Wh1teheacl apeaks ot durations. '!'hie really is riot eo 
much divergence aa a refine nt or Bergson'• view occa-
sioned b7 the theor7 or relatiY1ty. In tact, ther are 
places in Bergson's wri tlngs whet' he •eems to pp:ro ch 
lb1tehe d's views nd m1 ht h ve come to them had he oar• 
r1ed his an lye1e 1Uztther, Whitehead 1e in agreement with 
Be!'gson t:rom Be:rgeon' s point ot view. Hi d1yerg noe come a 
t:rom a dttre:rent view ot ec1ence. Th1 1a brought out at 
th beginning or PNK where Whiteh ad dtecusees the tradition• 
al Yiew that Berg on o:r1t1cizea, 
t i phya1c 1 xpl nationt • • • During 
the modern period the orthodox newer has in• 
v ri bly n couched in terms o Tlm (flowing 
equably 1n measurable lapses) and ot Space 
(tim 1 a, void o ctiv1ty. euclid n), nd ot 
Material in apace ( uch as matter, ether, or 
el ctri ity). 
The goyerning principle underlying this cheme 
is th t xten ion, namely ext n ion in tt e or 
extension in apace, exprea es d1aconneot1on. 
This principl is u a in the e pt1on that 
causal action betwe n entities aepar t d in time 
or in ap 1 impose bl nd that extension in 
apace and unity ot being are 1nconsiatent.l 
1 2 
tter criticizing the traditional concepts, Whitehead goes 
on to expree hie own view ot events as the elements or 
actuality which partake ot the paaaage of nature, othe~1ae 
called, 1n Ber aontan terms, the creative advance ot n t~ • 
Bergson xpreaaed this adY nee 1n terms or time as pure 
duration. Whitehead however w a not c~pletely a t1at1e4. 
There 1s a tructure of events and th1a structure 
provide th rr mework or th xt rn lity or a-
tur within which object are located. • •• 
Space and time are bstra tion expr a 1ve t cer-
tain qualitiee of the atructure. • • • any paee-
time bstractiona r po ibl , ach t 1t own 
apeo1f1c relation to nature, • •• In space-
t1 abstraction, t1 xpr s ea ert in qual1t1 a 
ot the paaaage ot natur • This passage baa also 
been c 11 d the ore t1ve d noe o n tur • t 
th1 paeaage is not adequately expreeeed by any 
on tim - y te • Tb whol et ot t -ay te 
deriYed trom the whole set ot apace-t1 e abatr o-
t1one expr aee tb totality of tho prop rt 
ot the creative advance which re capable ot being 
r ndered xpl1c1t 1n thought. Thu no 1n le -
tion can be oompletely concrete in the een e or 
repre nt1ng a poea1bl whole ot all ture with• 
out omiaaion. Por duration 1a eaeent!ally 
rel ted to on p o -tim ay te a t u omlt 
th se p ct or th pasea which find •xp~ ea1on 
in other pace-tim y t m , co d1ngly ther 
c n no duration w o bound! mo nts re the 
tir t and la t mo ents o~ o t1on.1 
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For Whit h d• a dur t1on 1 n xpertenoe or a p rt!cular 
percipient ev nt and corre pond to it p cto r$ ent. 
Tb ult! t t ct for obe r tto 1 knowl 
pe,_.e ption tlu-o . h a: clurat1onJ namel71 
oont t ot a p ciou r 1 nd n t dur t1onl 88 t:nstant.- ts an ultt ate 
sc1ence.2 
1 eh sd e a to h ve telt t t rg on's 1ew ot duration 
w tru a t r a h went, but that h expr as d t, 1t 
w too general. Be th Petor gave the t rm p • 
tur to what Bergeon call d dur tion and s v tbe 
ot n -
t1on to the expert nc or tbi p ·•• g which, he maint lned, 
was neither continuous nol" 1nt1nit 1 d1 1 ble, In other-
word • it was ato ic or epochal~~ In thi view te d 
diet ngu! h betw n a tu lity n pot nt! 11ty.t oten-
t1 lly dur tlon ls p eontinu1t71 but ctual1ty ! tomto, 
compo e of ctu 1 ent1tie 1 eh w!th Its own spee1ou 
pr e nt nd o 1t own dut"att.on. Th r tore, tim ~·1e d 
hlator1o lly 1s a uco es1on or dur tion , or 
This theory ot duration e at f'1t-st to 
. s pooh • 
t I' wid • 
ly fl'om B rg on. H oould not oonceiv ct dUlt tio 
d1v1d 
• 
xoept 1n dietoJ-t!on by the 1nt llect. 
1• PBX, 80..81. 
2.. PNK, a. 
3. s w. 12'7t. 
or w can naly a thing, but not a proo e J 
we o n break up extensity, but not dur tion. Or, 
1~ w per !at ln n ly ing it, un onaoiou ly 
transform th proc a into a thing and duration 
into xtensity.l 
1t h ad in hi thod or ext naive ab tr otion" does 
onac1ou 1 w t rg o a h re 1a don unoonac1oua17 
16, 
wll n w an lyz a dur tion • But bJ th oon c1ou h tr 
t!on, hit head 1 bl to 1at1 utah betw en the batra t 
and th actual and he 1nta1na that whil xtena!on 1 
lJZ d into •ab tr ot!v ele nte, the relation ot apa 1o-
t por 1 xt n ion !a re 1 aa exprea 1ve ot the struotur or 
ev nt • For Bergson, extena!on m ant the absolute th or7 ot 
p ce and t1m which both he nd Whitehead rejected. 
It th id as ot Bergaon nd Whiteh ad are compared, 1n-
atead of their terminology, th view of Berg on ia att r all 
not o ver7 tar tro 1t e d, Berg n hinted at the idea 
ot div rg t tim ·•7 t ma ln his 1ft of the arted tensions 
of dur tion a lived b7 reatur with differing d gr ea of 
con iousne a ,2 ttehead augg at a very aim11 r view when 
h ay , • shall t1nd th t th re are ln n tur co p tlng 
t1 • 1 te d riv d tro ditt r nt t 111 a of durat1ona.ftS 
nd r eon ugg at that th r 1 eena ln hi h uration 
m 7 b cone 1v d a mult1pl1clty, nam ly, the sen in 
which itehe d t1nd duration 1v1ded, duration as xperl• 
need. Ber on aaya that •dur t1on within ua 1a a 
1. rg 1 T , 1 • 2. Bergson, , 275. 
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_.qualitative mult1pl1c1ty.w But, he s y , *The 
lnner urat on ~ not xtern 1 to one a oth ~. 1 
nt ot 
er on 1 - v r-y cl to t e n y 1 ot 
th pe~ nee o t e !.'~ nt. it he d n yz th "ob• 
e vat on 1 e nt•2 n n :ral y, 'P 1 c b to ny 
pe~c p ent eo a on. 1' on n yz a 1 t f"ro t no nt 0~ 
v cf one e e ub ct. 1 1' n' 
a lur o not t at t l" m ht e any num l' r d1rr :rent 
t t' h v w pr otic 11y dent ca l • t 1te• 
6 d' 
• 
t e. hat t head e 1 t n, Berg on 
a a "p:r ent." 
Th rea • conor t , 11v p:re ent • • • neceasa~11y 
oeupies a duration. • • • What t oall ' y 
pres nt' h o oot n 1 a t and nether in 
my t\ltuH.s 
The conclusion to be dr wn t.ram thie d1seue _1on 1e 
t t Bergeon' doctrine of time H 1 dur t!on influenced 
Whitehead • s re-.1 ion of' his view or t1 e, and eepec:ially !n 
th formation or 1 v1 w or t e pa sage ot natu.J' • t 
Whit head, und :r t lnnuenc or h th 07:7 or r lat1 v1 ty 
to ther w th an b tr et1ve analy 1 that rg on did not 
attempt, r tin d Berg en• view 1n aa 1m1lat1n pat! 1 x• 
ten !on to temper 1 exten ion aa to ether expreas1v ot the 
aotual atruot\U'e of' event • Vlb1t he 4 al o d v loped 
Be~g on' gener 1 v1 w o urat1on into h own " pooh 1" 
th ory ot time. 
1•.. Bergson, TF , 226. 
2. ON, 186. 
16 
s. Intellect nd Intuition 
Berg on' doctrine ot intuition nd tb corre ponding 
critic! ot the int 11 ct r pr ent one of th b ic prin-
ciple of hie philo oph7 nd the chief are in whi h h 
diverges tro tr 1tion. Bi view i that, in the proo sa 
ot evolution, tro i le t to the oat co plex living b 1ng 
th r h been progrea ive d v lopment or the intell ot aa 
an 1nat nt bywh1o it 7 • ecur the pert ct fitting ot 
our body to 1 t nt." 
e shall aee that intellect teela at 
ho amon 1nani te obj ct 1 ore e pecially 
oli4a, wher our otion find it tulcrum 
and our indu try it tooliJ t t our oono pta 
b ve been formed on the odel ot aol1daJ th t 
our log1 i 1 pre- 1nently1 tb logic ot eoltdal 
that, oon qu ntly, our intellect triumph• in 
Becu 
eomet•y, wherein i reve 1 d the kinship ot logi-
al thought with unor nized tter, and wh re the 
1nt 11 ct h a only to follow lt n tur 1 ove nt, 
tter the light t poaa!ble oontaot with exp r1 no , 
in order to go trom discovery to d1 covery, aur 
th t xp rlenc 1a following hin 1t nd will juat1ty it 1nv r1 bly.l 
t ita n ture, a dev loped in th evolution ry pro-
cea 1 t e lntell ot v1ewa all r llty in the ame w 7• It 
aeee t1 aa co in t nt , ep oe oom oa c! or 
point 1 nd 11 reality in rt, tollowin th 1 w of 
oh nio by which obj ota ov in p o nd endur in euc-
oea 1Te mo ent ot ti e. 11 po 1t1ve o1 no 1 th~ the 
work or the int 11 ot,2 nd po 1tiv1am aa a philo ophy ia 
pP ctically the a otb oaia ot tb intell ct. 
r eon, C , xix-.x. 2. rg on, C , 214. 
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But beoaue th int 11 ot ha dev loped in thi way, 
1n whic it i uzu- 11abl • It an-
not und ratand life, oau e t o tegorlea do no le ve 
room tor growth, tor novelty, or e do , for u lit t1v 
41 t n tion , for h nge. nd oau e th 1ntell ot 1 thus 
limited in it cope it c nnot co pr bend th ulti t na-
ture ot re lity, which 1 the pro in e of taphyaio • n 
ne tt pt to underatand th univ r 1ntellectuall , he 
• a it only 1n t rma ot phy 1oal categories and a mater1al-
1et1c, m oh n1 t!o philo ophy t t 1 contrary to the de-
liv rano a t xp ri no 1 th result. Th1a 1 t er a 
•metaphy 1 1 do at1a " or • taphy 1 al skept1o1am,• 
neither of ch " dd anything to po 1 t 1 ac1enoe."l 
nly poa 1ble t od ot philosophy, Ber on thought, 
wal an in raton o th int 11 tu 1 thod • Inat d o 
!ntell ctu 1 na ya1a, one 
aide, in the act of living. 
t le rn or lit ~om the in• 
beneficent fluid bathes ua, whence we draw the 
v ry foro to 1 bor and to 11v • o th1 ooea 
of life, in which we are 1mmer ed, we are con• 
t1nually dr wing ometh1ng, nd w f el that ur 
being, or at lea t the intelle~t that guides it, 
haa been to ther in kind or local o n en• 
trat1on. Philosophy oan only be an ettort to d1a-
eolve ag in into th lhol • In lli enoe, r ab-
orbed into ita principle, ay thus live back 
again 1 own gene ta.e 
n 
Thia ·one lou n o life 11v d, rgaon 11• ntu1t1on. 
1. Ber aon, CE. 215. 
2. Berg on, CE. 210. 
By intuition 1 m nt e kind o intell ctu 1 ~­
~ by which one places oneself within an oSjec 
In!O:rder to oo!noid it h t un qu in it n 
oonaequentl'y tnexprea ib'le. • • • It there exiete 
any n of po s 1ng r 11ty bsolutely tn• 
stead ot know1n it rel t!vely, ot placing one lt 
within it 1 t a ot look! at it tro out e 
point or view, ot having the intuition instead ot 
m k1ng the an lye at in ort, ot 1z1ng t t u 
any expreae1on, tr n lat1on, or ~bollc rep~een-
t tion- t p yeioa 1 n • 
rg on' att ck o o a d 
1 
t e r d!t ona.l • tion 1 t aceua d h1 
ot 
nt1-
1 t lleot 11 1 th b n o nt ot th ope ot v ri able 
owl dg • B1a emph a1 upon ntuition 
eubj ot vi I n o na qu ntly liable. to yetioi 
en ooking, o all s a 1 rg pl o or my tic in h1a 
religious philo oph 1 orit t oono ption ot tn-
tuition a 1 at exp r1 no 1 u e " hatev r c 1n-
t r t in xper1cno !a lr dy o ught 1n idea." ocldng 
t lt th t ther n be no s r p noy b tw en th tlueno7 
o re 11ty and the rigid!t7 ot ideae, because ideas re bl 
to ent rt in oh nges nd ent in their obj eta with-
out theme lve pite of th orltio:lsm, 
the auty d ol r1t ot on's expo it1on, t range ot 
hi a 1 ni I nd t br1111anc nc1 el v noe o ot 
bla in 1g te co nd d th ttention nd v n the adm:lttation 
d the ph11osoph1oal world. Tben, when Whitehead's Prooeaa 
and Rea11tz appeared, lh1tehe d declared that he intended to 
de tend r on. 
1 
1 o ~ atly ndebt o 
James. and J hn De e • 0 ot 
h been to 
the oha~ e or ant1•1nt 
7 ~ on ly een 
Thi t o t 1n • It nt t h reec1 wit rg• 
BO t oz. ticiern ot o enc nd ilo op ..,, t le at 1 p rt, 
d it m nt t t one d I' d 
. 
r son' thod () ntu tion 
to 1 it ' t ory or 1ntu1t on is not dent1-• 
0 1 1t th :re m ny point r g e t. 
t d at t t h g~ d \1'1 t on' 
·-
ert1 '"t 1 1 t 1 1 proc s."2 
But, 1 I' on, t he G 1e l' 41-
t on e no pt ot nd 11 0 s ben ahown• 
th1 al .., I t d -~ ed, 
wh th t1o , ' o:r 11 0 by, e 8 in 
on t uc tiel , q e . t o t r up o ot 
th tr 1t on o noepts nt:r-o oi nov 1 oon pt I 0 1" 
e toro1n tho e 1n r due 4 by oth re, He 4 itt d that 
8eJ>gson1 r1t1o1 or tr d1t o 1 ilo o h'y 1n ener 1 
ju t1f1ed, but t lt a :r on d c rr1ed 1 prot t teo 
tar. 
n the whol , iatory t philo ophy auDpor 
r o ' r e t -t e hum n 1nt 11 t 1 • 
t1 lize t un1veiJ o'; that 11 to say, th t it 
t nd to 1 nol"e t .. fluency, nd to anal7• th 
wol'ld in t rme or at t1o categories, Inde d 
r on went f ther and aono 1ved th s t nd noy 
e n lnh :rent neo aa1t of the tntell t. I o 
2. B P, 116. 
1"10 
not be11eYe this couaationJ but d hol 
'apatializat1on' is the shortest ~oute to 
out philosophy expree ed in re on 17 
lan u e.l 
lteh 's d1 g nc 0 rgeon' a vi w w a due to the 
d1f't r nc in their 1d of p • rgso ocepted Kant' 
oon ion ot p c aa a to~m ot h unde~ t ndin , while 
t head h ld to a heot-y or ap . c -ti •• s a o an tim 
h e 1mil ted in th th oPy Of P lat1v1ty.2 87 
ti liz t1on" 
r t that an e 11 
t t 
tun4am nt 1 
1n 11 ct n~ to think ot th 
s 11k mult1pl1c1 ot oint 
t nd ne to gnor th 
ot r lity. The 
apr d out in 
t 1d b aid • White-
h d p 1 hi crlt1o1 
' 
nd f lt that be• 
~or r on t1m h d not b n on 1 er d ith uft1c1 nt 
n ••• t it he d 1d 
t1 d1 tort d realit • In 
batl" o ion t t 
t re t t p t1 11za-
'• opinion, p t!ali-
c • ry for p rc pt1on z t1on a 
knowl d 
1 r 
• cc 1ng t th th o y ot 1 1 it , the 
b vi d tro d!tt 1 vi wpo1nt , b t n in• 
d!vi u 1 o rv r nnot v t 1 er s rro mol"e than on • 
FoX' n;t on o s rv r, pe.ti liz 1o oc.cura when .,, r there ia 
d no 41tterenoe for hie 
opt single 
t e older New• 
, the 1ntelleot 
but ot the 
l'Tl 
perception 1n the mode or pr 8 ntat1onal i 1 - - t 
8 t1 11 at1on o~ th pr 8 nt dur tion. Th1 mode ot per-
c pt!.on no r r nc to th p at or ture nd o h 
n J'e reno to • ut 1 er 1 going to b n kno 
1 
t1 
h 
1 obj o s , t t 0 ht 0 8 -
our-d ne1 try, b wh1o 
ut hi eory or o d r ln n tUl' • r uir. a both 
tion o pr nt dur ion in t d ot c 1 r-
tic y, n th pero pt1on or "pr n d lo 1' in t od 
0 r e nt t1on 1 d1a • p t1 11 tion bu does not 
to t r 11 1 b t -p otor o · r 1 i portano in 
t ph ic 1 c 1tut1on f t 1 titi • 
r 8 r n 
ti ot the world to 
J'e 
1 d r a e with it h d n 1 c it1o1 of' rg• 
son' Yi w.3 
it h d' own r1t1c1 ot ao1 0 and philo sop y 
s ai 11 r to r aon•a . orit1 t ubjeot-p 1-
c t t r or 1on &OJ' phllosophJ'" 
h 1 tl ' lo 1o, ult d in tb t 11Ult 
to r co niz b etu 1 1nt rc • t d or th ld . 
1. PR, 1 s. 
2 . R, 9 . 
3. lexander, ~D, I, 14 • 
intellectual 1mowled8e .3 --- r- ----- ~ -· 
Whitehead agPeed with Bergson 1n aaserting the practical 
• lue ot the intellect and the science which tt ore ted in 
1. so, 52. 
2 • SKW, 19 • 
1'72 
'1'h ame type 0~ thought peaulted in the 1dea or ··1 ple 
looa.t1on" which lb1tehea4 dented., In geneJ.-al, he orit1oize4 
the contusion ot abstraction w1 th a · tual .lty, which he eall d 
the "Fallacy or M1aplace4 Ooncret neaa .•• He :recosntzed a 
ldnahip w1 th Bersaon at thS.a point, but cona1dere4 "almple 
location• to e a t llacy or the intellect rather than a 
neceee ry detect. 
Thla simple location ot instantaneous mater! 1 
oont1gurat1ona 1e What Berg on baa protested 
against, so tar aa it concerns t1 e and ao ta7! 
aa lt 1a taken to be the fundamental tact ot con• 
crete nature. He calla lt a d1ato:.t1on ot natve 
4ue to the 1ntelleetu 1 'apat1a11aatton' ·or 
things. ! agree with Bergson in hla proteata 
but t do not agree that aucb d1atort1on 1a a 
v1oe neoeae '1'7 to the lntell c:tual appa-ehen ion 
ot natUI'e. • , • SpatS. ltaat!on i .e the exp:rea• 
a!on of more oonoP&te taota under the gut e or 
very ab tract logtoal conetruotiona. There ta 
an enorJ but tt 1e merely the accident 1 erroJt 
ot m1etaldng the abet'J'aot tor the oonorete. tt 
!a an example of what I will oall the 'fallaoy 
ot V1aplaoe4 Conoreteaeaa.• Thia t llac7 ia the 
oocaaion ot great contusion in philosophy. It 1• 
not neoeaaat-y to,. the .intellect to tall 1nto tb 
trap, though in this uample there has been a 
•ery seneral tendenc7 to do ao.l 
Thought 1• abatr otJ and the intolerant uae of ab-
etraot1one 1e the major v1oe ot the 1ntelleot.2 
The 1eolat1on ot n ent1tf 1n thought, when we 
think ot it a a b re nit baa no counterpart 1n 
any oorreepondin isolation in nature. · Such 
1 olat1on 1a merely part of the procedure ot 
1ntell otual knowl dse.3 
Whitehead agPeed with Bergson 1n aaeert1ng the pr ot1oal 
v lue or the intellect and th solen e wbieh it created tn 
1.. SMW, 52 • 
2.. SMW, 19. 
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th venteenth and ht ent ntv1 s. not ita 
• stoundin ettio1 noy" in the orsan1zat1on ot c1 nt1tio 
re e rob. t it w •ache e or aoientit1o tho t 
1r med by the t1oian tor the e or the at1o1an •" 
It re t ervioe w 1te o p city tor d al th b tr o-
ona. t 1 resulted in th "bifurcation of n ture" with 
" 1th ita aimple location in ap oe and time" on one 
band, nd on th other 1v1 g, autter1ng, 
reaaoning, but not 1ntert ring.• Thia, h oonclud 1 baa 
"ruined• d rn pblloao by. 
Even t nt ot b1olo y and p yoholo 7 1 whio 
helped to br a down the traditional oonoe t in tavor ot 
mor tluid one 1 he telt "has probably be n cheeked by the 
uncriti 1 aa ption ot h lt•truth •" Th valu of the 
· abatr ctiona or o1enc. it head t lt in em nt with 
Ber on, w a i the facility acquired y th r lat1ve 
a mpl1c1ty ot the cone pta. 
1. 
Civilization vance by xtendin the ttumb r 
ot important operations wbiob one can perform 
witho t tbinki bo t the .a 
• 5 -5'7. , 61. 
Whitehead accordingly dev1aed a motto for th n tural phi• 
loaophera •s.ek 1mp11c1ty nd dlatru t it."l 
tiresome 11at of quotation might b made to how 
how tr uently 1teh ad er1t1o1zed philosophy tor accept-
in the ab tr tion of actenc a ult1 te t ta. t 
erhapa on or will utf1ce to ke th point cl ar. 
1 on tor o1 too t :r, but h 
ace p d r o ' n r 1 a1pl t t to a r1v t t -
physic 1 truth on at o ual operation of 
t int 11 t, t t 8 d na-
17ala, and adopt th • thod ot 1 1nat1ve rat1 nal.za-
t1on,• r t uae or t p cu1 t1v R aon. part of 
1te d'a e e a f Ber a •a 11 e t1•1ntell etual• 
1 1• the t1rat chapt r ot PR, which ta ad ira le d tense 
ot ap culat1v hllo opby. 1 ead th r r1t1 is d the 
1. 0 , 16~. 3. R, 7. 
2. , v111. 
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th ot 1nductio , h a ro tnt ph!loao by 0 
ac1 nti 1o t , .. • 1 thod ot p 11oaoph1oa1 ln• 
at1 t1on. Wh t on o it in· the ot tn uct1on 
w 8 .. 1 7 •• 1 tn t1on, o ntr lled bJ the r -
u1r ot nee d 1o to." 
Thi 1m 1 1• •1 11 to o aed r on. 0 a 
th u ot 1 t t1on • p 1loao t t 1e rn• 
in to aw1 • t 0 t of 1 • on-
ote it t t of walkin 1 count lee •v tiona on the 
the 0 11 e er 1 1 r le •1 1 • • 
0 1 rn t v t n 1 o t of he aol1d 
rt and n n ot t r. 
..., 
r on ot ophy 
"to a c 1 t I t •" It t 
the obj ct ot nc 1 • 1ch 1a ctio 1 and " xam1n the 
11v1 it t r a rv t1 
0 1 212e 
0 1 215. 
o p ctieal ut111t7•ft 
'1' 1 t 1 1 
0 h ht. 
nt w1th 
1 n t e 
t e r roe 
l t v ph 1 
t d'• 
tb 
d, 
l' 1 a 
re 1 ly 
in t 
• 
in r r 
now 1m wn 
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1. 
2. 
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ted •th a ya 1 o ton 
r • ie 1 elo e 
-
t en t Pr ott-
• t t in 
l th t f' eou-
b t tar 0 1 that 
p 
" 0 e ~om er on•-
t rt t dia-
t t u ht ich 
, d ynthet1c, 
ke progr •• 
t • 
d r aon uae 
t e t thod 
e7 bo h th 1 a ud1ea 
n 0 t e in b7 
(1. t y to 1, nd 
ir c at a 
en ae.•IS 
tl n" t 
4 . OOT, in ., 180. 
5 . 0 , 185. 
• , 2 1 • 232 • 
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1tehead o lls "stubborn t ota.•l The7 re arriyed at with-
out any unoritiotz d assumptions nd thua s ve philosophy 
tro a barren r tion lie • ltehe d pointe out th t, l• 
though Loc e nd Rame were unable to div at tb maelvee ot 
11 th 1r t ulty aaaumptiona, thla w a thei~ method and 
their philosophy w a thua a trt er the ration liem or 
the tddl a.2 Thla waa it he 's method in hla boo~ 
n ph7aic 1 act no and the results ot hla work torm d the 
b 1e tor th noYel etaph7eica ot PR. Tbla was al o th 
thod ot rs on tn ach ot hie tn wol"ka, each ot which 
i aed upon a detailed tudy ot one ot th aoienoea. 
Th apeculat1on th t tollowa such a study kea uae ot 
the ethod ot intuition a the ai ilea of n ero 1 ne tl1ght 
and a 1 ap into the w t r a eat. Whit h ad '• uae ot in• 
tuition 1e both 1 11olt nd xplioit. He unaahamedly uaea 
the ten or the idea in a v rl ty ot cont xta. In apeaking 
ot mor 1 educ tion, he aaya, "Wow the a nae ot greatn a ia 
1. itehe d•a ua ot the tet'Bl •t ct• 1• apt to be con:tuatng, 
unlea the paaa in POR h • been not d wb r lhitehe 4 
ve clear d tinition ot •raot" s the •totallt7" ot ir sented 4 t , nd distinguished tw en "tact" nd 
t otora." 
ot ••• i not th a ot t otora, tt ia 
r th r th oonoreteneaa (or, 1 b dd dnea ) ot 
t otora, and the ooncreteneaa ot n in xhauattbl 
rel t dneaa a ong lnexbauatible relata. • •• 
•pact" aug eata one t ct mons others. Th1a 
is not what I mean. and 1a subordinate -
tng which I exprea bT "tactor." (PO, 15). 
2. PR, 231·2S2. 
• t di t intuit to n n t the c elusion r &2' 
R u ntl;r p • of 1nt 1tlon ln u1-
tio • tn 11 1 u exp :r enc 2 ap k r t • 
lie 1 "oz. e:r ot t II •• u t • ina 1 c 1v 
faith. 1 p h a I 
t 1• t t 1 , t e ook wh e oP 
ot r • 1nated b7 e:r on, Wl'i n r ... 
0 1 
0 per je ta 1a a 
not a 
t1a1ly tl' 
per eptio 
n • oont 
without.' 
tin tion. 
Event• are lived through, th 7 e tend aroun •· 
• • • 7 t ema lY a th vel p nt or ••• 
expe:rl nee. The t eta ot lite are the v nta or 
1 r • 
it ad 1a o 11 ho r, to ep bt tn t o 
1~ 
t."l 
within th ounda ot •rational tnterp:r tat1on• and the •:r -
quire nt1 o o r ne a lo to." a not , 
Whit he 0 ttl ae r a n tor t tar, t -
be d'a d1 eaton ot th "do tic tall a 7" he o1 t d out 
that Be!tg on d e xtr r t1on t!to 1 • 
1. t.(l 3) 1n • 1 6•107. 
2. cr. 
' 
5 t. 
~. PR, 32. 
"· 
p k, 13. 
• PH 1 63 • 
other typ or reaction is to um , often t oit-
171 that if there oan be any inte11eetu 1 an lye1a 
tt u p oce d according to eom one 41 o rded 
dogmatic method, and th oe to d duce that intel-
lect is 1 tr1ne1 117 t1 d to rroneou t1ot1on • 
'!'hie type S.e 111uatl' ted b7 the ant1•1nte11eotu 1• 
a or 1 tJ ob nd Ber aon, nd tin . • rio n 
Pragmat1am.l 
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On hie aide, rgaon apparentl7 ~elt that the or1t1• 
clam ot antl•lnt 11 ct 11em waa unjust; oaua b took 
oooaalon to detend hi lt. did not te 1 that intellect 
and intuition are neoeaaarilJ oppoaed. 
Intuition and intellect do not oppoae each other, 
v wber intuition r tua a to co e more pre-
otae by co 1ng into touch with taota actentttl• 
o lly tudied, a wh r S.ntell ct, in tead ot 
oonttnlng ttaelt to aotenoe proper (that ta, to 
at 0 1 terr from r ot or prove b7 
r aoning), oomb1n a with th1a an unoonectoua and 
in onat tent t phy io b1 h in Y in lay ol 1 
to ot nt1t1o pr t nalona.2 
It th1 waa always Bergaon•a Y1ew, he apparently oyerat ted 
h1a caa • nd itehe d ma7 be pardon d tor aaauming that 
intuition and intellect are neoeaaarilJ oppoaed. But there 
are a , .. other 1nd1eat1ona in Bergson'• writin that t e 
oppo tlo i ot a neoeaa ry on • :tn • h &7 t t 
tou1 ot:rol 1 only pp nt.•3 7 the !nt lleotual 
8J"'llP thy which ia intuition "our tntelll enoe oan follow 
t o " fro th t hioh the intellect usually the oppoa1t 
to1lo•••' t r7 po 1 le t rgaon di not con-
aider tnt itio ap oi 1 t oult7 t all, but that the 
1. I, 28'7. 
2. Ber eon, Art.(l911) tn 
, :54·35. 
3. Bergaon, 0 , 212. 
'· Bergson, ITM, &o. 
1 
thod or th in 11 ot ! 1 ply the 1 • y th t th 
tnt ll1g no wor • 0 rtainly it 1ntu1tton ro a p o1 1 
~ oulty, th n ita us b oat p raon woul or t n 
xt e l ditricult; it woul 1mpoa ibl , unl a on hap-
p d to b 1 •• 
hand 1ntu1t1o 1• 
th this r c lt7. tt on th otb r 
pow r th t eryon h a but wh1 h is not 
ordin rily ua , the r eon h a a1 ply expr eeed v1 w 
t t 1a co on o lato, Eant, 
ot ra. I lato'• ph1loaopby t re 1• the r alm ot opin-
ion nd th n r 18 th • op 1 view ot re 11tJ riv c! 
at t 0 r on1 • In t t r 1 tb d1at1nct1on be• 
tween Un r t d1 ( an BOD In 
e 1' lo 1c, th r is t e 1 t1on tw nth 1 vel 
ot B 1ng (!...!n), the l vel ot •• nee n th level 
ot he Botton ( £1ft). e vel 1a the r al ot 
acienc , th r al of aepar t 1y ex1at1n things 1n ext r-
nal r 1 tio 8J th egp1tt ley 1 1• th level ot 1nt rn 1 
r lationa, ot 1nd, ot th int rconneotednea ot all thinga 
i n t hol , 'l'he b olute. d 1teh ad in he FUnction 
ot t1 u1abea t een th Pr otic 1 e eon which 
the Speoul t1ve Re eon, 
I 4eaorib1ng the 
tJ1. aaea aha e with the tox •• 
.. c Plato bar a with the oda.l 
Sp culative Reaeon, itehead 781 
tunot1on Re aon 1a enthroned b v 
1 ta ka of the wor,ld. It ia not 
ping al1v • • • • Its a le ti ta 
xpertenee h been und r tood. It pro-
uppo 11t , nd ee life r nd r d good lth 
the o dne of under t nd1n .1 
In t r ot r on' philosoph , the intellect 1 the 
I 
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actio 1 e son, wh le intuit on 1 t e Sp cui tiv a on. 
1 t r no etw n rgaon and iteh d t thl polnt 1• 
no one or kind, but onl ot deg,.. ., tb en I' d tbat 
th op rationa of the 1 tell at ne d t b compl men d by 
the 1ntu1t1on, or th cul tlv R aeon. 1 t h d d1ttera 
0 r on ln 
t o typ o r 
a lea dr t c d1st1nctton t een th 
on d in 1 ttng mor st o ly upon t e crl• 
tlolem ot the intuition b7 the r 
lo 1 • 
nt t co Pence and 
In R, it h d atte t to a ow pr cl ly how l' -
aon' ida ot intuition 1 ua ot h1s own ta• 
hy tea. a ye th t hie own t "t lin ., has .,eo e kln• 
ehl p wl th Ber eon'• ua ot t t 'lntu1 tion'." It la 
alao a 11 0 1 X n e ' us or t term enjo e t," 
Loc t 1t1 .,. nd so rtee' e o th ter t elln 2 tn • 
1acsuas1ng conceptU&l pr ben 1 na 
lat1on to ~ son' "tntu1t1on.~ 
!teh ad not a hla ~ • 
e are cloaely concern d with what rgaon calla 
1 1ntu1tio '-- 1th o e dlt e no~ how v r. 
Bergson's intuition 1 n 11mpur ' oper tiont tt 
i n ln gr 1 lin d riv fro t e the s 
or th conceptu 1 pP hen ton with the hysical 
2 . PR, 65 . 
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itehc d rib 11 phya1o 1 poa ft a an tnt r ion ot 
e. physic 1 and cone pt l r~hen ion in which t ternal 
~bjeet in olved 1n the cone pt 1 pr ns1on ha lo t 1t d -
termi atenea n beco d t!.nit ly r liz d 1 m nt or 
th ph 1o 1 datum. It ha aeq tr d thereby ap <~1 1 pp -
t1t1on~~ v ra1on or v a1on~-1n r pect t t at et r al 
obj ct. • Th •abt>uptn t r nt 1 op l' t1on is ere • • 
11lustt- ·ted."2 1t head r lt t t,. in th1 1. w, hew ex-
pr s !ng wh t rg on nt b a 1ntu1t1 n. Tbr 1 in 
t 1 nt 1 opePat1on, b re n o 1t abruptn 
• 
r1 h 
of noveltyn nd a eon qu nt th t intensity in t e 
nt 1 pol , whtoh ana that t r pr ent valu •jud nt 
w 11 • j d ent of taet. n t 1 b ppens the preh n-
s1 n 1 a dprop s1t1on 1 pr h nston . " Physical purpo s, r 
1ntu1t1ona, ar not co cioua pur : tb t 1 , th e o ce 
1nd, but hen ucb 1a by th org n1 , not b7 h 
o ole e b come imp rt nt t y b eo cl thed ith ot1on . 
Thl p rt!c 1 r poa 1bil1t has be n p1ok d out, 
h ld up, nd clothed with emotion The ta ot 
xi t nc tn which propo it1 n 1 t elings a:z- 1m-
port nt . part from tnt 11 ctua.l fe ling , 7 
b 1 ent1t1 d with r aon'• at ge ot pur n 
in t1nct1v intuition. 
a physic 1 feelin , it he 
rg on' intuition ia involve 
physical purpo e" or 
in perception in the mod 
183 
of 
•c ua 1 efficacy, " but an i ur prehens on it i al o 
involved in symbolic reterenoe and so subject bo h to error 
nd the perception or novelty . 
itehead' oritioia ot science and philosophy w s not 
initi ted by re din B r on, but w prob bly reenr reed by 
Ber son. itehead ooepted Ber son' view th t the intel-
lect gener lly result in t ls1 !cation but did not believe 
it w a necessity of the intellect . ite ead ccepted 
Ber son• view of intu tion and felt that t e u e he 
ethod of intu tion w a necess ry for adY nee in philoso hie 
thou ht . Howev r, he felt t . at it u should be ore cloe-
ly u rded by logic nd ration 1 coherence th n Ber aon wa 
apt to do. In these iews he bowed that h had been influ-
enced by Ber on but w critic 1 in hi use or the e rg-
sonian ideas . 
4 . Doctrine or Freedo 
The doctrine or treedo in r on nd itehead h a 
lre dy b en expressed to ome extent in th discussion of 
"cr t ve evolution . There it w pointed out th t th very 
ide of creation involves th ide or fre dom nd th con• 
tin 1 production or novelty . The t eory does not n ed full 
xposition here, lthou h Ber eon's v ew or tree will does 
need ome disou sion . 
r son flatly refused to ive a po 1t1 e det1n1t1o of 
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treedo • o d eo, he a d, woul " nsure h victory ot 
et r in1 1 e re son tor thi tr n e t te t 1a • 
Ber son' constant 1n i tenoe t t duration c nnot be c n-
ceived in ter of ap o • d f1n1t on or treedo , he r lt, 
would n d to be 0 accou t or how p rson i bl to 
cboo am n lt rn tiv • ut sue 1 • ould e an ex-
tension ot duration into t tur n whio t e 08 1 111-
tie r ly1n • is 1 p t1 11 at1on or urat1o • 
ctu lly, do i not o oice b tw n altern tives but 
the ere tio of nov lty, and wh i t cr t d c not 
d termin d until i i or t d. Thi 1s b c u e oh ere a-
t1on is an adv nee into novelty, nd such, the ore tiv 
dvance 18 al 0 th ere t1on of poes1bi11ty . 
i ie, in ener 1 , in a e ent wltb r on. 
He gr •• th t cr t on in olv tb idea of fre om, nd 
he a r t at th ere t1v dvance i also th cont n 1 
er tion ot poaaib lity . 1 1 uae t proc 
of be eo in nd ev ry act 1 nt ty i a potent! 1 r r every 
b co i . 2 it d 1 in tat t t th trrer n e be-
t en rr do and t r in tion th diff r nee b tw en 
potent! li ty .an aotu 11ty. There 1 1nd ter in ti until 
the proc a of conereacenc 1 co plet n the entity 1 
tully ctual . Etern 1 obj eta, which re "pure potent! l " 
' 
r 1nd t rm1nat nd are pot nti la or in e a1 n into 
1. r on, , 220 . 2 PR, 33 . 
1 5 
any actual ent1t1e and integration with any eternal ob• 
jeet • ut a soon as the ingre sion takes plao the in-
determ1n t1on is removed. 
1tehe d's view ot freedom 1 expressed in the ninth 
Categore 1 Obl1 tion, "The Category ot eedom and Deter-
m1nat1on." ccording to this o tegory, "the eoner so nee 
oF e ch individual actual entity is intern lly determined 
and 1 externally 1'1-ee."l Th1 m ana that "whatev r is de-
terminable is d term1ned 1 ft but there 1a al•ays an elem nt 
or t:reedom which depends upon the deeis1on or the whole. 
fhis whol , wh1eh itehe d c lls the ''subject-euoerjeot," 
1 the whole universe trom the t ndpoint of the given yn-
the 1 or concrescenoe. Tht dec1 ion involves "emotion, 
appreciation, and purpose. But the dec sion of the whole 
is alway relevant to the part , because it arises out of 
the determ1n tion of the parts . a rs on's views, or cour e, 
a:re not expJ"eased in 1tehea ' s terminology, but he seem 
to have a simil r 1d a when h that personality 1 
made up of many psychic tate nd that unlesa the p ychtc 
tate a:re integrated a truly ~ e act 1s 1mpose1ble, be· 
c use one or another or the p y hie states may control the 
personality. But when tre act 1 performed , lt is done 
with "the whole of the selt. u3 We re· ~ee when our act 
spring from our whole personal1ty . 04 
l • PR. 41 . 
2 • PR, 41- 42 . 
3. Bergson, TFW, 166. 
4 ., Bel"gson , TFW. 1 '72 . 
oth Be:r son and 
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it he d tho ht ot ~eedom and 1nde-
ter in tion inherent in th creative process which w s 
conceived of as unlimited•• continu 1 dvanc into th t 
which wa beolutely new and therefore could never have b en 
p~e icted. Ber on y • Reality is 
creation .pursued without end."l !n 0 , 
perpetual rowth, 
1tehead wrot t t 
in vi~tu or the p es e ot n ture, "nature 1 alway ovin 
tate nt occurs in connection w t 1te ead'a 
stat nt th t h1 doctrine or p s ge of n tu:re is in 
cord it.h Bergson, nd 1t is possible th t the tdea of n 
advancing ore tion ca r:rom hi • 
itehead tate this view ore preci ely= 
The immanence ot God giv rea on for t belief 
that pure eh os is intrin io lly impossible. At 
the other end of the scale, th immensity of the 
world negatives the belief that any at te ot order 
can be o t bl1shed that beyond it there c n be 
no progress. Th1 belief 1n a final order, popu-
lar in religious end philoaophic thought, eema 
to be due to the prev lent fall cy that all types 
ot seriality n ce sarily lnvol t rminal instance • 
It follows th t Tennyson' phlt ae, 
• • • that t r-ott 4!v1ne event 
To which the whol c:re tion ove , 
pr santa a f llac1ous conception or the un1vera .3 
-
By t doctrine o th 1mm ence or God, 
Bergson's doctrine into gr ter coherence. 
1 t he d ttrought 
1le not elimi• 
nating ehance, 
did, and ave 
1tehead g ve le s place to 1t than rg on 
bettev re son tor the t ct ot progress, 
rgson himself ca e to a 1mll r v1ew when he wrote TS • 
1. B rgson, CE, 261. 3. PR, 169. 
2. CN, 54. 
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oth 1te e d and Be:r n ound in the d a or n 1n-
d term1n te or at1on the ground for morality. d 
aid t at the nvironment ha pl stio1ty which lt r 
th hol ethic 1 asp ot o~ volut1on."l He felt th t ac-
u 1 entitle are tr nd s lf•cre tiv • such they are 
ethic lly r po 1ble.2 Bergson leo felt t t natur p-
pears s "an 1mmene !n.t'loresoenc or un ore eeable novel-
ty. 3 Bee u e of th1 it is po sible to ere te v lue, but 
an 1 the only n1m 1 1 rt 1th urr 01 nt rr edom to do 
o. Thus the or 1 n 1a a or tor in the high st d .,.. 
"" 
F.ro this it o1low th t at is or at d 1s not • 
x1olo ie lly n utral, but that th s el -ereatlnn 1 the 
cr t1on or v lue. T is is cardin 1 point with itebe d, 
. 1n t 
But in bstr ct1on fro ctuality, the eternal 
ct1v1ty 1 divorced fro Y lue. For the ac-
tuality 1 the valu .s 
In itehea ' t ought, "m r cr tivityn 1 1ndeter-
nd o neither actual nor valuable. Conver ly, the 
mor def1nitenea , the more s1gn1r1c no an ctual entity 
po se , th more aotu 1 it 1 and the mor v luable. 
Sine. de 1niten is c uire throu h the 1n es ton or 
ternal obj ot , values are et rnal an God who "envi ages~ 
all tern 1 obj ete s th upreme v lu.e. The proce e 1 
thua not only the aotu lizat on r pot ntiality, but nleo 
1. s , 114. E, 31. 
2. s • e. 
3. Ber on, t.(l9ll), in 
4. Berg on, , 32. 
5. s , 108. 
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t e creation or v lue. Thi v lue doe not perish with 
per1sh1n oee sions but is carried on into other aetu 1 oe-
c ion bee u e ot "obj ct1ve 1 ort 11ty1 ., rooted !n the 
"oonsequent n ture ot God•" who 1 thus the preae~ver s 
well a th creator ot value. !though r on aee to 
have reco nized th production ot v lne in the cr t1ve 
process. itehe d' tully developed view went tar beyond 
hi , and wa prob bly influenced more by ex nder th n 
erg on 1n this respect . 
In 1tehead 1 philosophy there ar m ny ditterent 
typ a of nexu or the to etherneea or ctual ntit1 , d 
they a~ or different des . The lowe t form 1 a r 
multiplicity. higher gr de 1 the soc! 1 nexu • which 
has organic but not rial order . till higher r de ia 
per on 1 or er which 1a ord r d aerially w 11 a or an1-
c lly. lthough th e term in it he d do not corre pond 
exactly to the te~a oct ty and person in common speech. 
yet th co on usa e represents th oat obvious xampl a or 
w t h 1 talking about . o in it h d 1 scheme, by r 
on or their gr dation ot ctual1ty, social value are 
b! b r than mater1 1 values, n per onal v lues r hi h 
still . This eems to have been the c e w th Ber son 1 o . 
The cr t!v urge 
soo1et1e • both th 
etetie ~f 1ns eta. 
~ther p grea • 
s rr1ved t its highest development in 
oc1et1es ot human per one and th o-
But th in eot oo1 ty is 1ncapabl ot 
n havin neh1ev d a tr e perao 11ty• 
18 
s well 1 social con ciou ne s, 1 still c p ble ot 
growth.l e hererore repre ent the high t pe or th 
up nrd m vement of creati n so f r achieved. Thus r on 
pl c high valu on oc1 ty nd higher v lu on per on• 
ality, hich pree rves octal value w 11 ere ting hi h r 
per onnl values. 
the for o1 ha hown, ther much i ilarity 
b tween the views of itehe d and Bergson, nd the po si-
b111ty of ~gson1 n intluenc cannot e xc1uded On the 
oth r b nd, 1tehead doe not ret 1n any way to t view 
of Berg on 1n thi conn ct!on. ne de elop hie view 1n i 
wn y, with hie own distincti e termtnolo y, nd at ny 
p inte goe beyond Berg on, e pee a ly in the theory o value 
which, in r on' work prior to TS R, only u e te 
but not develop d. For this re on, there can no 1gn1-
f1cant in luenee ert d. 
5. Matter nd Memory 
Much or Ber eon' book 1th 
ep1 temolc Y• his part ot Berg on' 
with in connection with the tudy of 
~emory de 1 
wo~k 111 be alt 
itebe d's ep1 t molo• 
• How ver, 1 o d1sousee 
matter nd ind. This topic 1 
cu ed 1n thi s ction. 
the diatinetlon between 
the one that will be 1 -
B rgson' vi w of tter and 1nd nderw nt ome change 
1. Bergson, t.(l911), in 
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from the early exp~e ion in until the 1 ter xpree 1 n 
1n CE. In B rg on is duali tic, ad itting that th re are 
t o differ nt typ of r lity, m tt r and 1nd. t both 
a~ d aerib bl 1n term o~ th tension or uration. • 
p c 1 described in t rm of xten ion, t1 e 1 e pre sed 
in terms of tension.1 Th d gree ot 1nd which n 1nd1vidu 1 
po 8 oorr pond to the d gr e or tension 1n wh oh it 
bl to hold t1 • 
In r al1ty ther 1 no on rhyt or durat1onJ 
t 1 po sible to 1 in ny dif re t rh 
hich, lo er or faster, me sure the degree of 
ten ion or relax tion of ditt rent kind ot 
con a1ou n a, nd ther by fix th ir re pect1v 
place in the c le of be1n .2 
Thu t er h ten 1on, while conac us er-
on b v the te t a ount. The dy c or m t-
t r but it 1 ani ted by nd. e n ture or 1nd a e o~ 
ry; that 1 1 the coumulation or expert nee in mind. •e o• 
ry 1 only con eious 
the body where the 
it 1a xpresaed in ct1on throug 
tertal r lev~nt tor the ot1v1ty or the 
body 1 bro ht tot'w !'d • tter n in thus t1rely 
unconnecte , 1 ho _ b they ar cont mpor neou •. 3 on 
b 11eved that ther 1a a re t deal ~re mtn th n t re 1 
matter, althou h oat of mind 1 not. 1 ee ble, beoau 
t is only discovered in th proce ot otin bro h t 
bo y 1n the ~ of oonsoiou reco ition. B r son believ d 
t t, inee m nt 1 lite 1 
rgson. 
r son, 
• 239. 
' 275. 
muoh more vast th n the cerebr 1 
3. Berg on, , 232 • 
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lif ,~ i~ortal ty of the nd or oul is so prob bl t t 
th onus of proo lle on him ho denies it r tber than on 
him who t 1rm it."l 
Bergson devi t d somewhat in C ~om hi arl1 r vi • 
H apparent! b ndon d b1 du 11 m and he developed om -
wh t different v1ew ot •tt r . H till held to th diatino-
tion between mind and matt r, exc pt that dur tion s eon-
c ived in C as more fUndamental. In s erting a dual1 m in 
·' 1 B rg on mad the mistake of tho whom h cr1t1e1z d, 
that change 1 conditioned b thlnge or sub t nee that re 
in themselv changeless; namely, tter nd mind. In th1a 
r spect Bergson w s C rte ian. But in CE he held th t change 
or duration w s fUnd mental. T en att r nd mind wer p• 
ly 1ver tJnt tendencies ot the underlying dur tion . 
n ~ . Berg on de cribed matter in terms of the rhythm 
of duration, matter b 1ng duration with a rhythm o slow a 
to be pr ctio lly inef'fie cious in causing action. t in 
/ C , he developed hi theory of' the elan vital, which wa the 
principle of g:roowth and ore tion, eaus1n tbe 1nerea ed ten-
ion by which the higher forms of' con oiousness wer produced . 
e still held to his view of atter, xoept th t h d veloped 
a theoPy or its creation along with lif • The vital energy 
i limited and 1 opposed by th reo lo1tranoe o~ tter 
a..n 
through which it moves and spends its lf 1nAoppos1t 
1 . rgson, t .(l912) 1n ME, 71. Cf e 1 o Ber son, t. 
( 1913) in ·,, 97 • where pr otioally the exact words 
are :r pe ted. 
direction . 
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lle on th one hand 1 re is continu·lly being 
cr at d, that 1 • tho tension o dur t1on increases, on the 
other h nd, l1_e continually dies , that 1 , 1t let go its 
tension. It 1 detends in ord r to " xtend.''l 
iteh d' metaphysics is si ilar to ergson' later 
vi in r opect to the di tinction between matter nd ind . 
etual ent1t1 s re nalyzed into their prehensions. 1 ese 
aro both phy ic 1 ·nd conceptu 1 , eompri in the physic 1 
nd m ntal pole of the actual entity . The pr hension 1n 
both pole ar ith r f eling , or, in the ca o or ne tive 
preh nsions , they liminate trom feeling . Thi doe not 
me n eonec1ou f eling, but xpr es the r ct der!v d from 
the tneory or relativity th t every otual entit involve 
ev ry other actw 1 entit • Consc1ouaness, for Whitehead, is 
a oh racteri tic or highly developed organisms only. 1te-
h ad define eon ciousness a the feeling of the contrast 
of theory, s mere theo~y, ith fact , as mere r ct:2 Theories , 
- -
o~ propositions. ar hyb~id entitle including "d f'1n1te 
a t of otual entitle in nexus or reactions involving t e 
hypothetical ingression of a definite set o~ ternal objeots . ft3 
Theories may involve eelinge oonrormal to fact . or non-
conformal . It the latter , then ltern t1vea enter into the 
exp rlence, and it 1e the feeling of the contrast of theories 
1 . Ber sen, OE, 259 . 
2 . PR, 286 . 
1 3 
1nvolv1n alternatives with t ot th t constitutes con-
eiousness, ror 1t head . Since conaciou ne 1 such a 
eling of contr at involving altern ttve , then ooneotous-
ne 1 li ble to error . 
1tehe d d1 t1 u1 he four d s of actu 1 nt1t1es . 
They ar "empty p c , inorganic objects. living b 1 
• 
nd conscious being • In the first rade the "pre ented 
dur tion " are negligible . In the second grade, the mental 
pol 1 ne 11 1ble, with only th prehen ion from the 
physic 1 pol of importance . The third gr de of actu 11ty 
is ch raeteriEed by "flashes of conoeptu 1 or! 1nal1ty con-
atituting lit . • In th highest grad ot act 11ty, tree-
dom emerg a, with conceptual prehensions o th gre test 
defin1t&n • There is also v1v1d perception in th mode of 
pr entational 1 edt cy, a mode not round in lo r d 
ot ctual ty. l Th measur or ct 11ty for it h d 1 
vivid exper1enc ~ or d f1n1ten . "2 Each occ aion, 
itehe d felt, wa "v lu of some pee1tic det1n1t 
ind nd matter are two d1tr rent typ or v lue . 
In a living be1n th y re together in the 8 olo e t conn o-
tion. The high et type or value ie round in conscious lite, 
the c nal1zed import nee of ~ee oonceptu 1 
tunct1on1ngs, wh reby blind xperi nc i n lyzed 
by co pari on with th 1ma 1nat1ve rea11z t1on or 
re potenti lity. 4 
1. PR, 269-2~0. 3 . RIM. 109 . 
• PR, 270 . 2 . RI , 113 . 
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n this view 1tehe nd Bergson ar in greement: 
oth felt th t con ctou ltre is the most aetu 1, the hi h• 
es de elop d , t ~oat v luable. Ther is augg s-
ton of Ber .o tan influence here in th t the tBrm "en 11zed" 
is rgson' t r • it e d found th t rm "very conven-
1ent." By t e term both Whitehead and Bergson nt that 
the 1n eterm1n tlon of th creative fo~ce beoom s def1n1t 
hen t 0 liz d. But 1n b coming de lnite. in sum-
1n~ a definite d1reot1on. it 1s al o lim ted in that it be-
cernes just ~at t is nd ncthing el e. 
I use he term 1 11 1tat1on' for tho most general 
conception or finitude. In a eo ewhat more re-
tr1ete nse ergaon us e the v ry eonvenient 
term 'can 11zation.' ••• Thus a r etor !e a 
11 it t o ct fact 1n the enee that a r ctor 
refer to r et o nallzed into yetem of re-
1 t to itself. • , • Thus lso a finite oon-
ciousness 1s limit tion or tact. in the sene 
t at it is r ctor 0 nalizing fact in w ys 
peoul ar to 1tselt.l 
Bergson u s th term oana11zat1on 1n the s e way. By 1t 
be me ns the limit tion by which de 1n1teness and eftective-
nes are brought bout.2 
1tehead says that there re two pr1ne1ples inherent 
1n the nature o things, "chan e," nd "con ervat1on." Dit-
f'erent gr des or aotu l1ty expres varyirw. degrees of th e 
pr1ne1ples, but the 11v1 
the fullest 1nten ity. 
1. POR, 16. 
oul oont 1ns both pr1ncipl s in 
?. . Berg 1 CE, 104, 106, 1225 
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e A ar-f"t o or n-t m. lif> !n t. e r 
two r-ade or permanence • By this me n the 
rre hn ~r e nv nt ~s ~orhe o h 
nenee or the out . l 
B ~g on felt that th 1 ort 11ty of the oul wa very 
probabl • Wh1teh d did not o t r s Ber-g on 1n this 
belief. lthou h he reeo n zed with Ber son that there is 
no met phy leal objeoti n to BUCh b lie • On the other 
hand, he finds now rr nt ror it. On this point , White-
he d claims to be ''ent1~ely neutr 1." 
Finally, 1tehead' vi w ot tt r nd mind 1a in 
greement with Bergson in CE wher the pri cy ot process ia 
saerted. a in Ber so nd nd matter ar two divergent 
/ directions or the el n vital. 0 iteh retera aev ral 
t1 e to he ascent t nd ita r 1 pee into 
matter. it he lso t~es e the rimney ot prooea w!th 
"er t vity t e underlyin re lit • 
In eonelu io , itehe d nd Ber on re in subat nt1al 
a ee nt on the 1at1 ction ween tter nd mind. For 
bot , mind is the ore ctual nd t ore v luable. or 
both, matter is simply that 1n which the ount or min 1a 
ne 11 1bl • B th recognized degr e or act 1 ty between 
m tt r and ru11y develo ed eon ci us mind One a in there 
1 poe 1b111ty or influence b er son, but no cert 1nty or 
tt. H view m1 ht leo have been 1 bor ted trom the 1n-
a1 hta of lex nder. But 1tehe was ~ m111ar w th ergson 
1. s , 202. 
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nd t least not1eed the ·!1m1 x-1t of his views ith his 
0 • 
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C PT R V 
LE D NG I DEAS OF ITKHEAD ND THE . R ROOTS IN BERGS 
1 . Inadequacy of Language 
charaotet-ietic at tement of 
n:ttion of philo ophy "an ttempt to express the infinity 
of tb un1ver e in term of t 11m tations of lan uage . ql 
One or the nine point ot thought which re 1 at d tn the 
"Pref ee• of PR as being repud1at d i • "The tru t in 1 n-
gua e as an ad quate expression ot propoa1t1one . "2 
Whitehead's fir t er1t1eiam ot 1 nguage is that 1t ia 
ab tract . The universe 1a 1n 1n1tely complex . Even that 
part ot the univer e which is found 1n ense- war ne i 
infinitely complex . But the intelligence uppreaaea 1r-
rel vant d tail, and 1angu ge de la only with t t part or 
en e•awareneas th t st nda out tro the b ok round . 
Thu languag habttu 11y seta before the mind 
mi leading bstr ct of tbe infinite complexity 
ot the tact or sense-awareness .~ 
Whit head points out th t th1 a1mpl1t1~ tion of expert nee 
is made only by hi h- d organism. low- ad org n 
receives and tran mite, but •rails to s1mp11ty into 1ntel-
11g ble syst m. •4 
1 . 1tehead, ESP, 14 . In tb1 chapter 11 reference are 
to 1tehead, unless oth rw1 e not d . 
2 . PR, v1.11. 
3 . CN, 108 . 
4 . PR, 389 . 
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itehead also telt that 1 n e was inadequate be-
eaus it wa a biguous~ ord re likely to mean ditterent 
thing to different people, or 
I 
t least the me nlng re apt 
not to be identical~ Worda carry emotion 1 overton~ aaso-
ci t1on of all typea: o:rd re only bola, not the :re 1 
things . reter:red to by lan uag • 
L n e • • • is lways ambiguous a to the 
exact proposition which lt 1nd1c tes . Spoken 
1 n is merely a series ot queaka . l 
uch of the trouble in philosophy, Whitehead tho ht, 
came from the istoteli logic which attempted absolutely 
precise statements in word • Clear nd distinct ideas, 
itehead t lt, were not sign or truth, D sc rt s had 
t ught. Knowled e must neee sarily be v gue, becau th 
universe ia n state ot flux and thin do not have the 
clear- cut nature that the intellect ass! n to them . 
Th reason for th1 domin nee of v u ness and 
clarity in respect to the proble or knowledge 
i th t the world 1 not m de up of independent 
thin 1 e ch completely determin te in b traction 
trom all the rest . • •• Our xperienoe is domi-
nated by composite whole, more or lea clear in 
the focus, and more or lese v ue in the penumbr 1 
and with the whole sh d1~g orr into umbr 1 d rk-
n a which is 1gnor nee , 
1tehead has been er1t1eized ~or hi esertion th t know-
1 d e 1 · vague nd that ole r ide 
t1 lly at least, m1 taken .3 But 
1 . PR, -&03 . 
2 . t . (l936) 1n ESP, 213 . 
3 . cr . Stokes, CVK, 67-70 . 
are likely to b , par• 
iteheAd has not implied 
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th t the condition is deair bl on • Be only wished to 
state that, a a m tter of fact, th n mind c n only 
achieve cl r idea by abstraction ~om the rest of reality, 
which i an instance of the fall cy of ispl ced concrete-
ness. 
test in 
itehead noted th t thta is wh t Bergson wa pro-
gat t 1n hi prote t a inst pati liz tion, be-
cause ae Plato said: 
"Th t which is cone 1v d by opinion with the hel~ 
of sensation nd without reason, is alw ys in t e 
proce or becoming and perisbin nd never really 
1s. 8 r son, in his prot at §•in t "• ti liz t1on1" a only echo1n~ Pl to's phr e nd never r ally 1a." 
itehe d p rt1cul rly objected to the aubject•predi· 
c te type of exprea ions which he called 
loaoph r by the aynt X Of language , •2 
tr p set for phi• 
ccordingly, 
h ad felt t t und rat ndin re u1red 1m gin t1on . 
But no 1 n u ge c n b nyth1ng but elliptic 1, 
requiring leap of the imagination to under-
tand ita mean1n in it relevance to immed1 te 
experience. • •• No verb 1 state ent is the 
dequate expres ion ot propoe1tion .3 
L ngua e i lw y elliptical, nd depend for 
it meanin upon the circum t noes o t publi-
cation, For xa ple, the word 'C ea r' ay me n 
puppy do , or ne o 1 ve, or the f rat Ro-
n e peror .4 
it -
L nguage, 1n Whitehead's thou ht, i moat de u t at 
th level of soc 1 lit nd ction, least d quate in th 
expre sion r precise truth . Plato, he says, "wrestles 
w th the difficulty of m kin 1 ngu e expre nything 
1. PR, 126, 3. PR, 20 . 
2 . POR, 14, 4 . PR, 397. 
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beyond t ram111ar1t1es o daily lffe . "1 1tehead also 
point out th t t ti es the distru t in language 1 is-
placed• at le t according to hi vi w • He intains that 
it is actually th eye th t sees , the e r that he r --1 -
stance or perception in the m de t o us 1 et 1c ey. The 
lan u ge ot co on peech is liter ry nd int 111g1b1 be-
caus it xprea e the ultimate truth or nim 1 perc pt1on . "2 
It w s 1teh d's miatru t ot 1 n u g tb t e used 
him to pay eo uch attention to it . or 1 n ua e 1 the tool 
of. the ph1loaopber ,3 and, in dequate though it may be, h 
u t u it nd er~ect it as wel s poaa bl • it h ad 
eke the moat or thi tool in two w ya . 
th a b1 u1ty o~ lan uage b eon tructin 
e tries to void 
pr ci e nd, to 
1 r e ext nt, novel termino1o Y• In this w y the ter 
could refe only to th eono pt to w 1e he 1nte ded the 
to ref r . ~ en, beoaus word ordin r1ly hav too much eon-
tent r ther t n too little, t h d tte pted to ~ tine 
xperience in terms of ent tie or such utter simplicity 
that t ere w uld b no anger or fur~er ab tracti n . 
Berg on' tt tude tow r 1 ngua e v ry much lik 
ite ea ' • H m int 1ned t t thought is a conti u ty, a 
proce s, but th t or tho ht to become 1st1nct, that ts, 
expre sibl 1 ''thet>e must be d!sper ion in wo:rd . •4 ord • 
1 . I, 153 • 
2 • PR, 180. 
3 . PR, 16 • 
4 . x-g on. rt . (l911) , in 
J • 28 . 
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be felt , re clum y symbols,~l which et torth conscious 
t te a though they wer xternalized, isolated tro one 
another , in oth r word ·• that xpr sses the world in ter 
of space rather than the movement or durat1on . 2 Langua e 
t ke tleeting sensations nd tr nsforms them into object , 
pl c d in sp ce. But th is merely t king ymbol for 
r 11ty b c use "in the human oul there nr only proo sea . 3 
Ber son, like 1tehe d , a~s t t lan gre up 
the respona to a oci 1 ne d: 'By language community or 
action 1 made poe 1ble . ut 1 ngu e c nnot pos 1bly re-
rer to reality in all it complexity, b c use the i s or 
langu ge r limited in number but th varl tiona of r li-
ty are 1ntin1te . 4 Thu lo 1c is not the form of langu ge in 
which the gP teet truth 1 to be expr ssed, 5 but lit r ry 
rt, hieh by suggestion is able to indicate the 1nt1nit 
co pl x1ty of lite and lead one back to n experience of 
reallty. e , ltehe d also believed t!lat one c n go "beyond 
me nlng already st b111zed in etymolo y nd grammar," to 
meaning m1r culously revealed 1n reat 11terat~e . But 
he sl o b 11eved that the sp o1a1 etence and philosophy 
were otbe~ field in w ieh ~me nings as yet une pres ed 
we~e emerg!ng . 7 Bergson s emed 1no11ned to d1stru t lan-
gu ge still more th n iteh d . For him the 1 ngua e ot 
1 . B rg on , T 1 xix . 
2 . Bergson , T , 122, 128 . 
3 . Berg on, T 1 131 . 
4 .. Bergson, CF., 173-174 . 
5 . Berg on, CF., 177 . 
e. Berg on, • , 133- 134 . 
7 ,. I, 291 . 
c1 nee and philosophy could ~esult only in a distortion 
of expert no • Language should be used only b cause no 
oth tool of expr sion 1 av 1labl • 
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n eneral, both it h d and ergson have 1m1lar 
attitude toward 1 ngua e, con 1dering it very imperfect 
tool . 1tehead h d ore 1th in its improvement, but 
agree th t it could never be perrect . t h ad does not 
refer t~ Ber on' ttitud on lan u ge t ny tim , and it 
is probable that his distrust or 1 ngu ge is largely a re-
ult of h own med!t tion . The 1m1lar1ty ith r on' 
attitude could b expl ine under the ener 1 principle th t 
both r cted a a1n t traditional forms of tho g t . t 1a 
quite po ible, however, th t th !de in itehead that lan-
uage rose 1n re ponse to practical, soe al ed , was an 
idea that h found in Bergson, since it appe rs to be p r -
ticularly erg ont n . 
2 . Reality a 
en it he d t!r t began writing in the field ot 
natural science nd philo ophy, c as expr ssi protest 
gain t wh the c lled "the bifurcation of nature . l By 
this he ant a division ot n tur into nature ~erceived 
and n tur as po tul t d by trad1 t1onal science. I in-
tained that the p st three centuries or science had inter-
in thoro hly materialistic manner. The 
1 . CN. 261" . 
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e tegor! s of the sevent enth nd ei ht enth century phys-
1ea we e b Q on the ssumptlon t t ubatanc wa fun 
nt 1 to 1 n ture . The empiric l r duct1on of Locke 
a emed t sho th11t the econ r·y qu 1 tie o_- th ub-
tane w re due to the aot1~ity or the perceiving nd . 
er ley o r 
rim ry nd 
jeet1vo de 1 
B rkel y , 
d hi work fUrther to show th t 11 qu 11ties , 
eondary, ere ment 1 in o r ot r , with a b-
as his eo cl s on . e or t cized ocke 
~ vin at thoroughly kept1o 1 conclusion 
about the o sibil!ty of kno 1 ge , Kent wa 1mpr aed by 
th ork o , an in his Pure Re son reduced 
th physic l world to ph nomena hose ult1 ate n ture could 
not be kno • 1 th K nt the "bifuro tion wa complete with 
n 1 pas able 1 fix d b twe n t e knower nd th kno n . 
tn the m ant! , a itehead ay , acienc "re in d bl nd• 
1y in ifferent to it refUtation by ume . 1 Sci no i gnored 
m taphys1o nd by emph !zing 1t m teri listie umpt1ons , 
h d re rk bly ucc etul d velopm nt , specially in tech-
nology. But t te eienc a the ciene or qu ntity . 
Q.u 11 t , as ttr!bute of ub t nee , occupied seoon ry 
po tt1on nd their in at at1on w s ne lected. Ignoring 
~1ty, c1e c l o ignored thet1c , moral, nd 
r 11g1ous . F 1losophy, however , specially in the nln -
teenth century, emp size in~ but due to the b1~eat1on 
of nature r 1ned out or touch with e e1enoe . 2 
l . s , 17 . 2 . s "· 192 . 
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Berg on also objected to thi ~bifuro tion of nature , • 
lthough the term is ltehead's • In rgson cr1.t1c1zed 
Idealism, both that of B~rkeley and that or' K nt . It wa 
th1s "blf'uroation of nature that was criticiz d in favo1• 
' 
of a more organic view . 
y consciousness or matter ls then no longer ei-
ther subjective , a it is for nglieh idealism, or 
relative, s it is tor the Kanti n idealism, It 
is not subjective. for 1t is in things rather th n 
in m • It 1s not relat1v , beoaus th relation 
between the ' phenomenon • and. the 'thing ' is not 
that of appearance to reality, but merely that of 
the part to the whole . l 
The or ante relation ot p rt to whole is an e eential 
feature ot ite ead ' s philosophy of organism. The part 
are related to the whole 1n the way that the cells of an 
organism are related to the whole body, and the part de-
rive their meaning nd existence trom the whole . 
The full univer e , disclosed for every variety or 
experience, is a universe in which very det 11 
enters into its proper rel t1onsb1p with the 1mme-
d1at occasion .~ 
This organic r 1 tlonehip is expr ssed by fu1tehea as 
r 1 t1onsh1p o "so11dat>1ty, " a term which he borrowed trom 
C rr 1 1917 Presidential ddress to the Art toteli n Soc1e-
ty.3 Carr set £orth the organic r lat1onsh1p in th1 
articl • 
Every n w exper-ience mod1f1e the whole mind, and 
he mod rtoatton or the whole .1nd entails an 
ltered attitude or the hol body . 
1 . Ber eon. M·, 306 . 
2 ~ s • 2'7. 
3 . PR , 65n . 
oth the term 'solidarity" e.nd prob bly Carr's use of t 
cnme om Ber son.1 Carr did not refer to Bergson in hi 
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us o th s term, but Ca~r used it 1n the s me 
did , nd ... a.rl' was o thoroug ly 1m ue w-1 th the 
y: Ber son 
r onian 
ph .lo ophy th t It 1s quite probable t at he got the term 
from Bergson. Thus itehead w s influenced by Bergson 
through C rr in t11 respect. There was very prob bly an 
earlier d1r et in luence of Berg on which helped to predls -
po e 1tehea.d' mlnd toward this view. 1i'!h1t head c rt· lnly 
r d CE, nd he wa 1mpre sed · th the t ot that Bergson had 
introduced into philosophy the org n1e conceptions of 
phy 1olo 1c 1 scieno . "2 
In the twentieth c ntury, the breakdo n or some of 
the event enth century o1entif1c idea coupled with th 
rise of p ycholo y and phy 1ology tend d o bring about a 
closer harmony between sclenee and philosophy. The b1fUr• 
oatton c nature was lleviated. ~The ertect of physiology 
was to put mind back into nature . "3 The ide a w 1ch ~col-
lect1vely form the chllle eel" or the event enth century 
idea or cienee, ""life, orgs.n1s • fUnction, 1nstantaneou 
r allty, inter ction, order or n ture,"4 were used by it -
he d in his r construction of metaphysics. He ~pud1 ted 
any ubst nee t eery, th t 1 , any theory that oo ceived t 
1. B rgaon, CE, 19?, 285 . 3 . SM , 148. 
2. SMW, 19Q • 4 . SM , 58 . 
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the u1tl te s a chan leas u str tum und ~ly1n 11 actu-
. 
1 ty. In th repud1 t!on he 1 cl d ot on J 1al1am 
bt t lao ph 1nso h't n z n b o1 t deal-
• 
n t t t t y -oro e • e 1ty, 
1e t tt te. t s n t ct un-
t it e te m1. te 1 et 1 ee e1 n pn t 18 
f et. act, en r feu 1y ted, 
"t eon or 1 b dd nee ) of t c or 1 n the 
en e b1 1 ted e 1ne -
h !ble :r. 1 t n2 t et c e t!v ty, e un1ver 1 or • 
1 r ! 8 prior to concret r ct. , 
1t he ot for 1 t t of" roc 8 nd 
ere 1ty n 11 ter 1t1n K d c • 1922 e a 1d 
t t e 1 v 1t w 1 881 le to 1 et te 0 t e 
"u1t1 t ,. et," b c f t h d o it ve o tent it 
w ul t er by exelu om thin , ut 1f some h1n x-
elud d, t would ot b u1t1 .ate t ct.• t in 1 
ote I t t e econd ed t1on of p • 1tehe onte 
t e r nc1p e o t e r1m ey of nroee • 
1. PR, 11. 3. PR, 31. 
2. POR, 15. •• rt .( 1922), 133. 
e tr e doctrine, that 1proc se' is the funda-
mental idea, w s not in my mind with surrtcient 
emph s s. Extension 1 derivativo .fl•om proeoe , 
and is required by tt .l 
07 
In 1926, 1n RI , Wb1teh ad's doctrine or process nd cres-
t vity ppeared al o t a it did in its tin 1 ormulat1on 
in PR, lthou 
thr e "tor 
leas tully dev loped . In R , there are 
nts" which oonat1tut the dhar cter 
o~ the tempor 1 world. They are: (1) "The creativity 
whereby the aetu 1 orld ha it char oter o~ temporal pas-
s ge to noveltyJ" (2) "The realm or ideal ent1t1 , or 
:f'orma," which in S (1925) and in PR are t rm "eter 1 
objects:" (3) "The non-temporal actual entity" known aa 
God, "whereby the 1ndeter 1nat1on ot mere creativity 1e 
tran mut d into a determinate treedom."2 
In cert in respects these "formative ele ntsw show 
the influence ot Ber son, although not holly so. orthrup 
haa stated th t ite ead w s influenced by B r son throu h 
u. ildon Carr "during the 1mprees1onable war ye r . " He 
ma1nt in th t 'tro this source o me the doctrin or the 
primacy of roces .•3 !:f' th1 1 true, then only the ~ 
of h1e tully developed ideas of' proce a came to h1m at this 
time, bee use aa ha just been shown, the 1d a was not tu1ly 
ln h1a mind until after 1922, and the term creativity a th 
ulti te category was not used until 1926. In 1925, in S 
NK (2nd 
Sch lpp, 
RI , 90. 
ortbrop, 
d . ), 202, cited 1n Lo e, 
P , as. 
rt.(l94l) in Schilpp, P 
t.(l941) in 
' 169. 
, 
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he use t e ter "eternal act1v1 y,"l and the doctrine or 
creative adv nee" ad b en ltehead's !nee h first be-
b n writing on natural sci nc • But he had not s ttl d on 
the definite orm of his doctrine until 1926 . It 1 quite 
po sible that .e w a influenced by laxander in the fin 1 
f'ormul t1on. r~owe rep rts t t 1te ead in conversation 
stat d th•t t e cent mporary tron1 whom he actu lly got mos t 
a S mu 1 1 xnnder: he nd lexander 'cor.c ived cf the 
problem or metaphys1e in the 
lcxande 1s paee , Tim and Deitz was pub11 hed in 
1920, n ter ite e d ha.d written PUK and Cl . The 1 cturc 
form ng STD were del1vored from 1916 to 1918 nnd iteh d 
a ome at t mil ar 1ith them as 1s indicated by hi 
:re erence in the "Pre a.c " to C , but th wo:rding there sug-
st th t h had not had an opportunity to study the ork.3 
en . opportunity to tudy the work, 1t 
evidently tnt.lu~ ced him consid rably, an it is probnbl 
t t hi doctr n of G ~. altho 1h not identic 1 with lex-
a.n er ' ct:t"1n 
th ulti ·te 
as , in p rt , uggest d by 1t . Th ldea of 
er at1ve and ~av1ng t e char cter or "tem-
pora1 uass ge to novelty, ~ is found 1n both Berg on nd 
1. 
2. 
s ' 108. 
From a convers,1tion in uguat, 1942• cited 1n Lowe, 
t.(1949)' 291. 
~ ~ v11i . •The eneral as 1m11at1on ot space and tim 
wns, I believe, one theme of Professor lexander' 
Glrro- d lectures del1ve~ed ome few years ago but not 
yet published . " 
• • • 
2 
ex nd r. Pr b-b y lex ncler hi 1 1n. l u f"n .. od by· 
e gson t t i po1nt.1 it ad VI 1'3• how ,v r, alr y 
r m 11 r th this a peet o ergs n' thO\ t. 0 0\1 t 
1 x n er ~ enforeed t 1 in luonoe no i d teh d in 
th in 1 ro :ulat o · o the doctrine o ore t v1ty. 
doatri.n· of etern 1 objects 0 e om ne ther r on nor 
le--:.and !' but 1s el arly laton1 d(')at:r1ne m di 1o hy 
1teh c • 
t one po nt 1 r gard to t ere t vtty, t ad 1f'-
f'er f'r m leY. n er. Th .. latt r ons1dere p ae-t1m 
e t e ul nt r.act o the un ve se. In teh d' 1-
lo 0 hy of O~"an1 ooule 1n~ 1 sp~ee-t1wc tact," ut 
p ce-t1 e n t .1 eon 1d re to b n traot1on.2 
e o nnot tn renltty be onR ~ r d ~B a 
1 tent ntity. It 1 n b tr ct1on. 
plo.nnt1on requ.ire ,.. . 't" en to 1.bat 
1ch it be n e tracted.3 
Wh1tehe d 1 ere t vity ie n t "self- uba1 t nt entity• but 
n Wlderlyin tern len r y" or ~ tern 1 o v1ty," 
which is A.n tr ction divorce rr the m tter-of•tact 
1 •. lexn ner e 1~ ot rg on tl haa re~d re ueh 
aerv1ce t etaphy io he on 1n nt in1ng 
the cl 1 or o t bP c~ .:re lt m t r 11ty . " 
( lexan or, STD, I, 150) However, lexander telt that 
pa~e-T rne a th ult m t r .1 ty, eont:r ry to er -
eon's view. •y am unable to coept the doctrine ot 
• r on tn t eh nge 1s t e stur of t ing ." 
( l xan er, STD, I, 329.) 
2 • :rt • ( 1 2) , 1 n 
3. 
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events of the real world.•l In H. Wildon Carr' 1918 
article h1ch itehe d refers to a being influential, 
Carr called life "the ult1 te t ct behind wh1eh even 
~
thought cannot get."2 The metaphysic 1 status of Whitehead's 
or at1 ity can best be understood by comparing 1t to Carr' 
use of the term •lit .a Life is 1 o an activity: it ha a 
"directional factor in timeJ• it 1s "becomingneas."3 But 
lite cannot be thought or as a lt- ubeiatent entity. 
er life ha no meaning ap rt trom omethin living. !t ia 
wholly ind terminate, until it finds dete~inat!on in a 
living being. So creativity 18 1ndet rm1nate until it be-
comes actual--in God ternally, and in actual occasions 
temporally. 
But ore tivity was too ab tr ct to rve as detin1-
tion of •the ultim te concrete tact," that i , or re lity. 
In 1922 itebead h d stat d th t he doubted whether any 
t rm would be sufficiently comprehen ive. But in 1925, 
1h1tehead ppe red to hav tound· h1s term. InS • he com• 
p re hie philo ophy to that of Spinoz • 
In the analogy with Spinoz 1 his one ub tanc is 
for me the one underly1n ct1v1ty ot r 11 ation 
1nd1vidual1 ins 1tselr in an interlocked plurali-
ty of odee. Thu , eoncret fact 1 proceaa.4 
L ter he aa1d, aNature 1 a tructure of evolvin process. 
The reality is the process.• 
1· s ' 107. 
2 . Carr, lrt . (l 18), 27. 
3. PNK, 63• 
In PR he made this id 
• svw, 71. 
5. s • 74. 
th 
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b ie principle hi t phy 1c • Creati ity i t e un-
derlyin etern 1 ener y, but th r al1ty 1e th proce of 
re liz t1on t thi or tiv ner y in d t inat ctu 1 
nt1ti • 
ue tion re ins to ow clo iteh d' d 
trin o process ie t th t ou t ot r o • t e to 
very clo e in e • t t in th 1 22 diacue-
eion r terred to above that on' ur o lite" wa on 
r th n atte t to de in th ulti te concret r ct , 
ich r 11 too narrow." On th oth han 1 t r 1a 
no indication that Berg on thought or ny ntity a und r 
1y1.n real ty would hav thou ht t at such an entity 
wa c • or 
a t p 1 z t1on." For r on, ov ment ia 
prior to i i11ty, 1ch i "only the xt e 11 t or the 
a1owin dwn or move ent.•l The under1yi ct1v1ty is th 
n th pro e or .r tion 1 r a1 lll' tion, 
•uno in or a 1o , the unint r upt upaur or n v lty. •2 
1 the ality it lt. 
n w conception to t 
in ti a ro a iv rowth 
th absolute, and in t volut on or t 1 • contin 1 in nt1on or to 
itehe d, in co r1 i philo opby with that ot 
Spinoz , r co 1z d the tact t at the philo ophy o r nta 
1 th on n plur 11 • It • a oni in that 
1. r on, IT 1 3. 3. r on, c • 374. 
2. rg on, c , 17. •• R, 10. 
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the ctual world was 1nte~r 1 ted and ~ conceivable under a 
n 1 ult1 t c te cry, th t of or t1 1ty. Th1 1 com-
P ed to 5p1noz 's one subst nee. Th philo ophy of organ-
1 m 1 viewed as plur 11sm, 1n that 1t 1 compos d of' a 
multiplicity or ctual entitle • In t 1 w it i compar d 
to Spinoz 's multiplicity of ~ odes. 1teh d reco ized 
l o that thi was Hegel! n view . 
It 1s no evid nt that th tin 1 analogy to 
philo ophtea or th B gel! n school, noted in the 
ef ce, is not eoidental~ Th un1v r e 1 at 
once th mult1p11city ot re ver e and the soli-
darity o r-s vera • Th soiidar{ty is itself 
the tt1ciency of the macroscopic res vera, em• 
bodyin the principle of unbounded permanence 
acquiring nov 1 ty through flux . The multiplicity 
is compo ed ot microscopic res v rae, aoh embody-
ing t e principle or bounded flux cqu1r1ng 'ever-
la t1ng 1 per n nee. On one side, the one becom 
manyJ and on the other 1d 1 the many become one. 
But what beco a 1 lwa:y res v r , and th con• 
oresoence or a re v ra 1 th development of a 
ubjective 1 • Th!a aev lopment 1 nothing 1 
than the Regel! development of an 1dea.l 
The n olid r1ty' expressed 1n this vi w is an idea which 
com t:Pom Berg on through H. ildon Oarr in hi 1918 rt1ele. 
Th Hege11 n1 
that 1t cam 
is dl y's vie , lthough 1tehead 
r cognition of a imilartty of h1 final 
view to t t of Bradley, ven though throughout th develop 
ment of hi philosophy e is ln dis eement with 
1teh ad a vanoes over Splnoza in this vi w by the deaertp-
tion ot re 11ty s 8dynam1c proc • " nd the void nee or th 
aubj ct-pred1cate forms of thought . •3 In this respect 
1 . PR, 254. 3 p , 10. 
2. PR, vtl. 
~13 
tehead 1 close to Ber son • Ber son cr1 t!oize t e 
thod or n ly 1 and what it he d called "the t 11 oy of 
a.tm le loc t1ontt a th sp ti 11z1 work ot the intellect. 
Be id in T , " e can an lyze a thing, but not proc es • ttl 
In thi re pect he agr ed with itehead that analy is y 
be u etul, but it al ay l"esul ta in . b traction , not act 1 
things. itehead, however, trusted the method of analy 1 
more than Bergson. He had the skill to u it 1J1 thout t 11• 
ins into error. itehe d not d th t the ubject-pred1 ate 
torm or thought, co in ~0 1"1 totel1an logic, ~e ulted in 
the ubstanc •quality m t phy 1c and the b1tur•cat1on ot n -
ture that "triumphed with exclusive dominanc 1n De c rte ' 
ootr1ne , 2 Locke nd Hume re cted g in_t thi tor ot 
thought, 
wrot : 
moat eone1 t ntly. Por th1 re on, 1teh ad 
e' a tl' in ot thought 
'proc •••' B1 very ac 
th d1acov ry that ther 
which o nnot be express 
t1on .3 
Berg on al o objected to th 
tor the s me reason. 
unw1tt1n ly emphasizes 
ptic m is nothing but 
1a om thing in the world 
d in n lytle propos!-
"sub t nc ~quality met physic ," 
It a modern philosopher '" • makes all the nclu-
sion ot a phy ic uppo ed omniscient eonv rg on 
a 1ngl point, h neglect wh t 1a eonoret 1n the 
phenomena••the qualities peroei ed, the perceptions 
themselv •• H1s ynthes1s compr1a s, it eema.., 
only £r ct1on of reality. In r ct, the fir t 
1. Bergson• T , 219. 3. PR, 212. 
2. PR, 209. 
re ult r th n w oieno w a to out th real nto 
two halves , quant ty and qu lity, the former being 
credit to the account ot bod1 a nd the latt r 
to the account ot aoul a . l 
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fUrther point 1n Whitehead' doctrine of proee t at 
ne ds to be mentioned ia his n lya1 or b coming, hieh he 
c lled eonore cence, an the oorrelati e ide or er1ah1ng, 
which he called "tr nsit1on . "2 The concrescence 1a "the in• 
tern 1 proce a wh reby th aotu 1 ntity beoo itself. " 
This i xprea ion r fin 1 cauaation . anaition is tb 
xpreasion o efficient c u t1on, the ~ nait1on fro otu• 
al entity to etual entity. "~ 
The conereaoence is the actual ty or the universe . 
croscop1cally1 the proeea ot univ raal beco 1 oonsti-
tutea th actuality or God . 1croacopically, each ctual 
entity 1 n occasion t concr acence. a aoon a it be-
co a, t perish • • The actuality is the activity. 
adopt d ia th t 
I ean th t 
The conception or the world here 
o function 1 ctiv1ty. By thi 
very actual thing 1 ao thin by reason or it 
et1v1ty . 4 
"Thing " or "obj eta only ext t in xperience by reason ot 
the abstractive proces. of "objectitication. "5 These h ve 
the ppear nc of endurance, but th1a 1a not due to t e tact 
that they do n t ch n e . t 1 du to the tact th t t ere 
i "reproduction. That is , an "historic rout " of actual 
1. er son, C , 379-380 . 
2 . PR, 320 . 
3 . PR, 228 . 
4 . • 26 . 
5 . s , 25 . 
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occ sions a:r o similar that o t ~ rel v nee ro~ the 
percipient is cone ~ned, they are 1dentica1.1 it he d 
p 1nted out th t th s view hich h w s including in h1 
philo ophy is one th t 1 de~1v d ~o modern science. 
I~ science be rightt nobody e er perc ive 
thing, but only an event. • •• Philo opby••that 
1s, th older ph1losophy--eonc ives the thing as 
directly perceived. ccord1n to c1ent1t1c 
thought, th ultimate thing is never p rceived, 
perception e entially issuing from a a r1es of 
ev nts .2 
This view i on which i p rticularly rg onian, 
1 s Emmet has noted. 
The v ry e1ng o things eonsi ta in their proee s 
ot concreaoene ·-their 1ng owth into n • 
unity. • •• Whit he d (like Bergson nd lexander) 
aeea that growth and ore t1v proceas must be t k n 
s rundam nta.l.~ 
Bergson a g sted that obj otitic tion was a proe 
atract1on--that the r alit7 1 the procees. 
o~ ab-
Everyth1 i bseure in the id a ot creation it 
we think of thinse which r created and a thing 
which cr tea . • •• tt 1 n tural to our In-
tellect, whose tunetion is easenti lly pr otto 1, 
made to pre ent to ua things and t te rather 
than chan ea nd eta. But things nd tate re 
only •1 we, taken by our mind, or becomin • There 
r no thing • ther ar only ction .• 
s bas been pre 1oualy pointed out, itehead differ 
trom Bergson in the 1 tter's b 11 r th t th intell et tal• 
i~i s the notion o~ proceas. or it head obj et1t1cat1on 
1 a ap t1 11zationn and a "tempo:x- 11zat1on" of' experienc • 
1. PR 1 365. 3 . Emm t, o, 2'75. 
2. OOT, in E, 221. 4~ Bergson, CE, 270-271. 
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t th s does not tal 1ry th idea o proee a, e en thou h 
1t is an abstraction, ~o~ the concrescence of an actu 1 en-
t ty ocoup1 dur t1 n, and the extensive continuum in-
eludes b th p ce d time. Space for 1tehe d, howev r, 
was not a ort or reeept ole, s it was for ewton; 1t w 
th "phy leal f1 ld" or mod r cie ce. Bee us t is exten• 
1ve continuum 'expresses t ct derived tro th actual 
world," mn1tehead considered it to b "real,n--not the reali-
ty or being actual, but rather ~th ea11ty or hat 1e po-
t ntial, in its character or being a real component o what 
1 actual.~l Ne•ton, from whom tr d1t1onal science, nd o 
Bergson, took their id ae of pace, erred, in 1tehe d' 
opinion, in transfor 1ng into actuality that which is po-
tential.~ 
ttohe d divides the process ot conore ceno into 
sev ral succe s!ve pba , which lack actual ty because they 
fall to fulfill the category of subj ctive unity. Thea 
pha are the 1n1t1 1 phase o primary teel1ngs, inter-
med1ary t s eompr1 ed of ucceaaively more complex t el-
1ngs by ~eaeon or the integration of the e rl!er phases, 
nd the ~inal phase or " t1 f cttonw when the eonere cenee 
oqu1r e tull ubjective unity nd the actual nt1ty 1 
formally eo$plete.~ 
1. PR. 103. 3. PR, 33'7. 
2. PR., 123. 
tull de cr1pt1on o th1 proc will b ma 
id ration of Whiteh ad ' th ory or pr henaions. 
3. Cone pt of Natur 
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in con• 
en it he d wro e his book on physical ci nee, h 
wa not att mpttng to give a complete metaphysic 1 account 
of n ture. In t ct. 1ns1 ted th t h w s oimply de er1b-
1n~ the concept of natur as 1ve in en e- warene • 1th-
out di cussing m taphys1c 1 u stions. although he recog• 
n1z d th f ct that ueh qu stion were being r is d . a 
he td 1n th dPrefaee~ to PNK, Th book 1 merely n n-
quiry. It r 1 e mor d1tt1eult1e than tho which 1t p o-
e s to ettle."l Th e d1ff1culti wer recognized by 
many critics, one of th o t :ttching of whom a Dr. D. s. 
obin on in hi article, •nr . it had's Th ory of Event . ~2 
o t of the question raised by th1 nd other or1t1o 1 
rticle and rev1 ws er v ry w 11 nawer d by 1tehend tn 
h1 m taphyaic 1 books, e pec1 lly PR . For Whitehe d' con-
e pt or natur , both the cientitie nd metaphy 1cnl work 
n ed to be con Ulted. 
1teh d cone 1ved or natur s made up ot actual en-
t1t1 •• or evonts s he c lled them in his earl! r works. 
R1 th ory a 1m1lar to that or Le1bn1z in th t th study 
of an ctual nt1ty revealed the nature of th entire organ• 
1 m, the whole. s Letbn1z's monad mirror the un1ver e. so 
1. PnK, vi !1. 2 . Robin on, Art.(l930). 
218 
tehead' actu l ent1tt r otero oop1c view r re 11ty. 
e maorosoopic vie is Goc, the pr!mordl 1. non~t mpor 1 
ctu 1 nt1ty. te ad anal z actu 1 ent1t1 in two 
wny , genetically and morphologically.l Th morphologic 1 
an ly 1 de ina e th book on phy to 1 eience and P rt 
V, e Th ory or~ tension,' of PR. This de cr1ption 1 
prim rily at matte 1 nd e ~cern extensive rel tiona ot 
th 1v r I he manner in w 1ch ent1t1 s are rel t d in 
sp c - 1m • naly 1 o ttehe d's morphological de or1p-
t1on o re 11ty 1 e 1etly beyon the acope of thts di r-
t tion, b c use t has r 1 t!on tc th ork o rg on, 
with one e oept1on. 1teh d include t1 e in th xten-
1ve eontinu nd o h1 de cription or th xtens1v r -
lat1on inol ded t n ture or ti an duration tte-
d' idea of duration a been ex lned in Oh pter IV . 
n 1tehe d as 1n London, he oon 1dered himself a 
r 11 t;2 t t 1 • e wa eonvino d th t natur h d a r 1 
x1at no part trom the perceiving mind, nd t t perc p-
tton not i ply n a arena or subjective p ychic 
•t tes, but rath r the cont nt of p roept1on w s deter 1ned 
by the ord r of nature. The mind could dopt "pe spec-
t1 e," tt could elect 1t m ter1 l by 1nten 1 yin , or 
11min t1 data ~om r lev nee, ut it could not det r 1n 
• at was n 1ven.n actu 1 entity, he 1d, 1 
2. rt.(l 22), 131. 
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*'def1n!t;e , d terminate , aettled tact , stubborn and 
avoidable con equeno a . 1 n p1t of the re rkabl 
ith un-
the 1s o~ modern philo ophy h1ch he w s able tc ne1~ev , it 
1 prob bl that h~ al ~Y considered himself a r aliwt 
'The ultima t facts o t na tur , • fu.1 t he a :1 1n 
".we event connected by their p tio- temporal rel t1ons . "2 
'l'h v nts he con id red th only re 1 tact of nature . 
'l'h r were other w ys of looking at the universe ., yield! g 
v rlou types or obj ct • pe c1p1 nts obj ct , eon e- object , 
percept l object , nd o1 nt1f1c objeets.3 But all ob-
j eta w re d rived b bstraotion . They were usual in e 1-
1ng · th n ture, but their u omitted the undamental pr1n-
c1pl of' the pa. go or natur • 1tehe d did not, however, 
oonaid r that ents wer simply :r 1 t d to on nothezt in 
a rial o:rder . In tead each v nt ext nds o<~rer oth r vents 
which are part 0 it lf, and every event 1s xtended ov ~ 
by other ev nt ot h1ch it 1 9. p :rt . 4 Thus there 1· an 
or anic :r lation mong events . In PR, 1tehe refers to 
his theory a "cell• th o:ry. 
1tehe d w profoundly influenced ln th1 view by 
the quant theory in physics . coording to this 
• 
l'eality is not de up of t tic unit 1 ho ever sm 11 
R the:r the ult1m te quant which k up physical re lity 
l . PR, 336 . 
2 . PNK, 4 . 
3 ,. P K, 60 . 
• PNK, 61 . 
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are t e vbr ry pre uct1 n of r.e Y• 1 f' 
p y 1cal unit 1 t e nergy itself. v1br tory uc-
t on h.a rt in p ttern n oec pi e rt n on . 
c1 nc , tryin to loco. e e ect n , f il eo u e e-
t ct onl n 1 ant neo p t t 
' 
ct true-
t l" • u the QUB.nt them 1 e et 1 d 
VG n re l_ty l"t from t e v1br y e 1. ty. 
t ere for t or 
of objects, e • • 
t1 re r q 
rently indio ted 
t 1 p rr etl c n 1 t 
or object intained 
In emph s1z1n he qu tu heory, te ea o n , 
n t so muc 0 t. d1v1sib11 ty or n tur , ~ to the lt1 te 
n visibility of t ele nt 0 c nature a eo pose • 
o in t d' t physic , t1 roceeda, not by in-
t nt , · t by epoch of a d t dur t • ctu 1 en-
titie e not d1 1 1ble into p r s, xcept y tr otion 
from ctu 1 ty . te ea c ut!ona his e r to re mb r , 
ho 
i 
er, t t t e or n c w olene a or t e worl or 
port nt n its tomle1ty . 
You must not th!nk or the worl u1 1 tely 
built up event- p rtioles . t is to put t e 
c rt bef' re t e hor e . The world we kno s a 
continuous atre o ooe~r nee w ic we c n d a-
cr1 1n te into nite events orm ng by t e1r 
ov rlapp!n and cont 1n1ng of e oh other nd 
separations a ap tio- te or 1 truct • • • • 
1. s , 136 . 2 . c ' 162 . 
The b tr tion f i ~e ent t h eh 
are truly 1n n ture, thou h they h ve n meaning 
1n 1.s l .ion "' nature. 
l 
lth h the r rm ' l m v ca.a-
1'\ J nf1ueneed by the qu n t E' T'y, 't vet'y po b 
re rev. s 0 eo"lpl me t ry nf1 ence r.r m 
r oo 1te 
' 
t eory 1. ~t" 0 r ~so 
t many p t", lthou h uc rn 1 y de t' -
8 t r~t bo k, 'Jt st rt tl" eh te:r on tt Int n• 11 
s1ty of ych o • ta.tes .. Ther h ned out th t, eon-
tl'a!'y to eo o 1n en, the 1nt na~ty of yeh1e et t s do s 
not chan,, b t r the~ var1 tt n in intensity indio te 
uce s on c p yeh1c t . te 11 eh en th co t!t nt 1n-
ten ity. Th eh ge do n t e m b ut r du 11y ut by 
e nite e n in nt n ity. peri nee, r r B r son, 1 
a to 1e.2 r eon ta tehe theo vent 
xtend.n over other ven • Re h n acute 1 ala or 
t L ptoesent 1 h1oh is 1 cussed in t rm very 11. e 
t e I £1 • aye t ~ ere th t the u re nt ne s-
rily occup! s n ur t1on . " rt •• o e foot 1n •I.Y p t 
n another n y .tu.tur • 3 itehe d id that the e~e -
t ve proaess 1s r yt c. 4 r s n eu e ted t e ~ e 
thin n y1 t t tteAe speei 1 e olut on 4 kind of 
c rel , a 1 a b auti 1 ~1 uro o~ sp eeh, " o e • • • 
c·, 1'72-173. 
Bergson, T •· · , 6 • 
3 . 
4 . 
ergs on, 
1teh ad , 
PR, 22 • 
, 176-1'77. cr . 
I, 246- 257. 
it e t ed in p that i8 uee ~ "ap ti 11zed" c m 
fro on,4 nd w en us d t e te h uau lly ut 1t 
in quot t on r • is use o it 1nd1c t th t 18 1nt n-
tion 8 to show w r r 0 • 8 in rrtor and t u 001"1" ct 
a oh me o which, on t w ole, a p o • 
ite d 1dent1f1 hi • to 1z d qu nt 0 extension 
w th 
1. 
2 . 
wt solute p1 nd 
wt th t t1on 
lut , i n its 
r on, C , 141-142. 
er o , , 12~• 
beol t dur tion. 
doe not pp1y to 
t re s mm b1 , 0 
3. J 127. 
4. p , 3 6. 
holds. Tbus an actual entity nev r 
where it is and what it is.l 
v~s: lt 1.s 
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In this view it 1e poesibl that itehead h d ln mind Berg-
son' multipllcity of p wch!e tate • hich do not change. 
Fo~ the not1cn of change itehe d ubetituted the idea of 
passage. Events do not ohan e, but only p s from one to 
another. Endurance results from the re1ter tion of the ~ t-
tern or sucoees1ve occ ston • This p sa ge , itebead ~1d , 
1 the creative advance, Bergeonian 1dea.2 Later Whitehead 
w s to say th t the only ch nge in actu 1 entities 1 their 
b coming nd peri bing. 
Thts quantum is constituted by its totality of re-
lation hips nd cannot move . lao the ere ture 
cannot h ve any external adventure , but only the 
nternal adventur cf becoming. Its birth 1 it 
end.3 
Thu · the ordinary conception of oh nge become , in ite-
he d's thought, the ditter noes betw en actu 1 occasion 
1n one event."' 
itehe d's description of time a a nperpet 1 per1eh-
1n " is an expre eion w~1eh comes from Locke. The ide was 
1 o found by 1tehe d in Plato' s Timaeua, where he said: 
But that which i conceived by opinion with the 
help f ensat on and •ithout . r ason , is altaye 
in the pro~ess of beeom1n.g and perishing and never 
re lly is. ' Bergson, in hi prot st 1g ir~st ''spa-
t1a11zation, is only echoing Plato ' s phrase ' nd 
nev r ~eall 1s .• 5 
1. PR , 113. 
2. p • 62. 
3. PR, 124. 
4. PR, 124. 
5 . R, l2C. 
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!t .~d' c~!tle ~m f the nrne n t on 1a embod ed 1n h s 
de iq c.f " imple 1 en on," the idea .... .... . t t ings m y exist 
s 1 ly in er.ternal r la \en to ono another, and tho.t they 
~Y b P-f n1tely located !n spaco nd time. itehead felt 
th t th1e f 1 aey a due .o t e confusion between evonto c. nd 
c ject • 
The e ief c n~usion between objects and events is 
conveyed in the prejudice that an object can only 
be n one ~lao Rt a time. That ls a fundamental 
propel"ty of event .1 
He maintained that «simple loca.tion" 1e a eon t-ruct of 
thought, rather than a datum or experience. 
How do we know that the two cargoes of material 
.. !c oQ<l th~ two instants 'lr den tic 1? The 
answer is t at we do not perceive isolated !nat n• 
tnrecu ra.ets, 'but continuity of existence. and 
that 'it is this observed continuity or e-x1 tence 
w .cr. uarante he persi tenc of material.2 
Looat1cn in ap ce ie lw y ideal of thought 
and never fact o pereept1on.3 
In itehead' thoUFpt, the eoneept of simple location 
was replace 
a her 
through 
by the 1d as or "vector ztelations" and "fields. rt4 
defined the field of an electron extend 
11 time nd 11 paee .5 
In e certain sen e, everything 1e verywhere at 
all timet.. Fbr every location involves an a pect 
or 1teelf in every otber location. Thus every 
spatiowtempor 1 standpoint mirrors the world.6 
1. PNK, 6fi. 
2. PNK. '7-8 • 
3• p J , 166. 
4. Lowe. Art .(1941) in Sch1lpp, P u, 97. 
5. P JK, 96. 
6 • SMt"', 93 • 
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ecordin~ to the theory or relativity which underl e the 
p lo ophy or it head, "simple location is the r eult of 
the "perspective" of the percipient, nd the emer ence into 
• ignific nee or certain elements of the given dat • Lowe 
s ys th t the assertion or ~significance' and the denial or 
"simple location' mean the same in itehead.l 
Tb denial or mple locat on w s almost eert inly in-
flueneed by Bergson. It was on or his primary concept nd 
1tehe d frequently refers to the r ct th t a1mple location 
1 wh t Berg on me ns by "sp tializ tion." 
This simple location or instant neous m terial eon• 
rt ur tiona is what Bergson ha proteste inst, 
so r r as it concerns time and so t r a it i taken 
to be the fUndament 1 tact or concrete nature. e 
c 11 it distortion or nature due to the intel-
lectual ' pati lia tion' or things. I ree with 
Berg on in his prot st.2 
itehe d pointed out that this tall cy wa one the ost 
import nt or the uncritic1zed assumptions of the p ilosophy 
or the seventeenth nd e1~hteenth centuries.3 itehead 
criticized K nt.4 De cartes, and HumeS tor stating t e doc-
trine or the 1n ependence or occ siona or sen e d ta. Ber -
on criticiz d Kant 1n a 1 ilar w y and m int !ned th t the 
Kanti n ant1nom1e were due to the t ulty supposi ion that 
matter is "wholly developed into p rts absolutely extern 1 
to one another. 6 This "complete reciprocal independence,• 
1. Lowe, rt.(l941) in Sehilpp, 3. 
p , 95. 4. 
2. s , 52. 5. 
6. 
8 , 49-50. 
PR, 172. 
PR, 207-208. 
Bergson, CE, 225. 
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s d Ber on, would result in perfect spati lity . In op• 
position to thi he cites th view of Faraday 'that all the 
toms int rpenetr te nd that e ch of them rill the world.~l 
Berg on believed that, not only w s thi the view of recent 
cience, but that 1t was the view t at is giv n to ense when 
the intellect uspenda its habitual forms of thought . 
If we con 1der m tter, which seems to us at fir t 
coincident with space, we find that the more our 
ttention is fixed on it, the more the parts which 
we said were laid ide by side enter into e eh 
other, e ch of them und rgo1ng the action of the 
whole, which is consequently omehow present in t . 2 
This is included 1n Whitehead's doctrine or solid rity which 
c me to h1 om Ber son, through e ~. 
Every otual entity in its rel tionship to oth r 
etual entities 1 1n this en e somewhere in the 
continuum, nd rise out or the d ta p~ovid d by 
thi standpoint. But in another sense it is every-
where throughout the continuum; for its constitu-
tion includes the objectification or the ctu 1 
world and thereby includes the continuum; al o the 
pot nti 1 obj etlttcation or itself contribute to 
the r 1 potent! 11t1es whose solidarity the con• 
tinuum xpresses . Thus the continuum 1 pre,eent 1n 
each ctual entity, nd each ctu 1 ntity perv dee 
the eont1nuum . 3 
1tehe d' den! 1 of motion to the actu 1 entity i 
also an echo of rgson . 
Now. if we reflect further , we shall see that the 
successive positions of the moving body really do 
occupy ep oe, but that the proces by whio it 
p s es from one position to the other, proce s 
which occupies dur tlon nd which has no reality 
except for a conscious spectator , eludes pace . 
1. Bergson, CF., 222 . 3 . PR, 104- 105 . 
2 . Berg on , C~, 227 . 
e h ve t do here not with 
pro~ress: motion, in o r pass e 
from one point to nother, i a ment 1 ynthe is, 
s p yohio and therefore unextended prooe s . • •• 
are thus co palled to admit th t we ha re 
to do with synthes1 which , o to pe k, 
qualitative, r du 1 or an1z t1on of our ue-
eesa1ve sene tiona , a unity r embl!ng th t or a 
phrs in melody.l 
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ltho h otu 1 entities re the only re 1 thing in 
the world, 1tehe d, by bstraot1on, an lyzed the etual 
entit1 s in var1ou w ys. On way w into physic 1 and 
ment 1 pole : ~Every occ ion f exp r1 nee i d1po1ar . "2 
ental 
lon in 
only 
so e 
act vity 1 one of the mode of feelin 
to all aotu 1 entitle in ome d gree, 
ountin to eonsoiou 1nte11eotu 11ty in 
otual entitle .3 
be-
but 
ith mental ty present in every occasion, nd f eling the 
ea ene or bot pol , it head' hilosophy y be termed 
"panp yeh1 m. Th1 1 also m d evident by the raet th t 
wh t Locke nd Hume c 11 the n ind," nd H e c 11 th 
" oul," are quated by it h ad with hi terms " otu 1 n-
t ty" or • otua1 ooo ion."4 lso tehead s id, "For 
Berkeley' mind, I substitute a proces of prehens1ve uni 1-
oation."5 
it head found it nece s ry to an lyze his occasion 
bee us it 1 in thi way ha one 1s ble to determine 
wh t he o 1led, ft r phr e or Locke , the "re 1 tnt rnal 
con t1tut1on of things, or their" ssenc .'6 Each actu 1 
1. B r on, T , 110-111. 
2 . ~R, 25. 
3. PR, ea. 
4 . PR, 213. 
5 . s , 71. 
6. PR, 37. 
entity is eompo e or oth r actual entities, eternal ob-
jects, and teeltngs, or preh n 1 na . The actual entiti 
re r lt in the physic 1 pole, h!le the etern 1 obj et 
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re conce~tu lized or telt in th mental pole. ile Ber -
on did not nt1c1pate 1tehe d 1 doctrine o actual n• 
t1tie , e does use term very 1 il r to Lock ' "real tn-
t rnal constitution . " He spe ks or "th internal eon igur-
tion o every real sy t m. 1 He 1 o spea ot the way an 
rti t ub titutes a r present tion ror the re 1 n in-
tern 1 or niz t1on of the thin . "2 11 1tehe d un-
d ubtedly got 1d a fro Locke, it 1 s1gn1fic nt that 
Bergson ' philosophy is o stmil r that he, ind pendently 
rob bly, used mtlar phrase • 
te. adt p npsychi m ha it nalogue in Ber son in 
that er son considered matter that in which the vit 1 force 
had pent it 1 ••th t in w ich th tension o life had been 
rel xed . Probably Bergson would say, 1tehe d would , 
that m tter w s th t in which the vital force , or the t n• 
sion or life wa negl1 ible , r th r than say it wa non-
xi t nt . For Berg on the creative urge m nif eta itself' 
a it oe in itehe d., as mind or spirit, which in ita 
highest pha e of' devel opment is eonsciousne • 
ut er on does not conceive or mentality in the w y 
that Wh1tehe d does, s the integr tlon or et rnal obj ct 
1 . Ber son, , 254 . 2 . Bergson, IT~ , 32 . 
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w thin the c ncr cence of ctua1 n !ties. The two v ewe 
1 11 in th t in tte d., t etern 1 obj cts r 
pure pot nti 1 " nd r the "tor s o de initene s" wh oh 
p ar in ooc ion or no e l conor cence; wh11 1n B r on, 
p r t • , or ti nd productive r ov lty . But 
th cone t r t rn 1 o ject fore! to the philosophy 
o rg on. In erg on pot nt1 1ity or pos b111ty w 
et te tnol d d in tho pr neiple of free om . Th con-
c pt or 1 to to uni er 1 w d nied, a imply d t r-
n tion, n the d or fr do t for r on ind -
t r ination.1 r son felt t at the ab olut reality t -
lf was in proce or gro th nd t t volut on w 
continu 1 invention of form ver new . 2 By the wor 
" 
•rorm 
r on me nt Pl tonic or i n the nse o potent! lity 
fo b eomin • e urth r d v lop d t e ide in C , nd id: 
In dur t1on , consider d or ti evolution, 
there is perpetu 1 ore tion of pos ib lity nd 
not only or r 11ty. 3 
1t be d a s rted de intte y th t "ther are no novel 
tern 1 object . " But . it h d' tern 1 obj cts r 
pur potent! 1s nd as ueh w r o mpletely indete in t • 
Th t 1a , ubjeet t the C te ore 1 Ob11 tion of ubjeotiv 
Unit , tern 1 object coul beoo tnt gr te w th any 
ot er eternal obj ots nd any atu 1 ntiti s in 
of in~r s ton into ny c t 1 ntitiea . S1nee 
1 . Ber son, C , 343- 3 7. 
2 . Berg on, C , 374 . 
3 . Ber son, C , 1 . 
• PR , 33 . 
proo s 
ch etu 1 
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occasion 1 novel ooe ion, nd, by t t eory of' r la-
tivity1 every aetu 1 entity 1e a potent al for 11 be-
oom1ng,l then the continual er ation of aetu 1 entities 
would me n the same thin that Ber son ean by the con-
tinual creation of possibility as well as re lity. 
In their conclusions, itehead nd Ber son are close 
together on the subject of po s1b1lity. ut itehead 
no·ted that t ere 8 neees a.ry cone pt missing from uc 
o philosophy, possibly he noted it absence in Berg on, 
the concept of eternal ty. 
Every scheme for the ana.ly is of nature h a to face 
the e two fact , ohanse nd endur nee. There is 
yet third tact to be placed ~Y !t, eternalitz.2 
P9s 1bly 1tehead objected to Bergson's wholesale rejection 
cf Plato, wh le agreeing with his general doctrine, nd 
attempt d to how that modified concept of eternal uni-
versal wa not inconsistent with a philosophy or free 
creativity. But itehead m~kes no explicit references to 
Berg on in h1s discussion or poss1b111ty and eternal object • 
4. Theory of Prehension 
itehead 1 s th ory or prehensions 1 very complex 
doctrine and is develo~ed in full det !1 in PR. o attempt 
will be ade to give f'ull exposttion of t is doetr:tne. 
Only the b~oad outlines of Whit head's theory will b 
~iven, with more detail at those points where it appears to 
be s1m1lli~ to view expressed by Berg on. 
1 . PR, 33 . 2 . s ' 88 . 
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In fuitehe d's theory o prehen ions e r j cted h t 
he t rmed the "sen at1ona11stic dootrine .ft H found twc 
pr1nc1ple tnvolv d in th1 doctrine , both o h ch 1e :re-
jected. The e t o principles he called "Th Subject'tv1st 
Principl ' and "The Sensationalistic Principle . " IJ d -
fines them a ollow • 
The subjectivist principle is, th t the datum 
in the act of experience can be adequ tely analysed 
pur ly in terms o un1v rs 1 • 
Th sensation list principle is, that the pri-
mary activity in the aot of experience is the b re 
ubjective entertainment of the datum. devoid of 
any subjective o:rm o :reception. Thls 1s the 
doctrine ot mer sene tion.l 
-
The error involved in th subjectivist principle come tram 
the ocept nee of the ubstance-qu 11ty, and ubj ~t-predi-
eate forms of thought implicit in 1 totle'a logic and the 
1tish empiric! m. Th1 mann r or th1nk1n result in the 
traditional distinction between un1ver l nd part 1. eul rs • 
In the philosophy of organism, 1te ea admits two classe 
ot entities, actual entities nd eternal objects, h1ch are 
''m1 -d scribed" as p rtioulars an un1vers ls respect1v ly. 
Th m1sdeser1pt1on arise from the t et that reality 1 a 
process in which both actual ent1t1e and eternal object . 
re integrate in the constitution of actual ty. In pl ee 
or this doctrine Whitehead adopt retormed subjectivist 
principle." Th truth in the subjectivist principl that is 
retained is th doctrine that a ll reality 1s ult mately 
1. PR, 238- 239 . 
ubjectlve expo~ienoe. 
The reform d subj'ect1v1at principle adopted by the 
philosophy of' organ! m i merely an alternative 
statement of th pr1ne1ple or r lat1vity (the 
fourth Category of Explan tion) . Thi principle 
tate th t 1t belongs to the nature of 'being' 
that it is potential for every 'becoming . ' 
Thus all thing are t be conceived a qu 11f1-
cat1ons of ctu 1 occ sion • • • • The way in 
which one actual entit 1 qualified by other 
ctuAl entities la the 'experience' of the actual 
wo~ld enjoyed by th t actual entity, as subj ct.l 
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Vh1tehead considered this doctrine important nd relter ted 
it in a dram tic m nner. 
The reform d subjectivist principle must be ~e­
pe ted: that part rom the xper1enoea or sub-
jects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, ba 
nothingnes .2 
itehead thu · states unequivocally th t all reality 
is composed of f'eellnga . In thi doctrine he modifies neo-
realism, nd stat a kinship with lexander, Be~gson, 
Locke nd D o rtes . 
Feelin • • • ~epl ee the 'neut~al stutr' o cer-
tain ~eal1st1c philosophers. • • , This use of ~he 
te~m 'reeling' ha close analogy to lex nder' 
us of the term 'enjoyment'; and has also some kin-
ship with Berg on•s u e or th te~m 'intuition.• 
· near an lo~y is Loe e's use or the term 'idea,' 
including 'tde s or particular things' •••• ut 
the word ' eellng' ••• is even more remini cent 
of Desc :rt s.3 
In s ~1tehead QUoted the tatement or Fr nci Bacon 
th t all borl1~s h ve perceptlon . 4 He noted th t the view 
also round in Lelbniz . 
1 . PR, 252 . 3. PR , 65 . 
2 . PR, 254 .. 4. s , 42. 
It is evident th t I can use Le1bn1z's languag , 
nd say that every volume m rrors in 1 tselt every 
other volume in space.l 
The doctrine is here c lled the doctrin o preh n 1ve 
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unity,~ ith th meaning that all xperience is un1t1ed b7 
the experiencing subject: ~ ~atever i d tum tor feel-
1ng ha a unity as folt."2 s itehead noted, the view 1 
related to Berg on'Q use of the term intuition. B rg on 
atre d the fact that in~uition, sort of "intell etual 
sympathy,' by wh_c the individual placed him el~ w thin 
dur tion, was th only mode o experience by wh ch true 
reality could be apprehended. Berg on frequently xpre sed 
himself in ways that indicated that h doctrine s very 
clo to itehe d. 
Concrete move nt, capable, like consciousness, 
of prolonging 1t past into its present, eapabl , 
by rep atin itself, or ngendering sensible 
qualit1e , already possesses o ething akin to 
eon eiou n , ometh1ng akin to sensation. • •• 
Between ensible qualitie • as regaPded ln our 
r pre ent tion of them. nd these a m qualit1e 
tre ted s oaleulabl Ch nge , there is there~or 
only a difference 1n rbytbm or duration, n dif-
ference of nternal ten ion. Thu , by the idea of 
tension we hav triv n to ov roo e the opposition 
betwe n quality and quant1ty.3 
Probably the ori in of this doetr1n for both ~ teh nd nd 
Bergson w the ory of r 1 t1v1ty, e peolally the doetrin 
of the interpenetration of the atom • It ha alr ady be n 
noted that both Bergson nd itehe d refer more th n once 
1. s w. 66. 3 . B rgson, , 329-330 . 
2. PR, 36. 
to this idea. 
Build up the universe with toms: e eh o them is 
subject to the ction, v ri ble in quantity nd 
quality according tc the d1 t nee, ex rted on it 
by al ter l atom • Bring 1n Par day' centr 
of rorce: th line o force e itt d in every 
direction from every centre bring to bear upon aoh 
the in lu nee of the whole mat r1 1 orld. Call 
up th Le1bniz1 n on d ' e ch 1 the 1rror of 
the un vers • 11 philosopbel" , t n, agr e on 
th1 point.l 
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The t eory r the org nic 1nterrel t dnea o th un1-
ver e as thu r 1rly co on ide in the philo ophy or 
science an beth Ber on and ~it e d se m to h ve t en it 
fro this co~on tr dition . ut the interpretation or the 
view a a the ry f re lin w s not so fr qu ntly expre sed, 
alt ou h a te e d noticed , it h d been hinted t by 
Bacon, Locke, nd Desc rt s nd stated de initely by Leib-
niz. But B r son 1 o interpreted th view a a theory or 
re lin~ and e ted th t coherent co molo y should be 
b sed upon psychology, r ther th n phy ics.2 It it e d 
had been att mpting to follow B rgson's au gestion, th 
re ult would h ve been PR , nd he proposed to write 
"critique 0 pure r eli 
' 
a K nt had written th Critique 
of Pure Re son . 3 In view or the e f ot , it seem oert in 
that there w a some influenc fro Ber on in ite ad's 
theory f reeling . 
iteh c lls hta doctrine theory or ~prehensions~ 
1 . Ber on, , 31- 32 . 3 • PR, 172• 1 73 • 
2 . Berg on, CE, 228 . 
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r ther th n a theory of f eling, bee u e he includes as pre-
hensions, operations w iah in his v ew are not prop rly 
t elinga. They are neg~tive pr b nsions, wh1c ~ellmin te 
aonoroacence ls the ntegraticn o e 1 ngs 
into ~ subjective unity, nd ne tlvo pr hension "hold 
ita datum as inoperat_ve in the progre s1v oonoreacenoe or 
prehensions.ftl The theory o~ n gative prehen lone neoes-
ary for a complet ly ooh rent co mology, but the study of 
prehen ion 1 pri ril the tudy o~ the ~eelin s, or posi-
tive prehensions which re involved in t~e conore cence. 
Prehen ions are divided lnto t o types. Physic 1 pre-
h nsione re the preben ion or actual ntitiee. Conoeptu 1 
prehensions r preh nsions of et rn 1 objects.2 
type nece arily involves consoiou ness which 1s 
either 
r 1 tive-
ly bl~h development in the c le of creation. P~ phy 1e 1 
prehensions, however, nev r involve ccnsciou ne s. FOr this 
reason, they have been le s treouently reco ntzed as orme 
of experience. 
In r spect to th roles cr the physical and the mental 
prehension • there 1 an 1nterest1n nalogy to Berge n' 
doctrine of the elan vital urging it w y through tter 1n 
the creation of spirit. The phys1o 1 ide or the coner a-
canoe, said ~1tehead, wa "the perishing of the past a tt 
rRns~or~ it elf tnto a new creation." The mental aide 
1. PR , 35. 
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"1e the Soul entertaining ideas . " In his us of the ter 
Soul , Whiteh ad was referring to the doctrine of Plato . l 
In V'Jh1tehead 1 theory, actual occasions occur and perish 
as oon as they ar born . But e eh ooca ton becom a. tum 
fer potent! 1 integr tion in th concre oenee of novel 
ctual ntlty, nd in thi w y acquire obj ctlve immortal! • 
ty . " itehead c lls this doctrine the 'appropriation of 
the dead by the livlng. " and also r fer to it s ~'~the 
creative dvanoe . ~ 2 There is thu close resembl nee of 
it head' view to Bergson's doctrine of the ela.nVLtal , ex~ 
cept that 'Nhltehead's v ew 1e more tully developed . Berg-
son ha.d maintain d that the creative impulse was expre ed 
in the ore t1on ot spirit . 
tive ur e ori in ted feeling . 
iteh d stated th t the orea-
Tn each concr scenee there 1s twofold aspect 
of the creative urge . In one aspect there 1a 
the origination of simple c~ueal feeling ; and in 
the other speot there is the origin tion or con-
ceptual feelings . Th se contrasted aspect will 
be called the physical and the mental poles of 
n actual ent!ty. 3 
hit he d viewed simple phy !oal feelings as act of 
cau at!on • . Thus he called them cau 1 re lings . They only 
acquire consciousness when th y re involved in more com• 
plex 'tran uted" feelings th t involve eternal bjects . 4 
T e purely cau al feelings repre ent the unconscious ex-
periences of th or ni m int ract1n with the environment . 
1 . I, 355 . 
2 . PR , lx . 
3 . PR , 366 . 
4 . PR , 361 . 
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It xperienees the environment s e , in e rt n r eots 
in th or ania , nd the or ani in turn ake cert n 
daption to the env r nment . This done by positively 
ee ptin c rt in dat n eg t1ve1y e11m1n tin other data 
rr m the concre cence. This theory h a clos n lo y to 
r a n' vi w of pure p rcepti n . Thi mode of perc ption 
is a pur ly phy 1c 1, or nlc, unconscious xperiene • Con-
eiou ex erience, for ergs on, the 1nt r ct1on o mind , 
or memcry, nd the physic 1, teri 1 bod-y . But pure per-
eeptlon is unoon clous. The 1 ving organ a selects h t 
1 r levant for th good o ita own functioning. 
Our reprea ntation of att r is the me sure or 
our possibl ction upon bodies: it re ult 
from t e discard ng cf w1at has n tnter st or 
our needs, o~ mor ganer lly or our functions . 
In one en e w m ght ay th perc pt1 n 
or any unconscious mater! 1 point whatever, in 
its inst ntan ou nee , 1 infinitely re t r nd 
more complete th n ours, inee th point gathers 
nd transmit the 1nflu no 8 or 11 the points 
or th m t rial un1vers , here our eonsciou -
n s only tt 1n t c rt in part nd to c rtain 
a pects of those part • Consoiouaneas, -- in re-
gard to ext rn 1 perc pt1on,--li s in ju t this 
choice. But there is , in th1 nece ry poverty 
r our con a1ous p rc pt1on, som thi th t 1 
positive , th t r ret 11 spirit: it is, n the 
et lo 1c 1 ena o t e ord, di c rnm nt . l 
bitehe d ke ~ di tlnotlon bet 6 n en e - perc ption and 
nse-roce t1on." Locke nd ther , he o id, rr d in con-
aid ring en e-p rc ptlon th et primitive forUl of x-
p ri nee . It w , h point d out , hi h form of xp r1ence 
1. Ber on, , 30- 31 . 
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c u e t in olv d con o1ousnes , wh le en -r eep 1 n" 
f unconscious. r.t is ph eic 1 re lin~, or h t B r on 
called pure perc t1 n. 
But th c ur e f thcu ht o n be 1r.d1c t d y 
adopting Bergson' edm rabl phr s olo y, aenae-
r c ptton i 'un p~t! lizen,' d ns -perce t1 n 
1 ' o ti 11zed.' In n e-r c pt1 n t e eena 
ar t def nit ne s cf e otion.l 
B r son do no us t1e t r '1n p ti liz d" or pure p r-
c ption, but th b ve u t tion from ' indio t t t 
•bitehead' di t notion i tru to r on's Lhou ht, nee 
h organic r lin hav r er nc the hole universe . 
1tohe d' view ~ preh ns en 1 1 o allied ith 
B rg on' v e in t both b 1 eved t t con c1ousn a 
inv lv d r coll cti n, "e rl1er ph es from th dim re-
c of the uncon e1ous . n2 B r on u d the t rm con-
c o ne t m n ny o p city fo xpertenoe, or wh t 
it he d m nt by ment 1 ty. Consc1ouanes in the ordinary 
e of the term, ~ believ d invol ec r cogn tion, th t 1a, 
0 lemnt n the p at a involv d 1n th 
pr nt e er1enc • Like ~!te d, h t h u ht th t th w 
a function o hi h- r de or · n:t ms onl:r~ 
H c n tton !s 1n no Y e mecha.n c 1 
awaken in of emori h t in th 
brain. It or 
1 
0 8 
ory n ro r 
cont ct p rcep,;ion. 
1. R, 173-17 3 . Bergson, MM, 31'7 . • • 
2 . PR, 370. 
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n ergson' vi pu , or 
I 
n c 'C\erce t "n 8 1 ce 
in th phy ic 1 world. ind or em ry 1. he ocumul ted 
e rl no 0 th indlvidu 1 . Ths s re ectod 1n te-
hA d' philo ophy by th vie t w ile t e hya c 1 ole 
or an 
ol 
ctu 1 entity part k s ct nsion, t eo cep 
does n • 
r etu 1 entity 'in ti ' o r a . 1ta 
physic 1 pole 1a concerned, nd 1 'out or time' 
r r a ita ment 1 pole is cone rn • ! a 
1 
the union or two w rld , n mely, th t mpor 1 w rld, 
nd the orld of utonomou v lu tlon . l 
Every preh ton ha " ubjective rm . he 
w y in h eh the ubj et pr h nds it tum. • ere m ny 
kind o subjective forms, uch as e ot1on , na, 
lu tiona, con ciousneaa, etc . 2 The ubjeet1v or 
oonceptu 1 r lin 1 valuation. Since in e ery concre -
cenoe ther occur t~e prehension o 1 cb et , or 
conceptual eelin 1 ever ccncr·e c nee a m v . nt tow r 
v lu • en in ~he in ti · 1 s ~ th e ncr s~ nc 
simple ph ale 1 6 ling 1 1ntegr t6 lt 1 c ncep-
tu 1 r lin , tn result in ubs q·en o t"'e eon-
or o nc 1e phy c 1 f el g kno "phy !c 1 pur-
po • c u e u r ion 
or cone pt 
po i t l 
l r ellng , fu t 
u ture of mind . 3 In otler r.rd, t ~ unction 
t mi d in tho b comin o ctu· 1 t t e t ro e 
1 . PR, eo . 3. PR, 380. 
2 . PR, 35 . 
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t hich will d t rmine w t or t or 1 n " 11 
t ke . The hi her or n1 8 :re 0 p bl 0 ore a nt 
pur 8 nd thu d P r te lin a . l 
it h d note that 1 c no pt of ph to 1 p poa 
1 b t B rp; 
tu1t on te 
pur o e nd 
et. r for 
e con c ou 
t r ted 
ere p 
on c 11 intuttion . l t that r n' in-
n lem nt 1n urc ot n . 2 Phy 10 l 
a te 0 11 1nt llect l e , to-
com ara t 
, but th hy 
b lnt 11 ctu 1 
r ''1ntu1 ti 
ling • Inte1l otu 1 lin 
o l purpo not unl in-
lin • th t 1 , co ec1ou 
jud nta • t3 In b tw n pure 
phy 1c 1 urp n 1nt 11 otu 1 t el n a, it head 
pl 0 d h ta 0 f 11 in hlch ropo 1t1on 1 t e11n 
import nt . 'l'hl h c 11 d th tag or ure 
i inctiv ntuit cone pt n t r v d 
to Ber 
h r 
ti n . 
n . Propo tion 1 f e11n 
n xu or aotu 1 ntiti 
r tho n 1oh 
to ether with a r po-
ro it n 1 n 1 ure preh n 1cn eon t1ng 
the tnt gr t1 f th pr h n lone or n ct l ent ty 
with n etern 1 ob ect . I h n e1 ent of 1ndeterm1n -
t1on r p tent! 11ty 1n 1t, derived rom t e ete n 1 object . 
For th1 r a on th pr poa1t onal r 1 n 1nv lve jud nt 
or truth or f l ity . In re1 in the e r e1 n t r -
on' at e of 1n t1nct1v tnt 1t1on, owever , teh ad 
1 . 
• 
252 . 3 . R, 406 . 
2 . PR, • 
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indio te t t y are not reflective judgm nt • rgson, 
in descr1bing in tinetlve 1ntu1M .. o • c 11 it u r lectlng 
l~pathy nd antipathy," or "divining eymp thy.nl 
e inal phase or concre cence •s th t cf "s t1 r c-
tlon," which is t st ge subjective unity nd s cf ac-
tua11ty. itehead uses t~1 term o~ the 1rn1lar tarm •en-
joyment" to indicate that the concreacenee moves to ard the 
achievement o v~lue, and this value ts achieved when the 
ctual .nt1ty cquircs 1gnir en ca for it lf. 1tehead 
t us ases hi conception of th...,. ·vorld "in the aesthetic 
experi nee, rather than--a · 1 th K .nt-•1n th cognitive and 
1 "2 cone~ t!v exp r enee . T 1a s elo e to 3ergscn'a theory . 
Reg rden rom itbout , natur ppe r a 1mmen 
inflorescence of unforese bl novelty . he 
roree hie animates it eems to create lovingly, 
for nothin~, for the m r ple sure c it, the 
en les variety o! veget ble and animal peel • 
Cn each it eonf r t e abeolut alu of e t 
w rk or rt. 
Bet> en 11~ s . e t rm joy in th... sam en c th t ltehead 
u e the ter "a t1 faot1on" or "enjoym nt, ·• although le 
t .chn call:y-. 
Joy 1 y n noune s ~at 1 e : s uce eded, 
g 1ne round, conquer ed . • • • Wherever there 
ls joy, th~r t! creation; the richer the cr tion, 
the eper joy . 
Wh1tehe d see s !most eert 1nly to be referring to thi 
passage when he s ys, Joy i t e nor al h althy pur for 
1 . B :t' on, '1'-.~, 192-193 . 
2. ~I , 104· 105 . 
3 . Berg on, t . ( l 911}, in , 31 . 
4 . Ber son, rt . (l911 ) 1 i n M , 29 . 
the elan vital."l 
itehead'a doctrine of reeling 1 
1 t in red ent came from ny d rr l' nt 
complex one 
ources. n 
242 
nd 
ot 
these sources wa certainly B rgson, with whom Wh te ad 1s 
in a reement t many pointe. Some or this reement wa 
sympathy and appreciation; som w an ind1c t1on of' a com• 
mon source. ut it seems cert n th t tehe d' develop-
ment o the theory owed som thing, p rh p a ood de 1, to 
is study of B rgson. 
5. Theory of Knowledge 
Whitehead dl tinguished three mode in hi anqly is 
of perception . They re the pur mode or oaus 1 effie cy, 
the pure mode of presentational 1 edlacy, and the mixed 
mod of symbolic reference. The two pure mode ar modes 
of direct or 1mm d1 te perception and ueh preclud th 
po a1b111ty or error. Symbolic reference Involve me n1ngs 
nd so a t e eourc both or error nd or art and th con-
ception or novelty. C us 1 eftio cy 1nvol s the p t nd 
the tutur , cr memory nd nt1c1p tion, but is not oonsclou 
or only v uely so. Present tionql 1 edt cy involve tb 
present duration only, but is vivid xperienoe. 1teh ad' 
theory or knowledge la close to Berg on's t ny point 1 
although Berg on's three modes or expert nee re not identi-
cal with 1tehead. Bergson's epistemology included pure 
perception, pure memory, nd direct perception. D1r ct 
1 • Art • ( 1923) 1 n • , 49 • 
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pe~oept1on, w 1o 1 1n Bergson oombin t1on or 1nteraect1 n 
or memory nd pure perception, corre ponds to teh 
' 
mode o symbolic r ferenoe . But Ber on•~ mode ot pure per-
oept1on included both ttehe d 1 o u l effie oy nd pre-
sent tion l i ed1 cy, while ergson ' s physic 1 recognition 
1 1tehead . ana by memory and i one example ot 
0 u l effie oy . The tot l schemes ot it he nd el' -
son re t var1 nee, but in the d t 11 of the soh me they 
are 1 lar . 
or itehe d , the pure mode of 0 u 1 tt1oacy do a 
not involve con o ouaneas . In OOT , tteh d ref'er:z-ed to 
the p nora yielded y i ht, oun , t ate, m 11, touch, 
n by more 1noho te ensible teelinga . ql 7 this he was 
r f'er~i to pure perception nd the 1 at phras , "more 
inchoate sen ible feel1n • 1 tatement of causal tti-
c oy. Fo:z- this mo e reve l xperience 1n a vague m nn r. 
it b in pri rily a phy 1oal experience . In tact, s oon 
8 1t co into con c1ousne nd on mak judgment about 
1 t, 1t parta a of the n tur or ymbol1o refer nee . t • 
head pointed out that th mode o perception 1s one in 
which the~e ts an interplay betwe n the organism and the en-
vironment , so th t th d ta are otually pprehended by the 
enses. tehe d referred in th1 !de to the view or 
Hum an Desc rtes th t perception 1 ecoomp n1e by n 
1 . OCT, n E, 157. 
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exp rienc or the "witbneaa of the body. "1 Thla was also 
Ber son' v ew, for whom pure perception wa n or nic 
experience . 
There is a v gue nd in so e sort objective re em-
blanc , apr d over e surf ce of he i ea th m-
selves, w ioh m ht act erh pa like phy c 1 
c use or reciproc 1 attr ction.2 
T ode or perception examined by most inveati tor , 
1nclud1n Bu nd De c rtea, 1tehe d pointed out, 1e th 
ode or present tion 1 1 edi ey, 1 ho h they did hint at 
c us 1 er 1cacy . ut this 1 tter od 1e t e more pr1m1-
tive. !t 1 ode of experience "whereby their function-
1n~ a con it1oned by the r environment . 3 Sen -p rception 
or pre ent tion 1 1 ediacy ia nly a characteristic of 
more dv need or is s . C ua 1 ft1oaoy re er to the p t 
nd leo to the tutur 1 due to ts vector oh r cter . 
e ory nd nt1o1p tion re thus ex mples o this mode .4 
Ber aon ha 1 o a e ted this 1n i tatement t t 11 
conseiousn a ia emory r th past and anticip tion or th 
future . 5 This ia lao fund in Ber eon' doctrine that ft t 
the ba is r r co nition there would • • • be 
of motor order . ft 6 
phenomenon 
1te e d 1 s p rception in the mode o presentation 1 
i edi cy, lik causal efficacy, ia a pur od • Th t is, 
1 . PR, 12 • 
2 . Bergson, 
3 • SYi , 5 • 
4 . PR, 84 • 
, 107. 
5 . B r eon, rt.(1911), 1n 
M , a . 
6 . Ber aon, , 111 . 
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it ts a perception which i direct n immediate. But th1 
mode is vivid rather than vagu • 
Perception which m ~ely • • • rescues fro vagu -
ne a eontempor ry social region • • • will be 
called perc ption in the mode or pr sent t1onal 
1 ediacy.l 
This mode differs from causal effie cy 1n that it r fer 
only to the present duration. It oorreapond to that wh1.eh 
1s g nerally called "sense-perception in the eimpl t en 
of b ing mere perc ption without interpretation.2 
nrl.t head' doctrine or presentational immed1 cy is 1 0 
included in Bergson• doctrine or pure perc pt n, because 
it till is without the intervention of memory or conceptual-
ization. Berg on et ted thi view when he said th t the 
simplest type of reco nltion would be "an inat ntaneoua 
recognition, of whioh the body is capable by itself, without 
th help of ny explicit memory 1m g .3 Whitehead stated 
thi ame view in ON. 
Recognition does not merely concern the oomp rison 
of factor of nature posited by memory with a 
factor po !ted by sense-awareness. Recogn tion 
tak a plao within the present ithout any inter• 
vention or pur memory.4 
Thi recognition i not con ciou r cognition, but rather 
1t is the physic 1 warenes or element of experience th t 
are familiar, particularly, 1n 1tehead 1 s vi w, the et rn 1 
objects. 
1. PR, 185. 3. Bex-gson, ., 10 • 
2. PR, 54. 4. c ' 124. 
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1t h ad nd Ber son r g ee upon epi temolo ic 1 
oniam a fun to p rc nd th re ore nece s ry 
for veridic 1 led e~ or teh 
du lim n error h ch p rvades 
ite e o tea nt yana' octrin 
1 conception . 
' 
p te ol ic 1 
dern philo opby . "l 
an x mpl o th 
ow the ot point h re S nta~ n 
th or n c h11osonhy in hi 
th t '1ntutt1on th a lve ' 
'd t or intuition,' t t 1 
ther 1ntu1 ion • 
b r nt , there 
ti credul 
tion, n 
t e re lit! 
Ber eon 1 1 ted t "pure perc ption' 1 n1 t1o , 
pt n we r 
touch t r 
1ntu t1on . 3 
But both r son n iteh ad 
ct lly pl o d out ide 
11ty or th obj ct in 
ed th t for knowl 
the~e uet b the plate olo to 11y d 11 t c ope~ t1on 
w 1ch c 11 d • bol o ret r nee, nd that 
pr ct1cally all con ciou ercept n w a in thi mode . 
c lled this mode " ix • because it w an interpl y betwe n 
t two ure ee or perception, o u 1 efficacy nd pre-
ent tion 1 1 diaoy . He d fined " ymb lie r ~ renee s 
"the or n e tunot onin her by t ere is tr n 1t1on fro 
the a bo1 to t me in , or t h otiv th tic 1 nt 
contributed y tb natur or the p reipi nt . 4 By bola 
1 . R, 216 . 3 . B rgeon, , 84 . 
2 . PR , 21 • • s , a. 
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1tehead me nt concepts like oonaolouanesa, belief , emo-
tions, u ge 1 etc. , as they r sp et "other component " ot 
experience . Thea othe~ component re the "me n1ngs" or 
the symbol • 
Symbolic reterenc~ has a one of its functions th 
election of relevant details , and r !sin them from taint 
relevance they occur in pre entational immedi cy, to 1m-
port nt r levance or s1 nit1o noe .l 
point o individual peycholo y, we et t the 
idea by the ro h an rea y method of' su pre sin 
what ppe r to be irrelevant eta1la . 2 
nother function or symbolic reference is to employ 
the !mag n tion tor the completion of experience • 
Th world of pr ent fact 1 more th n a stream 
of sense• pr sent t1on . e find ourselv s with 
emotions, volitions, imagination , conception, nd jud _ ents. • • • Imagin tion 1 neceas ry to com-
plete the or nge , n mely, the 1 ag1nat1on of 
hypothetic 1 n e- pre ent t1ons ~3 
Symbolic reference 1 late development in the histo~y ot 
creation nd introduce a "new element of origin tive tre -
dom . " It is also the source of rror . 
Error 1 the mark or the higher organisms, and 
is the ehool ster by hose eney th re 1 up-
ward evolution . or xample, the evolutionary use 
or intelligence is that 1t onable the individual 
to profit by error without being slaughtered by 
1t .4 ' 
Bergson fails to d1st1ngu1sh in pure p roept1on the two 
1 . PR, 277 . 3 . OOT, in E, 196 . 
2 . s , 53 . 4 . PR, 255·256 . 
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modes th t Vhit head call cau al etttc cy and pres nt t1on 1 
1mmd1aoy. Yet he doe say that most pel"ception i "direct 
pe~eeption," which 1 the inter ction or the body and memo-
ry, the mind . Bergson ' s "direct perception" is very much 
like White ead' dootri~ or "symbolic reference" b c use it 
combine the op rations of *pure pe1"oept1on" and memory . 
Berg on' pure perc ption 1 a otor experience, ite-
he d 1 "pure» modes o perception ar larg ly phy leal re l -
ing • To pure perception" 1 add d the re l evant experience 
~om the memory . The r ult 1s recognition which 1s partly 
a comparison ot presented data wlth memory- images, but is 
also to a con iderable extent an imagin tiv reconstruction. 
The image which come from emory only thos that r fer 
to bodily needs or function , In perception an nt1re ob-
ject 1 not d1 clo ed . For this reason Ber son a ys ther 
needs to be an education of the senses , that they may re• 
construct th gap in experience , l Because or the indeter-
mination thus introduced 1nto perc ption, error 1a poa 1ble , 
not the error or perception, but the erPor of interpret -
t!on . Becau e th primary function or the intel lect !e to 
secure the action or the body upon the en ironment. the in• 
tellect view r lity as though it were composed o s1mu1-
taneitiee . 
Whiteh ad in hi view or symbolic reterenc dif ers 
1. Bergson• ' 46- 4'7 . 
2 9 
~om Ber son in that he assigns greater value to th s 
mode th n doe Ber on. 1tehead b liev d that symbolis 
was es ntial ror the higher gr de r lite and that 1t • 
re ponsible or t dvnnces which human life has been abl 
tom k , as well as tor it errors. 1t he d dmitt d 
th t the rrors are not wholly avoidabl ,1 but he d1d not, 
on that account, turn over all knowledge to intuition. 
Intuition is v lu ble for t novel insights, but rational 
thou ht need to precede nd follow it. 
itehead 1 s theory or knowledge has points of aimil ri-
ty nd points or d1ff renee with the thought o · itehe d. 
But whil the gener 1 framework of Ber son's views a dir-
ter nt from 1tehead'a, t e b ie ide s quite imil 
' 
eap ei lly in the oeount o ur perception which i an 
awarenea of the physic 1 org nis rather than n awarene 
in conac1ouanesa. Both itehead nd B rgson re erred to 
thi type or p reeption as "pur • itehead lso a id that 
"the current ccount o perception re th stronghold or 
m dern metaphysical diffloulti • Their chi f troubl , he 
thought, was the 1 nor no diapl yed of modern phy ic . 2 
In this r apect, Berg on wa on th side of 1tehead, and 
i is very possible that itehead w a 1 pres ed by r -
on' ooount or perception and that it aided him in con-
tructing his own views. 
1. PR, 27 -27 • 2. PR, 179 . 
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CH PTER VI 
D ND t ODER • PHILOS PHY 
The philo ophy of organism 1 a ynthet1c p 11osophy 
in th t it cont in 1n Qne y tem oharaoteristics which ap-
pe r 1n widely d1v r nt schools of thought. In order to 
determine the influeno of Bergson on Whitehe&d, it will b 
neoe ary to eterm1ne their rel t1on to modern curr nt ot 
thought, and note wh re they a re nd where they differ . 
The reason for this 1 that many of their view are imply 
th ideas common to p rticul r school or philosophy, 
whil oth rs of th 1r ide s represent cr1tic1 ms or or! i~ 
nal mod f1pat1ons of trad tional thou ht. The pUl'pos or 
t e udy of th1 ohapter is to determine hether apparent 
influence on itehe d by B rgson wa the result of real in-
fluence or. h ther t repr sented the ide common to a par-
t cular chool of· thouu.ht. e 11 m, pr matism, nd 1deal-
i m will be discus ed in order, with the different forms 
whic the e schools take . 
typ 
Reali m 1 
of tho 
1 . Re 11sm 
a term that ppli d to any differ nt 
ht • :t'ull discu eion of re lism would r -
quire a discus ion of a re t many m n, becau e e ch 1m• 
port nt r all t has developed hi views 1n w y that 1s 
mo~e or le s diver ent from the view ot other re list • 
But thl 1scussion will be conf'ined to the gener· 1 tenets 
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o reali m, which may be briefly stated. 
Realism, on the negative s1d • 1 a revolt against 
po t-K~nt1~n lde.lism. part cularly absolute idealism. It 
rej cts the He elian proposition that "the true is th 
hole,n an in pl ce of an organic monism who e div ra ty 
1 wholly e pre sed by internal relations, it po its n 
atomi tic plur li , with the world de cr1bed in t rm of 
xt rn 1 relation • The primary problem o re 11sm is 
epistemology and it asserts that reality exists independent-
ly o its being known and unaffected by any act or being 
known. The world, _ as studied by realists, i simply the 
world invest! at d by cience. The only di~ference between 
cience nd philosophy i in the greater en rality or t e 
problem invest! ated by the latter.l Realists, gen rally, 
b lieve t at ide 11 m has been unable to integr te the find-
ings of science, especially that or recent physics, into 
the r chem , and that reali m 1 making such an integration. 
athemat1cal logic n the implications of relativity play 
large part in reali tic philosophy. 11 r al1st reject 
th idea or mind as substance and reg rd 1t either a an or-
ganization of ot or awarene s, or a a ~elation between 
nt1t1ee . ost reali m throws no light on the problems of 
theology or the theory of value. lthough th ia by no 
means t ue of 11 reali ts. There re three main type or 
1. Russell, Sceptical Ess ye, 1n Robinson, ARP , 292 . 
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r 11a : En liah neo-re li eric n neo-reali m nd 
or tie 1 re li m. 
The main oint in F.n 11sh neo-re 1 am ia th t ther 
:re two .el ent n ex r1enoe: th ob ot or w ren , nd 
the et t 
" r esa . h ental act 1 nt 1, w tle t e 
object non- nt 1. Th1 the r u en of G. ;1 . oor 
1n is o 1 br ted ·rt1 cl "The de 11 m. nl 
oore, 11 e J 8 r nd • • t ut, re r d e p r1eno 
v:tn ubj o ive and obj ct1ve po1es .2 lex nd r d 
the ame di t1ncti n and cl 
pl t d, 1 th et · r a. ren 
th t t 
i 
o j et 1 "c nt m-
njoyed . "3 Sell r 
point out that the 1 b neo-re li ta thou ht or ental 
act vity "in ubat t1a.1, ooamolo cal w Y• 
e o n o-r 1 t iffer rom t e En 11 v r1ety 
c 1efly in th t they rejected the ex ate e or con cion n a 
b 1 n thin xe pt a 1 t on t een non- ent 1 ent1-
t e • T 1 was t e po 1t1on o 1111 J r ou rti-
cl , frm ich mer c n n •re lis ot it t rt, Do a 
Conaciou nea x1 t a5 rio n neo-re lism d nied oth ep 
temolo teal du lis foun in critic 1 r 1 s n ycho-
phy to 1 ualia , i plio t in .n li n o- r Re ty 
~cr the m ric n n o- reali t consisted r 1 or "neu-
tr 1 ent1ti wh ch wer either ent 1 nor physical . 
• s. 
rt.(l 03) cited in 
orri , T , 152, n.2 
1 nder, 'I'D, II, 1 -11 
ellar , in bin on, RP, 
J , rt . (l 04) cit d in 
orr , ST , 152. 
, cited in orria, 
298. 
orri , T , 110. 
T , 153. 
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in in thia view i only the relation o warene of cer-
t in elements in the un1ver e selected by the br in or ner-
vou y tem. The relation of mind or conaeiousne s is not 
loo ted in th org nis but wherever the content of aware-
nee 1 loc ted-- out there wherever th thing p c1f'1e 1-
ly re ponded to re."1 Holt give a clear-cut definition 
or th view of c n c1ou nee • 
Con ciouanes i not 9. substance but relo.t en• • ..... 
the relation bet een the l:!v1ng org n sm nd the .. ~ 111 r r· 
environ nt t which lt pec1.f1c 1 y re pon ; Qf -.,: · 
which 1 to behavior 1 found t be this or that ~ · · 
con t nt function; or, in th r words, t . J'lh c"' 
1 ts purpos re r .2 · - , '. 
,, >/• 
Bee use f the ternal1t~~ o rol t1ons, t e n o- realiats 
·../ ;-·· r ,, • .:-.c' · ,l 
r • in merica wer a 1-e to t ink o !&l: o~t1ona o experience j : 
-~ r.?' ' 
8 r 1 and in DO y aly r~d ' by the f Ct Of ' t . eir being 
,. ... r ,-,- ,, 
•""'*~"' ,IJ 
e leeted. el tion ~ 1 r just s real nd just as ob-
' • ,!/' 
ject! v the 't .in .sA them e~!_es. 3 
\ ~ 
The aim ot or1t cal :re 11 m was to reject the epia-
I • 
temolo io 1 monis of both var1et1 of neo-re 11em, and to 
r j eot th p ?ohophyoloal du lis that was 1 plied 1n 
Engli h neo-realism. They f lt that ep1 te olog1oa mon1 m 
could not g1 an ad qu te ocount of e~~or. They eon e• 
quently di tinguished three r ther than two element 1.n 
xp r!ence. They believed that there 1s a lmow1n ubj ot , 
a datum known, and n object to hiob th1 d tum re"'ers . 
1. Holt, ST , 112 . 
2. n lt, Pl ce in Ethics, 96, 
:s. 
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Critic~l realists differ idely in thei~ opinions concern-
ing the m taphys1c 1 t tu , but the es ential point upon 
which th y ree is that th ndatum" or "essenoeft as San-
t yana o lls 1 t, om th n other than the object referred 
to. A Sellala put it, the mental ct 1s not a simple 
a arenes , lt is in Engli h neo- reali m, but it ha a 
tructur ; it is "complex process of interpret tion r ther 
than a simple awareness . 1 
Th abov h s been only a bar outline of the e ntiul 
point in th various type or roali m. The question re-
maining is the relation of 1tehead and Bergson to the 
variou views. Whit he d is ueu lly classed ith En 11 h 
neo-real1~m bee use he tart d a a member of that school, 
but co ntator usually point out that itehead ha d -
viaed a highly original system that does not lend itself to 
classif'icnt1on. 
It ne d to b r cognized, first of all, th t there 
a progres in teh ad's thought. en writin~ on the 
philo ophy of science, h coneid red himself a real · st. I~ 
obj cted to 1d lism, becau in hi opinion there was not 
nough mind to o around . 2 Yet in his final vi w, he ae-
cepted .entality a roperty of ev ry etual ntity. He 
di this a re ult of the el bar tion of his doctrine of 
feeling. in which feeling r placed the ftn utral turr• or 
1~ S llar 1 P1, in RP. 289 . 2 . itehead, Art.(1922), 
131 . 
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th erie· n o-r 1 t • t d till, however, in 
PR, o 1 er 1m elf re 1 t. d ln th "Prer o " 
t R• 
chool 
n 11 n 
n t no , he olted p t oul 
r thoug t, my 
rio n R 11ata 
rot as or T. P . 
unn, h e pi t olo y 1a r pre nt of .,....n 11 h n o-
real! m. 3 n e follow n t t ent lteh d umed th t 
is r stic t by 1c s 
th b or any r 
perce tion tber 
lob 
1 ed1 
tic p ilo o hy, 
1 closure o b• 
h vin c 
ro which 
I t 1 connection it he d o t a ook ' dootr e of po -
r tin t objectivity th d t • nit e 
1 o t te th t P rt V of 
' 
r hi dootr ne 
t m croaco c int rp et tion of r llty, w s di ou ed, 
1 tr n or on or 0 a in 
I e 11 on e 1 tic b s " • 
1tehea r ith ~ gl 
11 t t t worl to b cone 
an 1n hi r j etlon or th Subj 
1d th t 11 r lit coul b a 
un ver 1 J cone pt .a 
t t ph lo o y n ed t m k u 
' p ' v • PR, v11 . 
rt . (1 16). 
4 . 
s . 
6 . 
doctr1 es of b olut 
neo-r 1 in his b -
iv d of pl 11st1c, 
ctl at Pr1nc1p1 n th , 
lyz dpu.r ly in ter e 
d with rt nd u 8 
or 11 th d t or 
p , 123 . 
PR , v111. 
p ' 239 . 
r 
11 
2 6 
c! ce n e at o , p c 1 y t e most r cen • 
t.d e nt h t th wor d 0 
p 1; h conv1n t1n tr e kn lee 0 .. 
le rl r 1 ·1 t c • wever , 
cccrd c 1e re t1v1ty, t ntur th 
wor d depend d on "per p et v " th 0 rver . 
t o 1t1 n o• objective rel , doctr 
o er t c 1 r lt • 
h 
atr c • 
t 
th t ey to obj ct v re1 t 1 ts , 1 
1 1 ec 
t~ t t e ct 
y f ,.. t 
1x d 
e ?t en m t t fl) 
n 1t t e o 1t Q 1 re 1 at • 
e e !! not 1 ple, ut 
t t r n p rcep on 
0 lie erer noe.l T 
uct o ool" n int :r t -
t ve el t 1 ... c t knc 1n 0 8 d t u in trod ed 
t 
f 
c 1 
t a 
ce 
t 
b 
1. 
8 b cf er or . In h discus 1on of th1 
re .pt o , t ad mue n co on ith t cr t1-
e 11 ... " . But ym 1 c :ra r nee 1d not m n for h 
0 111ty or 1 , d rnow1 d a. n th 1r t 
1 c r ranee s an nte t e n t t 0 
p ro p .. o 1 r c e o 1 m 1 te p 
ld t u t c b1e o• rror . Sc1ent1f c 1nvest1g -
t erefore d pres ntat on 1 1mme the 1 e 1 
htch ac ur ey 0 d . 2 !n t e secon p1 e , p r-
t o , PR, 2 5-256 . t h ad , PR , 257 . 
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eeption n t e ymbo1 c re mit r c 1 
1 b c u e e en upo n rou con. e 
h pure e o percept on . on ""ou 1 
ti t of 11 the pres nted 1ocu • T t s, ceo n to 
th persp ct ve of t perc1.1ent, t e pe c tio t e 
1 c 1n f nit 1 ou ot p ce-time- -in a ''olum ot 
ce nd in "~p t 1 z d" pee o pre nt of' t 1 • 
S cond1y, t co on r nnd r ymbol c r er nc th 
identi tern 1 obj ct n r d! n in bet ure 
o perc pt n . 2 Th it e r1 gre t t e crlt ·c 1 
r 1 t in tt ng poa 1 ty cf' r or s to 
the in rpret tiv 
al o inclu d t 
r o eon ciou perc t • 
ib 1 t o cr t v 1 ynt et1c o ra-
t on o ith th 1" 
neo-r 11 t ceo t pr nt t on 1 i d1 cy 
h c he d b d e inin ero ction o h uni-
ver • 1sa re ith t e cause t ey did not eco -
n z ny ot· r e or p rcept n . T us they id not llo 
r r er o , no 1 t 1· cd p copt1on lve n c 
tion t t :p t or t ture . " 
tehe in t ph 0 1 o tr re rom con-
t mporar re lis 1 t at he b 1i ed the o 1 .o b or-
nic 11 in sy te o intern 1 r 1 tlcns , 
in th philo o h of el n Br ley . he u Yer e, 
hit 6 J p 1 56• 257 . 
h!tehe d , PR, 25 • 
3 . · it he d , R, 255 . 
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nd th 
a croacop1c vi w of h univ r e ino1udi o oe t r 
God nd alu and tern 1 developm nt . 
c u or t e con in w y th term r 11 1a u 
' 
it diff cult to det rmin whether or not tehe d' ta-
p y ice m y be c lled real1at1c . In h s lur nd h 
ns! t nee upon actual entities it he d 1 
re li tic, but in a ert1n that both poles of actu 1 nti-
t r compose 0 f eli • and th t mind in eo e d r 
of signifie nee is found in very etual entity, iteh d 
1 ven clo er to n id li tic etaphy ics . ite d 1 
prob bly b at char as realist in hi epi te lo y 
nd an ideal! t in hi taphy io • 
Fin lly, it e iff red fro neo-re 1 am in his 
p nps e e • in that he bel eved th t ent 11ty is a ch r c-
teristic r 11 otu 1 entitle • For th 
a refor ed ubjectivi t principle" an 
r son he dopt d 
a ert d th t " part 
fro the exp rience of ubject th re 1 no thin n2 • P n-
psych! le nts in co on with both ide 11 ts nd 
real at n is so eti e con idere a type of er1t1eal 
re 1 s , s 1 the view clo ly as oc1 t d with it , th 
double- pee t ory, w 1oh oonce1v or h world a com-
po d r atuf'f" th t y be called " ind- aturr r tt r 
1 . it ead• PR, 25 • 2 . iteh d, P , 25 • 
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depen in upon th aspect that is bein stres ed. These 
view re expres ed particularly in the work of c. • Strong, 
Dur nt Dr ke, Roy w. Sellars, nd c. Lloyd or an.l 
Ber son, in his metaphysics, se ms f r from the doc-
trine or r alis , but in oert in res ects, par~ioularly in 
hi epi temolo y, he appe rs to be ver7 olo e to rican 
neo-re lism. orri point out th simil rity between the 
vi w of Bergson nd Holt. 
It i or intere t to note the imilar ty be-
tw n olt and Ber on, nd t e point at which th 
divergence be ins. Ber son i as re li tic s any 
n w realist in insistin th t wh t is iven in p r-
ception owes its exi tence to n ither perceivin 
ind nor a rocal or nism, givin one or the oat 
r die lly selective, s oppo ed to ener tive, c-
counts or sen a that is to be f und ( ee particu-
1 rly ch P• 1 of Matter and emort). it Holt he 
would a ree that the body fa ole y n instrum nt 
of action nd is not gener tor or storehouse of 
content, that the p rceived world is the objective 
world s out out or selected by the activity or the 
or ania nd th t qualitl iffere trom qu ntity in 
being a fusion of ftslow periodic proc sees. For 
both n the destruction of the body only destroys 
the condition by which a lf- xieti content i 
brou ht into rel tion to n active or ani • Th 
difference in the vi we come in the fact that Berg-
eon introduces pirit or mind in ddition to uoh 
a leot d content, aa e ns or dealing with thought 
nd m ory, while Holt, aid d by th concept or ub-
iatence, attempts to c ry through the doctrine r 
selected content, now m d equivalent to mind or 
consciousness, throughout the whole range or e ory, 
knowled e, error, and illusion, 1nvolvin no ddi-
tion 1 principle or mind or spirit. In the doctrine 
o perception, howev r, B rgaon 1 quite n w 
re 11 tic a is Holt.2 
' ; The rtr t app arance or M t1ere et emoire w a in 18 6. 
1. Drake, P , x-xiJ orri , ST , 237. 
2. orr , ST ~ , 114n. 
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This w s befo~e contemporary realism had become prominent, 
a1noe the d1ecuaeton really start d in England with oore's 
MR rut tion of Idealiemft 1n 1903, and in er1ca in 1904 
with J mea's, ~Does Consciousness Extat?n Yet Bergson an-
t1c1pated ny of the p~oblems ot realism and d1 cussed 
the before they had become prominent . In , he criticize 
both realism and idealism because of their views of per-
ception . 
The re list starts , in t ct, trom the uni-
verse , that !a to say !Pom n aggreg te ot !mag s 
governed, as to their mutual r lations• by fixed 
1 we , 1n which effects are in strict proportion 
to their o uses, and of which the character is an 
aba nee of o ntre, all the images unfolding on one 
nd the same pl ne indefinitely prolonged . ! 
But, he a ys, the real! t 1 bound to recognize the exi -
t nee of peroeptlona , which are a system ot image which de-
pend upon a single image ae a cent r, a percipient . This 
center, he says, 1 what the !dealt t starts trom . But the 
idealist is unable to cquire scientific knowledge and con-
neot the a t, present, and future , unless he a ain ran es 
1m es on the a me pl ne so that they ~e independent o the 
p rc1p1ent••in other words , he must adopt a realistic posi-
t1on . 
The first system alone 1a s1ven to present ex-
perience; but we bel ieve in the second, it only 
becau e we ft1r th! eont1nu1ty or the past , 
present, nd future . 
1 . Berg on, MM, 14 . 2 . Bergson, MM, 15 . 
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The f r.t y tem or images, the sy t m or science w th ut 
re rd to p et, pre ent, nd future, nd " 1ven in pr sent 
exoerienee," is comp r ble t itehe d's pr~sentat1onal 
immediacy. Th second, the idealist yetem of imA.ges 
wh oh connect the past, present, qnd ture, requires 
1tehead's mode or causal ef.fleacy. lso perception re-
quire memory, which constitute a form of oau al eff1oacy.l 
Bergson, like Wh1tehe d, maintains that neither ystem or 
1m ges can account ~or the acts, since neithe~ one 1mp11e 
the oth r . e t us rejects neo-r lim s 1t c me to be 
developed 1n America, and 1 o rejected ubjeotlve idealism . 
There needed, he felt, to be 
o 11 the t eta. The sy tem 
called pure perception . A 
view th t would take account 
r ima es in one pl ne he 
orr! pointed out in th quo-
tation abov , ergeon nalyzed pure perception tn a manner 
practically identical with the Americ n n o•re lists, nd 
o 1 ke itehead's mode o present t!onal 1~ed1aoy . But 
h felt that direct ~erception w s due to the interplay be-
tween pure perception, the act or the body, including th 
brain and nervous sy tem, and pure memory, which wa mind or 
expert nee or the past held by the ten ion or consciousness. 
Direct peroention w for Bergson very 11k ite ead' mode 
or ymbolic reference and in thi Bergson 1 1n the comp ny 
of the critical reali ts . gain, in tftrmin that matter 
1 . Bergson, , 24 . 
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1 simply that in which the tension or llf'e is of such a 
low .grade as to be negligible, he affirms a view that i 
airriilara to that of Whitehead and the panosychists. Thus on 
almost every point, Bera~son 1 position with regard to 
realism is similar to Whitehead' • 
Bergson's diveragence from realistic view is s1m11 r 
lso to 1tehead 1 s. Bergson aff1r ed the 1nterconn cted-
ness of the un1verase, and consequently, the inadequacy of 
analysts. Like itebead, he admitted the data or recent 
d velopments in science ae being or great importance to 
philo opby, but felt that the philosopher must accept a 
method which i morae synthetic than that of science, a 
method that enables one to see the whole, both it develop-
ing order and 1ts total s1gntf1oance. This method was the 
method of intuition, which itehead also accepted, al-
though Whitehead subjected the insights of intuition to a 
closer r t1on 1 scrutiny th n Bergson did. 
H v1n ascertained the position or Ber son nd ite-
bead in respect to the raeali tic movements, it now rem ins 
to a k in what respect the philo ophy o ~1tehead w s ~­
reoted by Ber son's position. Very probably there was some 
ffect from Bergson's philosophy upon the de~elopment of 
real! m in ener 1. orris, however, does not believe that 
the influence w s very reat. 
Undoubtedly th empiri c 1 peet of the n 11 h 
tr dition a r fleeted in 111 , Sp neer , nd the 
s ciat1on1st helpe prep re the r und for 
od rn realism, did certain p a e or t e 
tho ht of nt no• r ley, and rg on . T at 
twenti th- eentury re lism nd pre m t1am drew 
its major nouri hm nt from historic 1 ouree doe 
not, how ver , seem pparent • Their b 1 impetu 
seem to have been g ined from the lo ic 1 , 
methodolo~ical, nd f etu 1 results or modern 
science, results which fUrnished a convenient 
point of oppo ition to the bsoluti m nd 
m nt 11sm of the then dominant 1dea11 m. l 
it head' t phy io nd episte olo y were in proc 
development while he w s in London nd s oei ted with th 
ri totel1~n Soei ty . Ther w much di eu sion o ep 
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or 
te olo y nd T. P. unn w s influencing tehe d in r vor 
of En 1 sh r 1 am . On the oth r hand, th re w a also much 
discussion or Ber on, nd • 1ldon C rr w in luencing 
1t head in r vor of Rer son . · Furthermore, it has been 
a own th t 1tehe d d r d 8 r on with ood deal of 
pprec1atio t this time . 'or thi r a son, it poears 
v ry prob bl th t, what ver r s n' influence on t e d -
v lop nt of re lism in gener 1 y h v been, he undoubt d -
ly influenced iteh ad . Probably this influence wa in th 
cr1t1o1 of re 1 m, how v r , rather th n tow rd it , or 
toward influencing Wh1tehe d' epi te olo Y• itehe d' 
epistemology tn tt tin 1 fo ppe ra to h ve e a fair -
ly 1 te dev lopment nd he doe n t cite 
or any or hi v ws . The in lueno of 
rg on 1n upport 
r on w s tow r 
1 . orr1 , ST , 106n . l . 
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emphasizing the twin epect or complex ty and solid rity 
in the un1ver , and the primacy or proeea • oseibly Berg-
on also 1nfluenc d 
immediacy, by tress! 
1teh ad in hi vi w of pre entational 
that there ia in perseption, a cer-
ta n element of 1 edi te knowl d e . 
2 . Pragmati m 
The term pr gmatism n turally brings to mind the names 
of James and Dew y and t e r ct th t tebead in th "Pr -
f c " to PR, mentioned them, lon with Bergson, as being 
peel lly influent! 1 upon his thou ht. Pra tis is 
not met~pby ic ; it la more p 1lo ophic method . Dewey 
s pointed out th t J mea' pragmati m was re lly hia 
wradical empiric! m" carried out to include the futur s 
well as the paat . l Pra matism tress action nd pr eti -
c 1 consequences; it bold that the truth of n idea 1 
verified or modi ied by its con equ noes . Sine pr matism 
atre se action, it has not built up a eystem tic met phys-
ic , but it assume that the orld is fund mentally plural-
1 tie and eompl x . It accepts the wo~ld a it appears 
and e it m y be act d upon nd cdif d, s true inter-
pr tation or the world , holding that any r t1onnliat1e at-
tempt to pre ent the world oth rwise is truitl ss . 2 
In the hand o~ Dewey nd othera , pr matiam bee me 
1. D ey. !n Rob1n on , 
2. Dewey, in Robinson , 
RP , 441 . 
RP , 43'7. 
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o~e m taphyaic 1 than it w s in the hands or Jamo , and be-
cam known s instrumentalism . The import.ant idea expreased 
w that the 1nd is an in trument favoring t e activity or 
functioning or the or niem. Th mind a lso thou ht or 
a imply the instrumental unction of non- mental entities , 
and a uch it had no re 1 existence . ind a ·simply non• 
mental element functioning in a eert in way . For th s rea-
on the view 1 o c me to b known functionalism . Pie~ce 
tressed the importance of symbolism in thinkin , nd De ey 
included hi ide s in hi theory or mind a t e eymbol1c 
runet1on1n of event . 1 In other word , when 1n the tunc~ 
t1on1ng of an organism, certain event arc operativ in the 
functioning a hav ng meaning nd r f renee to oth r vents , 
they ar a id to be functioning ymboltc lly, and this ctiv• 
tty i. eR.lled thought . It 1s only when events function sym-
ol c~lly that they are considered ent 1. Thu ment lity 
1 a property o highly developed organisms only. 
Both B rgson and ~it he a hav import nt points ln 
common with pra matism, althou h neither of them ean be 
ela. ed a pr t1. t wt thout extending the term to in-
elude so much that it lo s most of it definite meaning . 
r son's view ~ rel ted to pr gmat1 m ln the import nt 
aspect of stre 1ng aetlvlty . Pra matist , like Bergson, 
based their vi w primar ly on biol ogy and psychol ogy. 
1 . Morri , STM, 283- 298 . 
266 
They re influenced by the theory o evolut on. and ts 
recognition o1' th f::lct t t ol"gan1sms are adapt ve; they 
ad pt oi ther th ~u el v s or th 1r environment. Bergson ls 
ram u for pointing out bo the intellect views t e un1v rse 
in terms of 1t poe 1b111ty or action . In thi re peat he 
ha uch in common 1th the voluntari ... m o Schopenhau r.l 
But Bergson differ rad o~ lly from the pra~Atic w y of 
thinking in that he feels that the intellect is not a a 
u!d to truth, that it fal i l th natUl~e o reality. 
The instrument lists have inverted rgaon4 They hold that 
th mind is simply an inetru ent ~or th ct vi ty or the 
body. But Bergson held th t t e body was an 1n trument for 
the expr a ion of mind. In stating this view Bergson ox-
pl1a1 tly rejected the instrumentalist or •. \motion llot v1sw . 
The doctrine which makes of me ory an i~~edi te 
function of the brain-· doetrln which raises 
1nsolubl theoretical diff cultie -- doctr_n the 
complexity ot which d fies all 1mag1n tion, nd 
the results of whioh re incomp tible ith th 
data of introspection--cannot even count upon the 
support of cerabr l pathology . 11 the f cts and 
all the n logie re in t vour of a theory which 
reg rds the bra1 as onl an intermediary between 
ensat1on and movement , which sees ln th s ~ re-
gate of sen ations nd m vements the point d nd 
of ment 1 11fe•-a point ver pres ed forward into 
the t1 ue of events, and , ttr1but1ng thus to the 
body the sole function of d1reotin memory tow rds 
the re 1 nd of binding it to t e present, con-
!ders memory ttself s absolutely independent or 
matter . 2 
In the above pa s e Bergson t te t e psycho•phy 1c 1 
1. .orris I ST t 278 • 2. Bergson• • 232. 
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dualism which he dmite in the "Preface" or as the posi-
tion of the book . Thi also ls a divergence from most 
pragmatism, which in se ing mind as a function or the brain 
is materialistic, or more aoeur tely, since pragmatism is 
closely connected to biologic 1 evolution, natur 11 tic . 
Bergson, in CE, moved aw y from his former dual m, but 
toward panp yohism, rather than n turalism. Bergson, even 
as dualist , considered mind s of a higher order o re-
ality than matter, nd his movement through the years was 
toward the enhancement of the import nee or mind . 
t one other point , however, Bergson is in sympathy 
with pragmatism . lthough holdin a more or anic view than 
that h ld by pragm tista , he emphasized the cont1n ency of 
the world and ita continual advance into bsolute novelty . 
Dewey, in commenting on the views o Ja es, make a at te~ 
ment that is very close to Bergson in OE . 
Monism is equivalent to a rigid universe where 
everything 1 fixed and immutably united to others, 
where indetermination, free choice , novelty, and 
the unforseen in e~perience have no place; a uni-
verse which demand the sacrifice or the concrete 
nd complex diversity of things to the simplicity 
and nobility of n architectural structure . In 
what concerns our belief , onism demands a rat1on-
al1st1o temperament leading to a 1xed and dog-
matic attitude . Plur 11am, on the other hand, 
leaves room for contingence , liberty, novelty, and 
gives complete liberty of action to the empirical 
method, which a n be reatly extended . l 
It 1a interesting to note that, de pite Bergson's 
1. Dewey, in Robinson, ARP, 437 . 
268 
diYer ences from pra matic doctrine , J mea, according to 
Schiller , once dm1tted that he got m ny of hi arly in-
sights from Bergson.1 Ber son and the pra mnt1sta apparent-
ly at rted fro closely similar positions, bUt d veloped 
them in opposite directions . Th pr matist followe the 
lead o th int llect (in Bergson' sense), while Ber son 
followed the le d of 1ntu tion . 
itehead differ from th pragmat1 t at about the 
a m point t t Bergson does . ite e d considered the 
world to be plur 1 tic, but he also considered it to be 
org nic . itehead did not coept th pragm tic theory of 
truth, which he r lt wa re lly kepticism bout th po -
b 1 ty or rindin real truth, nd 0 the willingness to 
adopt the ethod of pr otioal consequences uide . 
1tehead criticized he merely pr otic l because it too 
frequently was an ab traction . Frequently batr ctions 
work b tter than re 11ty, because they are simpler . 
The world of science has alw ya remained perfectly 
a tisfied with its peculiar b tractions . They 
work, nd that is sufficient ror it.2 
·Whitehe d did reject w t e called the "do m tic fal-
l cy, " which i the belief that the methods or inve tigation 
used must neoea ar1ly yield truth . But h bel eved th t th 
pr matiat ad one too r r.3 H also included rgson in 
1. Schill r, rt . (1927), in Robin on, RP, 458 . 
2 . itehe d , S , 67 . 
3. ite ead, I, 287 . 
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this cr1ticis , however, for he felt th t Ber son also was 
keptical of finding the truth . 1tehe d h d more trust 1n 
r son . H s 1d th t "~he function of R ason is to promote 
the art or lite . "1 ile at first this sound like a pr g-
m tic position, what Whitehead eant by "art" wa enjoyment 
o lite and enhancement or ignif1cance, contrasting it 
with the ~erely praetio 1 . 1tehead recognized two types 
of Reason, the Practical and the SpecUlative . In general, 
the pr m ti ts emph sized the practical at the expense or 
the speculative . The same distinction in the function of 
reason appear 1n Whitehead ' educ tion 1 e s y , her he 
is at variance with the more practical views or Dewey. 
Very 1 kely itehe d o ed much to the pragmat1 ts , e -
p eially w y, in the develop ent of his pistemology, but 
not so much that Wh tebead 1 s views can b ol ime a tho e 
of the pragmatists . Lowe point out th t Whitehead's view 
of the d reet xperience or causality in perception in the 
mode of o us 1 efficacy was probably 1n luenced by Dewey . 2 
leo the doctrine or ymbolic reference may hav come from 
Dewey . 1teh d tated in PR that 
The failure to lay due mpha 1 on symbolic 
reference s one of the ~eason for met phy ioal 
d1tf1cult1e ; 1t ha reduced the notion of 
'meaning' to mystery . 3 
Dewey 1 o recognized the need to under t nd the meanin of 
1 . 1tehead, FOR, 2 . 
2 . Lowe, rt . (l949) , 295 . 
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aymboli and ven interpreted m nd 
Whitehead woul not go f r a t t. 
symbolic functioning . 
or him ymboli m 
repre nted the mod of perception mo t common m ng c n-
eiou , thinking bel s. but he did not equate th a mode 
with mind or even eonseiou n s. 1nd for itehead wa 
the prehena1 n or tern 1 objects, th conceptual pole of 
actual ty. In ny xperienc both phy 1o 1 and mental pre-
h naion r involved . ! 
In their mutual relation to pra matism, 1tehea y 
hav been 1 pressed in re ding Bergson, s James prob bly 
w e , by hi ooount of 11:f'e as etive nd purpo 1ve. push-
1 forw rd into novelty . s de fro th1 th re 1 1 ttl 
th.a t pr m t1 m ot ered itehe d th t mi ht ju t 
well have r oe1ved from other sources than from Berg on . 
3 . Ide 
During th nineteenth century, the prev 111ng ph!loa-
ophy w 1deal1 m. ut according to Sell rs, idealism f 1led 
to ke p p ce with th sci nt1f1e dv nee with the re ult 
that a re ction et in, producing th d1at1nct1ve ph1loso-
phie o th br nt1eth century. 
Th plain t et eem that 1d 11am w not qu 1 
to its task . It did not r ce Up to th r eta dla-
cov r d by the o!encea, and a emed to consider it-
s 1 n eao p trom their pressure . Di a tier o-
tion was certain to man1:f'eat it elt . 
Th1 di sati r otion expre ed its lf t lmo t 
1. !tehead, PR, 272-273 . 
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the a e mom nt in person l ide li m o plur 1-
1 tic type, in pr ti , n in re li . 1 
Th r etion, a it p e red in the r rms r r alis and 
pra t1 m, h a lre y been diacu in o f r a a Berg 
on and itehe d were involved in it. In th1 section 
the r rel tion to id 11 m w11 inv ati at d. 
difficult to d fine th n r 1 am 
r pra at sm. It t k n n roua for 
• 
nd 1 ht n 
point out th t ere ide lia i 1 o t 1 oasibl to 
fin • For 1ntell1 1bil1ty, he a y , it i nee aary to 
qual fy th te:r w1 h n adj ct1ve in order to define w eh 
type o id 1 i b in r f rred to . everthele i ht 
an does atte pt a v ue work1 definition or 1d l 8 • 
11 ide 11 
ulti t r 
1nd (u 1 
th de 1 
1nd.2 
1 ch r eter1zed by belief 1n th 
11ty or c e 1 n tie no it er of 
th t rm 1n the bro dest n ) or or 
nd v lu re 1 d to nd priz d by 
Bri tm n i tin u1ahe tour ener 1 types of ide 1-
i .3 Pl tonic id ali asert th object ity or lues . 
rkele1 n, om ti e lled ubjectiv id alism, rta 
t at 11 r ality is of the nature o in or consc1ou nee • 
Re lity is eon tituted by the aet of erception. Per n no 
and th or er inn ture i th result or th ubiquity of 
God' perception. H eli n, or b olut id alia , 1 the 
theory that re 1 ty con 1 t of coherent sy t , nd th t 
1. Sellars , in Robin on, P, 280•281. 
2. Br1 htman, POI, 172 . 
3 . Bri htm n, POI, 171. 
only the hole is true in an absolute e nse . Parts of the 
w ole are partial truths, and may be understood dequ tely 
only 1n t 1r r lation to th b olute. Th s bsolute 1 
~cord ng to Hegel, 1s sp1r1tunl, as the mo t adcquat 
description ror f"ully developed real:!. ty. This for of 
ide lism ts lso termed lo 1oal, or organic ide lism. 
Boaan et, member o~ th1 philo ophio school, sugge ted 
that t _s type of idealism m1 ht well be termed "speoul ~ 
tive philosophy~"l The fourth type of idealism, to wh oh 
he h1ms~l~ subscribes, Brightman calls the Lotzean. It 
finds aelfbood or person 11ty the ult1 t principle for 
th und r tanding of r a11ty. 
The r lat1on of .ergson nd 1t he to each of the e 
tour types of idealism w111 no be considered. In support 
of th contention that 1tehead's philosophy s synthetic, 
it ill appear that hie thou ht embrace elements ore oh 
of the e typ a, a well as realistic and pragma.t1e in 1ghts. 
Thel"e is much in tehead that is Pl tonto . 
heavily 1n constructing his cosmology, on Pl to' T1maeue, 
epee! lly s 1nte~preted by • E. Taylo~. But he c me 
closest to Pl to's idealism in ht theory of eternal ob-
ject • The e al" cloa ly an lo oue to Pl to' Ide s. H 
pointed out that while every cheme or nature must de 1 
w~th both change and endUl" noe, it must lao deal with 
third act, th t of et rnal1ty.2 There are, however. two 
l• Brightman, POI, 169. 2. 1tehe d, s . , ea. 
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point at hich itehe d m d1f1ed Pl t 's theo~y. 11 
eternal objects are objective in that they re given ter-
na.lly nd do not peri h with perishing occasion 1 yet th y 
a:re not otual in abstraction from such oco s!on • They 
ar 0 purc pot ntials."l F~ Pl to the Ideas are renl, or 
which th thin s of e rth r only copies in the real ot 
phenomen • P~thermore, for 1t head the eternal obj eta 
subsist in t e primordial nature of God. In thi h is 
1 totelian than Platonic; for Plato the Id ns were 
compl n th oond plao , the Ide of 
Plato r forms of valu , so that in his vie v lu are 
obj ctive. But in White ead, v lue 1a "th word o~ u e for 
the 1nt~1n 1c reality of n ev nt. • •• There 1 no uch 
thin a m r v lue."2 Thu th tarnal objects nro poten-
t!al tor the production of valu , but are not v lues in 
themselves. Here a in, 1tehe d follows rlstotle' d1 -
tinction between potentiality and actuality, w ich i one 
o r!stotl ' con truct1ve improvements upon the views of 
Pl to. 
In the philosophy ot ~gson, Pl tonic Ide li m has no 
place. Bergson specifically er1t1e1z d Plato' th ory of 
ideas beoaus, as he put it, the Forms were 'simply sn pshots 
taken by the mind of the continuity of becom1ng."3 Bergson 
al o criticized iri totle 1s tre t nt of the Ide s, beo u e 
1.· 
2. 
itehead, PR, 32. 
itehe d, SMW, 95. 
3. Bergson, OE, 349. 
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i totl , in giving the Ideas a subsistence in the mind of 
God , m de th " otive intellect" to be "Science entire , 
po 1ted all at onee . "l But tor Ber son, reality w s in pro-
o s of' eon tant evolution, produein ''form ever new . "2 
Bergson app rently did not ee the import nee or th prin-
oiple or " ternal1ty• n ee sary to ooher nt expl n t1on 
of n ture . 1te ead w a very possibly following Ber on in 
hi doctrine or novelty in e oh actu 1 occasion, but he did 
not find this ide ineonsi tent with the empiric 1 t ot th t 
there re etern 1 elements ingredient in every such occasion . 
Whitehe d's m t physic o nnot be el saed ubj ct1ve 
ide 1ism, but there re cert in ina1 hts or Berkeley's which 
he ret ined . 1tehead rejected the "Subjectivist Principl , " 
in the ense th t 11 re 1ity may be expre sed a id as, in 
the sense or idea s concept or un1vere ls . 3 On the other 
hand, h ccepted the Berk leian notion th t 11 re lity con-
sist or the experiences or subjects . 4 Reality is a prooe 
of concr scence which i the bringing into unity in subject, 
experiences or that ubject . Thi process itehead o lled 
procea . of prehensive unification, and sub titut d th 
term tor Berkeley' . ind . s 
-
itehead lao reed with 
Berkeley in that the permanence and order of the universe 1 
due to the "prehenaive unifie tion ot 11 xper1 nee in the 
mind of God . 
1 . B rgson, OE, 350. 
2 . Bergson, CE, 374 . 
3 . iteb d, PR, 239 . 
4 . 
5 . 
it he d , PR, 254 . 
itehe d, S , 71 . 
275 
on agree tb u jeot v 1 e 1i m 1 t t e 
ecntent of ere ptual knowledge i eompo ed or "1m es," 
t at s , nt 1 un1f1o t1on xperienee . But B rg on 
oou1 not ecept ubjeotiv 1d lie , beeaus he s eon• 
vlnae t t 1 a es outrun peraept1o o ev ry sid . •1 By 
th s he eant that th re 1 uoh more to re 11ty th n te 
ever perceived . On th other nd , Berg on could not aoo pt 
t•e Kant! n po 1t1on that perc ptu 1 knowledge 1• phenom-
ena1 . 2 · 1tehe d s able to go turt er with Berk 1 y th 
Ber son was , bee use ite d 9. 1111ng to ecept erke-
1 's view th t exper1ene wa org niz ult1 tely in d . 
ergs on frald , perhap , th t th1 view would compromiee 
h view of novelty, bee u e t only vie o Go he reeo -
n1zed t t o God as b 1 g tn om t ruture lies 
eo plated . He wa abl later to ccept a view or God ore 
con 1stent with the pr nctple o novelty n freedom . lt -
h ad a able to overeo e the hes t t1on in Bergson by the 
d1st1nct~on between the pr ordt 1 and the consequ nt nature 
o God . !t is possible th t teh ad, having been 1 pres ed 
by erg on's ocount of the ere t1v1ty vtdent 1n th world , 
dev loped his views of God th th n c a 1ty 1n h1 mind 
of d velop1 view th t woul ccount r bot ternal1-
ty nd n velty . Very prob bly, e al o in ueno d by 
lex nder's dootrln of velopin Deity . 
J 
, , 3 r.: . 2 . B r son, , 06 . 
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The H gelian philosophy, bsolute 1 e 1! m, · a t e 
p ev iling philosophy du~i the 1 tter part o the nine-
t enth c ntury, and much· ntieth century philo 0 hy W' 
eaction from it . Th ph1lo ophy of 1tehe d wns 1n 
p rt a r ction way from b olut 1 11 , b t n t e other 
hand, s has been 1ndic9ted earl! r 1n this dissert t n, 
itehead ngreed in m ny re p ct ith t e l!e e 1 n school . 
In Engl nd the geli n with who iteh d c m st 
in contact wa Bradle • itehead dmitted that most o~ R 
w s 1n h rp di agr ment with Br dl y," but 1 o dmitt d 
th t the tin 1 r sult aa "not so greatly difteren nl • In 
common with the majorit of twentieth century philo opher , 
itehe d was or th opinion that the Heg 11. n appro e wa 
t ration listie nd lacked rnp1r1c1sm. They elt t t ab-
olute ide lism did not tak ade uate account o mo rn c1-
enc • Th y objected to the concept or th b olut as the ul-
tim t r 11ty . ill1 Jam called th1 cosrnolo ic 1 ache e 
a "block univ rae . " The pi•agm t etc a d r nl!. te in 1 t d 
upon plural! tic universe and the xtern 11ty r 1 t1on • 
it head did not , ho ev r , o all the way wit th 
o:ra1t1os of U ge11an1 m. The first oh pter of" PR eont ns 
defen e of ep oul t1v philosophy. tehe d r w th 
the H g 11an tha.t the un1ver w s org n1e and 1th their 
oo tention that relation 
1. hite ead , PR, v11 . 
ere internal , and th t reality 
( 
r 
~ 
I 
j_ 
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proc ~ of evelopm nt . By m king d1 tinction be• 
tween pot nt1al1ty and actu llty, owever_ 1t h ad re-
m 1 e , . th t e llsta , plur 1 t . rae univ rs , in 
t p 11oso y of or ganism, 1 both unity nd ultipl 1-
ctty.1 In , 1tehead ' s addres on .T.h_e_R_h_Y. t_h_m __ _.._._~t~i-o_.n 
adtr1tt d e VRl d1ty o~ t e H gelian d1· lectic, t 
least in it applic t1on to human progre • 
I t ink that egal wa r ght wh n he n~lysed 
progr s into three t gee , which ~e cal led 
The is, nt1thes1 , n Synthe 1 • 
T e Beg lian 1alect1c is vld nt in ~fu!tehead's conception 
of God 1s infinite patience . " rn Res 1' thought, th stage 
o-r C!ynth s1 that stage in which the negation of the An-
tithes! r tr nsform into o. n un t : previous tag s 
re pre~erv d wit contr ction er die ted by their in-
elusion in a mo e inoluA1ve 
in the conelu 1ng p rt or PR. 
ole . ~1milar thought occurs 
he r ader , who perei ts in 
rea ing P t roug much th t is xc e ingly di ficult, 1 
rewar d. ... the nd of the jou:r-ney w1 th ord or gre t be uty 
n 1 si t: 
The 1.adom of' eubjec t1 ve aim pt-eh 1 a very 
actu lity for what it o n b in ueh a perfected 
yst m-- ite ufferings , ta orrows, its failure , 
1ts trium h , its imme i ci of joy-- oven by 
r ghtn of teel1ng into the harmony of the uni-
vers 1 f eling, which !e l ways immediate , always 
1 . h1tehe d , PR, 254 . This r f renee to th He elian 
obool , quoted in ful l on page J.tl.. or this di s e r tation, 
describe prec sely where Whit he d belie e h is in 
a~!'ee ent and dis a reement with thie type or thoup:ht . 
2 . iteh ad, RE, in ., 27-26 . 
many, always one, always with nov 1 dvance, 
moving onw rd and never peri bing. Th revolt 
ot de truct1ve evil, purely s 1~-re nr 1ng, re 
d!smis ed into the1~ triviality of merely 1nd1v1d-
u 1 f ot&J and y t the good they did chi ve in 
individual joy, in 1ndiv1d 1 sorrow, in th ln• 
troduetion of needed contra t, 1 yet saved by its 
r lation to the eomplet whol • The 1 ge-- nd 
1t 1 but n 1mag ~-th lma e under which tbla 
oper 1ve rowth of God's n ture is be t conceived, 
is that of ten er oare that nothin~ be lo t . l 
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Ber son m ke no m ntion of H el nor or absolute ide 1-
18m~ 1t th exception o ingle reference to n article 
by B adley on th psychology of ttent1on . 2 ¥ t , in the 
11ght of wh t Ber son s ya about the absolute in CE, it 1 
d1f -.cult to lma ine t t he wa not influenced by this 
enhool, e peel 1 y inc it w s th dom1n nt philosophy of 
th nineteenth century. The theory of evolution had a 
strong pact on t e nineteenth century, nd Hegel' ph11os -
o hy of ial otic 1 development reflected the inter st in 
evolution. ny evolutionary philosoohy has t least th1 
nch in co on with Hegel . Ber son did ~eact strongly to 
the ration 11sm or absolute idealism nd, like other twen-
tieth century hilo ophers, attempted to be more empirical 
nd re te ~h1 o oph wtth the ~ ct of c1ence . It is 
pr bly tr that mo t of t o e who re eted a~a1nst bso-
lute 1deal1 m r~iled to note how emp r1oal Hegel himself 
as 6 nd how carefully he considered the dat or science . 
Yet the etURl t ct 1s that most re li ts nd pragm tists 
1 . Whitehead, PR, 525 . 2 . Bergson, M , 120n . 
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elt th t Hegel and the He el1an 
therefor untrust orthy. 
er un mn r c 1 nd 
Bergson bell v d in concvpt of th absolute, but he 
in i t d ~t as in prce~su of ccnt1nual d v lopment , 
not v n complete 1n pot nt1al1t • 
If the tim taken up by th1 ucco ion 1s some-
thing other th n a number • • • it 1 bee use here 
1 unceasingly b 1n cr ted in it , not indeed in 
ny such rtlt1o1ally isol ted system s gl s 
o r•ad 11r t r , b t in th concr t hol ot 
hich very such yste forms part, omethin un-
r r abl nd new . l 
Lat r not d th t b intuition one 1ght see in time 
BJ:. ve g1~o tb ot the bsolute . u2 The . bsolut for 
H 1 th st ~e r th pli'lt 1 life . For Berg n, a 
1 0 for p1r1t 1 a hi h r f'or o£ re lity th n 
tt r . B r on 1 o :r fer to tho unity of the spit'itual 
llfe . "3 In these mod1f1c tion of b clute ideali m, Ber g -
on un oubtedly influ nc d by th • ench plrit lists , 
p cially in de Biran . 4 
In conclusion, it ppear that , hil Bergson nd 1te• 
h d w r both influenced by Hegel! ni sm nd cc pt d nd 
rejected b olute lde 11 t p ro ·im t ly th m points , 
hi e ead ~.riv d t hi vie s from hie tudy o b ol t 
ideal! m, p tioul rly BI> dl y, rather than by c nd ry 
influence fro B rgson . 
The fourth t pe of id 11 m not by Brightman, he 
1 . Ber on, CE, 369 . 3 . Bergson, CE, 292 . 
2 . Bergson, CE, 374 . 4. C~ . Oheva l 1 r , HB, 16f t. 
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school in which ha belongs, 1 personal 1 eali r.a~ ol" p r-
Sellars noted, this a ool w s the 1 eal1stic 
an er to the c:r1 tiel 1n r 1sed ag inst abaolut idealism 
b there 11st and pragm ti ts . Personalism reject the 
quantitative mon1 m of ab clute d allam, whlle a r e1ng 
to its qual1tat1v mon1 m. ersonalis~ asserts that real!-
ty is olritual, but af irma the plurality of persona . 
Re lity con i ta of a oo.mnnmit.y or p raona, with God, the 
suprem per on. qothing exists exevp& per ons and th 1r ex-
peri nee. Brightman points out that there are two roota in 
personal! m, both of the~ 1n Kant, lthough personalism can-
not term d a Kantldn philo ophy . One root is epl t mow 
logic 1, re ulng K nt' doctrine of the oo titutiv ac• 
.... . 
t1 vl ty of the mind 11 knowledg • The ot;her root 1s mo:r- 1, 
der~ved from Kant' doctrine of the pri cy of the praoti-
c l r on. In th1 doc~rine Kant a serted the objectivity 
of moral valu , and per on list point out th t only per-
son o n b moral .l A par on, s d fined y Bri htman, is 
'a elf that i potentially lf-oon oious , rational, and 
~ 1deal . ' 4 He contrasts a person with s lf, ~h1oh 1 a 
generic term for any nd ev ry consciousness , ho· ev 
ple or compl x it may b • •t3 
1. Br1~htman, POI, 170•171. 
2 . Br1~htman, POR, 350. 
3 . Bri~htman , POR, 350 . 
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tinually, 1n its c e t1ve advance~ 1th th obtu ness of 
m tte~. Be held that conscious persons are rr e and that 
the universe 1 unfinished. In his earlier books, h1 r-
1 giou view ere t ose or religiou naturalism, but 1n h' 
1 ter book~ TtMR, Ber son rrived at a t eiet1c position. 
Brightman' theorie appe red later than Bergson's and 
prob bly owed much to the 1nfluenc~ or Bergson, but B r -
on's views cert 1nly h d per onal1st1c lement 1mpl,.c1 t 
in them . 
Neith r 1te e d 1 nor Berg on in his earli r book 
ean clearly b said to be personalist , but both included 
in their view, personalistic insight • Whitehead's plural • 
i m ot actual entities, with God the supreme actual entity, 
is like personalistic plur 11sm except that in personalism 
each lf 1s d1 tinct, while in 1tehead, God is the whole 
of which the subordin te actual occa ions are the parts , 
nalogous to the rel t1on or cell to a complete org ni m-
.· 
In this r sp ct 1tehead 1a closer to baolute ideal! m 
than personalism. But 1tehe d did recognize the re ~ity 
o spirit nd the supreme importance or pe~sons . Ev ~Y 
actual entity contains conceptual prehension of etern 1 
objects. 
It is the foundation ot lthe7 met phy ical po it1on 
which I am ma1nt 1n1n that-th under t ndin or 
actuality requires a reference to 1de lity.l 
1. Whitehead , SMW, 158. 
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Thus all ctu 1 entttie have ment lity. In this respect 
otual entities correepond to Brightm n' s derin1t1on or a 
d tum self. 
ver e. 
1tehead reoogniz•d three rades of order in the uni-
multiplicity is a mere to eth rnea • Soci 1 
order ts an or anic togetherness, while personal order is 
or nio togethernea with aerial order. For it head per-
son 1 order is the highest type or order, although a per-
on 1 society need not b conscious or even living, in the 
ordinary sense or the term.1 But the high st type or per-
onal order is a conscious per on, what Plato called the 
1tehead does not o rry on this analy 1s or "Th 
Grouping of Occasions" to decide what typ ot order God 
xemplitioa, ut it is evid nt that He is a per on, since 
B fulfill all th requirem nt or personal order. Thus 
itehead roes with personal! t that personality is the 
highest type or the organiz tion or experience that can be 
ttatned. ~ t 1tehead does not m ke God ultimate, but 
rather creativity. But God is the most ulti to form of 
otual1ty. Creativity i not actu 1, beo use otuality 
con 1st to a certain extent in dot rmination. itehead'a 
philosophy t this point is closer to Indian or Chine e 
philosophy than it 1 to estern thought, a h himself 
not d.3 Hindu thought consid rs God in the most absolute 
1. 
2~ 
tt head, 
itehead, 
I, 264• 
I, 267. 
3. Whitehead, PR, 11. 
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ense as absolutely unlimited, and therefore indescribable 
nd unknowable. The only God th t can be wor b!pp d tor 
them is a lesser, determinate approximation to the ultimate 
Deity. 
In itehead's epistemology he is close to personalism. 
but differs 1n some respects. He dmits with personal! t 
that "the only triotly personal society of hich we h ve 
direct discriminative intuition is the society of our own 
personal xper1ences.•l By "direct d1sor1m1nat1ve 1ntu1-
t1on,n itehead eans conscious p roept1on in the mode or 
presentational immediacy. 11 other conscious knowledge is 
by the epistemologio lly dual! tic method or symbolic t>et-
erence. So ~ar be 1 1n complete agreement with per onal-
1sts. But he goes further to ssert that there is lao 
perception in the mode ot causal efficacy, which means 
vague, though dit>ect knowledge or the antecedent function• 
ing ot the body and the •still vaguer intuition" or th 
bodily awarenes or extern 1 nature. 
Whitehead al o is in agreement with both person list 
and Bergson in affirming the reality or treedom and novelty 
in a rowing universe. In these latter respects 1tehead 
may have been influenced, 1n part, by Bergson. Whitehead's 
doctrine of per onal order, however, h s little that is 
Bergson1an about it except that both Berg on and Whitehead 
1. Whitehead, AI, 285. 
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exp~esse the suprem oy or the spiritual life, nd ite-
' he d may have got this ~om Bergson, but he leo could have 
reo 1v d the idea from ~any others . 
Ther ia one other to~ ot 1deal1 m that needs to b 
mentioned, and th t is panp yohism . brief mention of it 
has been made 1n connection with cr1t1aal re 11sm, with 
which it is som times ~l seed . But since panpaychism seeks 
to show t t all reality is ultimately mental , the philos-
ophy needs to b cla sed with ideal! m. It is very close to 
personalism nd e.ry Whiton Calkins, one of the chief expo-
nent ot panpsych1 m, is us lly el a ed a n person list . 
On the other hand• the panpeyohists Durant Drake and c. • 
Stron :r usually classed a cr1t1o 1 realists . till 
another panp yohist, Hartshorne, i dtscipl of ltehead . 
Panpsychism d1tfett f'loom th personal! of Bowne and Bright-
man in that the latter thinker confine the term "self to 
conscious experience, although it need not be selt- oonsc1ous . 
Bri htman eays, uThere is good ~e son to believe that very 
living being experience itself as s lr .•l But Brightman 
denies eelthood to inorganic object • believing that they 
y be completely explained in terms ot the conscious ex-
pe~ience or person • d riving their permanence fttom their 
eternal env1sagem nt in the mind or God . The panpsych1st, 
however, would r nt th t s lfhood extends even to the 
1 . · Br1 tman, POR, 350 . 
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inor n e world . l Bright an criti cize thi view, 1n p r -
ticul r that of Dr ke nd Strong, because in hi opinion 
elf t t 1 ck "thou ht • sen ation, emotion, and will is 
so devoid or consciousness that to a sert that it h s con-
se1ousn s is to divest the term or eaning . 
In "J'iew ot the foregoing discuss on, it he d must be 
cl ssed a a p np ych1st , becau e 1n his vie ev ry etual 
entity has a mental pole, w 1le bot poles constat o reel-
in , nd the n ture of an actu 1 entity is to be a eompl x 
of prehensions- -an experience of pr hensive unific tion . 
But iteh d dld not ad it of grade of v rying complexity 
or etu 1 ent1ti s, except to a very limited d gree. Som 
entitle have de per or more intense feelings , o that they 
hav mor ai nif1cant ment l pole nd re more cl arly 
m ntal in char oter, wnile other occasion emphasize the 
physical pole nd heir mentality 1 pr ct1cally irrelev nt . · 
Bu 11 ctual ntit1es ar the simplest kind or entity 
1mag1nabl with th exception of God . Complexe or occasions 
-re called n xus, nd they ar org nized a note above into 
mult1pl1c1t1ea , aocletie , and persona . man, in it -
he d' thou ht, is not, tr1otly p akin • a person . e 1 
a liv:t bo y oompo ed or "living aoo1et:tes or low-gr d oo-
o stone . " But these ar ao coordin ted •as to upport per-
onal 11v1ng society or high• r de occasion n2 • 
1 . 
2 . 
Calkins, 
1tehead, 
t . (1919), in Robin on. RP , 228 . 
I, 26'7 . 
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It has been noted previously that Bergson's vi 1a 
sim11 r to ~1tehe d'e 1n that 11 reality is mental, but 
that matter 1 that 1n whioh the mentality 1s or sueh low 
ade as to be pr otic lly n 11 1ble. This 1e the view ot 
CE. In Bergson se~ted a et1n1te dualism but later 
seemed to abandon the strict d1v1 ion between m nd and mat-
t r, beoau the d1at1nct1on seemed to b accounted or in 
the v1ew ot low grade mentality. Howeverf Bergson e nnot 
b dla ed as a panpsychiat becau e he did not make th 
clear d1 t1net1ons o entities that are made b;y panp y ... 
chi ts, who genel:'ally hold an atom st1c pllll'ali m. although 
generally held in unity by a suprem self. er son 11 however, 
emphasized the flux of reality and felt that discrete d1v1• 
ions mounte to spatializat on and were thus tals1f1o -
tion of reality by the intellect. 1tehead may well have -
been in luenc d in his panp yebism by the French spiritual-
ism coming through Bergson, but in his plur 1 sm was in-
tluenced partly by L ibniz and partly by the aontempor ry 
r 11am. 
The final r sult of this tudy of Whitehead 1 s and Berg-
son1 relation to modern philosophy bears out the ott-re-
P ated contention th t it he d's philosophy i a synthetic 
philosophy which in a remarkably oobe~ent t ahi n eke to 
br1n together the 1na1ghts of both reali~t and ide list , 
final quotation from SMW indicates that ~ltehea oonee1ved 
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o~ his met physical task 1n just this manner , although he 
ecns dered his syst m 1n the 1 st analysis to be an organic 
rea lism. 
I am spe king of the philosophic idea11 which 
finds the ultimate meanin or re 11ty in mentality 
that is fUlly cognitive . Th1 1deali tic school 
, • • baa been too 'much divorced rrom the scientif-
ic outlook . Tt ha. s allowed the scientific schem 
in it entirety as bein the only r ndering of the 
f eta ot nature , anc hns then explained it as being 
an idea in the ultimate mentality . • • • But, how-
ever you take it , th se 1d nl1 tic schools have 
oonsp1cuou ly tailed to ~oonneot , 1n any or an1c 
tash!on, the tact or n ture with their ideal! tic 
philosophies . So t r a concerns what wi l l be 
sa d in the e lectures , your ultimate outlook 
y b real stie or ide li tic . y point is that 
a further Dt ge of provisional realism 1 requi~ed 
in which the ac1entit1c scheme 1 recast, and 
cund d upon the ult1m te concept of organism. l 
1 . Whitehead~ S W, 64·65 . 
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C" T ,RVI 
CONCLUSIONs TOT L INFLUENC OF BERGSON ON WHITEHE D 
1 . The Ori5inal~ty or Bergson 
I 
.en B r son's books f rst mae the1~ ppear nee, e -
o1 lly a th y first appeared in English transl t on. 
they eemed to sound an utterly n note in philoaophy, and 
Bergson was hailed a eat ori !nal thinker . er son* 
commentators point out , however, t his or! in lity a 
b en exagg rated and hat he w s very muc th product of the 
Fl'ench th1nk1n o h s ere. . Th appe.rent-~or1 1n~l ty of 
Bergson was due to the r o tha th nineteenth century was 
domina ed by German nd Br1t1 h philosophy. n Eng and 
Mill's emp1r1c1cm and Sp neer ' s evolut1on1 m tended to mini-
mize the dom or msn and reduce the univere to a mechan-
1m 1n hich n was a ~er automaton . n Ger ny, th 
metaphysics or nt nd Hegel r .igned upremo . In chte , 
Schelling, n.d Hegol, metaphysics turn d tow rd a panthe-
1 tic monism. l ~he German p loaophy thu tended to sub-
o~d1nate th individual to the w ol ~ oth the English and 
the Gel'man types or thought thu tend d to a form 0 deterr-
1n1sm in which man as lmo t lost in th movem nts ot 
great imperson 1 forces over wh1oh he had no control . n 
r cted again t th· s type o thought , not by supplant1n~ lt 
with omething more adequate , but by the development or a 
1 . Chev lier , HB, 3-8 . 
met physio 1 skept cis and reliance upon mat&l"' l tie 
science, hiah marked the limits o human knowle ge, an y 
m ans of hich he could gain a me sure or control over hi 
imper on 11 tic env1ro~ent, n France thi tendency ~6· 
ulted in the po 1t1v a~ of ugu t Comt • This scientific 
determini m Bergson call d the "n w soholn t cism . wl 
.ga1nst the impersonal ism nd detet'm n1 m c · rta1n 
thinkers , e peel 11 in ~ nc , et t emselve resolutely, 
nd Bergson a t at their feet , a a1m11 t d their t chings, 
aad combined th m into l s own distlnc e p 11oaoph which 
was to act a a pow rrul corrective to the pr lent mode 
of thought . In this respect Bergson's 1nflu 10e par llel d 
that of ,~r inong and Huaserl in G r any,. preced d by . n-
t no , as B rgson wa prec d d in Fr no by the French spir-
1tual1 t • The r otion in G r any, from 1ch modern 
realism nd phenomenolo y prang, is fascinating c pter' 
in th history or philosophy but beyond tl cope of th1 
investigation. It wa the reaction in France that wa re-
ponsibl or the work o B rgson • 
B rgson's startln · p 1nt s t •e tudy of th pr ail-
ing philosophy. He stud! d ;·111 , Spencer- nd K nt . Very 
oon, howev r, he b came di ati tl d wit th ir form 
thought and turned h1a thought to ard the gen!ue o hia own 
country. on a a pupil of ~mile Boutroux, 2 and from 
him came the insight that the law of science h ve no 
1. Bergson,. CE, 402. 2 . Chevalier , HB, 35 . 
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b.eolute v 1 ty • · e>:pre sed ln his art" cl "D la. Con• 
t ng nee des lois e la nature . "1 Similar conclusion were 
r wn in the field of mathematic by He~1 Po1ncar~ .2 Of 
cons1 erabl n luone en Bergson nd on French philosophy 
e Clau e Bernar • e~g on claimed t t he did for th 
concr te science of t a 1 bor tory what De cartes don 
for abstract c enoe . .e introduce tho experiment l method 
!nto ~hys olo teal science and as the orcrunner of modern 
pr "'mt1 3 ese thinke long lth others were respon• • 
sible for Berg on' cr1t1qu or science . 
In the !el o met p y los our men, amon many ho 
influenced B rg on, stand out · h p rt cular promAnenoe . 
They t'e v 1 on, Laohel er , Renouvier , nd aine de Bir n . 
ueh of th t or th en spl' from r 0 l ho , 
ore th n any other philosoph r of the seventeenth century, 
t1c1p ted .he modern Fr no• phil osophy . In hie thought 
Be gson :roun th ideas o 1mmed1a.te kno 1 d e , intuition, 
an the nner 11fe . 4 
as ~o Rav 1 on that Berg on may have received 
h• conviction th t nono of the pr v iling schools of philoe· 
ophy ere < eq "· te . Rava1s on d the conviction that the 
determ n1 rev lent 1n both mechnnism and de 11sm or the 
n neteent o ntury e used t em both to be cons dered s 
1 . Ber on. LP, 17. 
2 . I'b1d . 
3 . Ber eon, LP, 12 . 
4 Bcr son, LP , 1 . 
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te~ialistio, along with the pos1tiv1em of Comte . 1 In 
the place of the e disc rded views Rav 1sson pl ced hi doc• 
trine o t spiritu li m, by wh1ch philosophy would be a syn-
thetic, rath r than an an lytic act v1ty, by which the ind 
could rl e to a vi ion df the perfect person 1 ty, God . 2 
Rav i eon's p rticular eont~ibution w in the paycholo leal 
study of habit, in which he round a meah n1sm which w the 
"tossil1zed r aiduum of a spiritual activity. " This spiritu-
al activity was described by Bergson in term so like his own 
doctrine or the el n vital that ther can be little doubt 
that he found the g rm ot his doctrine in Ravaisson .3 
Closely associated with the thought of Ravaisson is that 
or L chelier, who was eap a1 lly d1at1ngu1 h d by hi work in 
logic. He developed th ide ot Kant that tressed th activ-
1ty or the mind in knowing and rounded his spiritual realis 
on the b ic principl or the freedom of the will . 
Renouvi r, whom Bergson called th nker "de pr mier 
ordr , " arrived gradually t personqlistie met physics 
nd r pl ced freedom the world . 5 
or 11 the nineteenth century thinker 1 probably none 
wa mor i port nt than ine de Biran . Bergson speak of 
him in term of hi heat praise , calling hi France• great-
e t m taphysician aince the time of De c rte and 
1 . Cheval! r , BB, 22 . 
2 . Chevalier , HB, 21~22 . 
~ . Bergson, rt . (l906), 1n Cheva11 r, HB. 20 . 
4 . Chevalier , HB, 24- 27; Berg on, LP, 16- 17 . 
s . B r son, LP, 18• 19 . 
lebr nche . 
2 
o hi Ber on r c ived the doctrine ot intuition nd 
le rne t t by it on 1 ht vi w t baolute and even k 
it t e object of et physical enquiry. By intuition as 
in B r n deacri d it one mi ht o b yond the ph no -
na nd know the tbi •1n-1taelf. 
in de Bir n a j / qu 1' aprit humain / tait 
cap ble, au moin aur un point, d' tteindr 
l'absol t d' n tire l'obj t d ea specula-
tion • Il ontr' que 1 conn is no que nou 
avons de nous- ~ a, n rt culler d n 1 
senti ent de 1•ertort, eat une connaies no 
privile ie , ui d ' paa e le pur "pheno ~ne" et 
qui atte1nt la r ' lite n oi , c tte re lit ' 
qu K nt declar it inacc a ibl ' no specul tions.l 
Ber son c1ai ed no ori inality for is i wa. H con-
a1dered hi self t e product of hie French ters. T king 
hie in p1r ion ~o ine de B ran and Rav 1aaon, h 
wi hed o udy, by t e thod or intuition, 11 cience, 
not only in en r 1 w y but xtendin h th d to the 
tudy of specific eta1la . He wi h d hi wn ontribution 
to be the de onetration th t this ethod 1ght yi ld re ulte 
a preci as tho of positive a 1enoe.2 
It h b en hown that B rgeon' philo opby w a prod-
uct of' the encb philo ophy or his d y, p rticul rly of 
t French epiritu lis • The c1a1 to ori in lit which 
her lded the r on1 n philosophy w du in a 1 rg 
e sUl'e to tb ner 1 1 noranc amo n 11ah-spe ki 
people of' th a F%-enoh 1d liet1o move ent. The i or 0 
r son, LP, 15-16. r eon, LP, 1 • 
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w s not baolute, or cour e, but th h1loaoph1c wo~ld wa 
dominated by German and itia think r nd did not appear 
to r nd 
son' wor 
ench tho ht part1cula~ly ai 1r1c nt until Ber -
pp a~ed. ~ intere twit which Berg on' work 
w ~ece ved w n p rt due to his thoro hne a, his b u-
tifully lucid style, nd the power ot clearly at ted nd 
adequately de~ended ideas. It was also due, in pa~t, to 
the f ct th t a ~e ction h d already appe r d in th world or 
iloaophy, nd r alia and r tis we~ preparin people 1 
inda for ne ide a b sed on empirical obaerv tion rather 
than r t1on listie construction. Berg on's philosophy w 
p rt cularly w 11 uited to this intellectu 1 clim te. 
it h ad, early in th century, w a busy with m the-
atica, nd th re is no indio tion th t e w s t mill r with 
cont porary French thought, except in the field or mathe-
atics. In this field, howeve~, e did become intereated in 
~enc tho ht thro / Poincare and Coutour t, 1tehe d 1 
b ic intere t in met physics was app rently stirred at a 
very arly d te, so that even while wo~ki with mathematics 
he was thinkin o reconstruction or the phy 1c 1 world 
in keepin with adv ncin science and thematic • Very 
prob bly, this diaaert tion h a shown, it w s during 
his at y in London that he discovered through read! and 
d1acu sing B rgaon th t the ideas which he had co e to d-
mire in the French mathe tioian were also bein expre sed 
2 6 
in et physics . er son him el ay not ve been partie -
larly original, but n1 et nth century French thought • • 
Be~ on dr w tog ther the 1 a !ng insight ot h!s country-
men 1nto unique philofJophie 1 struotur • t w s or1 1nal 
in the French tho ht appe red in Berg on and constituted a 
ne line o tho ht for those like iteh ad who were un-
familiar wit Ber on's French predecessors and contempora-
ries . 
2 . Innuenoe on 
In eummar1z1n the Berg on1 n influence upon 
it ne ds to be s id first of 11 t t itehe d, 
ite'he d, 
lthough 
he acknowl d ed a con 1der ble debt to Ber aon n referr d 
to his vl ws frequently, t no point oknowled es that ny 
pec1t1o dootr1n o is wa influenced by ny apec1 1o doc-
trine ot Bergson ' s . en he refers to a specific doctrin 
1t is alw ys with appreciation, but not the aoknowled ement 
ot 1nflu noe, so th t n each ea the poBs1b111ty rem ina 
that he recognized p r l lel but arrived t his ide in-
d pendently. Yet the tr qu nt references nd more frequent 
s1m11 r1t1es between the thought of Ber son and Whitehead, 
coupled with Whitehead' dmi s1on t at t ere w n 1nf'lu-
enoe, leaves the way open to pply the method of o reum-
stant1al evidence to acertain infl nee or lack o it . 
1le 1n ome c sea the evidence ie conv1nc1n and in others 
only indio t1ve or probable or a possible influence, 11 
2 '1 
conclusions a:r-e p:rov1s1·onal. a.n categor1e 1 statements made 
must be con trued a merely p:rob ble. Furthermore, the ev1-
denee points to the fact that 1tehead w s particularly 
influenced by OE. The ev1d nee is less cert in t t he reAd 
other book by Bergson, .although it 1 probable that he did. 
r 
How ve:r, evid nee of Bergsonian influ nee from idees x• 
pres ed in books by B rgson other than CE, and not expre s d 
at all or only vaguely in CE• must be considered evidence ot 
a lower order fro t at of ideas clearly expr seed 1n CE. 
'I'he book or Whitehea. t 8 that shows he most influenee 
by Berg -on is PNK. ~oat o ~1tehead' other book show 
marked influence as ell• however. Since P s 1tehead's 
fir t book in which he discussed philosophy, th Ber~son1 n 
1nflueno was p~ior to it and t us run throu h his entire 
philosophic output. 
Wbitehe d felt strongly ergson' c~iticism of science 
and agr ed that 1t a justified. e did not, however, 
agree that the intellect was neceasarilJ guilty of fals1~-
1ng real ty, or that se1ent1f1c truth could not be valid 
He wrote PNK to indicate the way in which otence and math ~ 
mattes m1 ht be re~ormed to meet Bergson' criticism, ite• 
head may have been influenced by Bergson•s m1st~u t of 
languag dequ te to xpree truth, specially 1n th doo-
trine that langu ge grew up 1n response to pract1c 1 needs 
and wa therefore 1nadequ te to expres speeul t1ve in 1 hts, 
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or the truth rev aled in intuition . 
Wh1teh d was influenced by Be~gson in hi emphas1 
upon the primacy of process, the view that reality i not 
at tic but dynamic prQoes. • or a univ ~sal becoming. 
1tehe d w s influeno d by B rg on in his doctrln that 
the univ rse. that 1 • the process of nature , as a creative 
process which wa eternally gro 1ng and unf1n1she and 
eternally producing novelty . 
1tehead w s in luenoed by Bergson's ~lan vital 1n 
d velop1 hi theory of "creativity, " and also in the doc• 
trine o~ perishing occa ions which could be oomp red to 
th r lapse into matter of the &lan vital . 
Bergson's introduction of th d ta of b1olo y and pay• 
hology into philosophic d1sous ion influenced Whit head . 
In particular the doctrine of volution was specially in-
fluent! 1 . 
Berg on' doctrine of pure duration wa influent! 1 in 
itehead'a r vision of his doctrine of time as composed 
of 1n t nts, to time composed o• epochs or dur tiona . 
it head' dootr1n or f' eling owed omet 1ng to Berg-
on's doctr!n or intuition• 1ncl din the 1d a that intui-
tion is neoesa ry for 1ntelleotu 1 advance. nd the doctrine 
that the conore oenoe in the o:rmat1on of actual entities 
includes feelings, certain o which, the phy lo 1 purposes , 
are comp r bl to B r son ' intuitions . 
B r on ' s doctrine that the intellect " p t1al1z s 
real dur t1on s .1nf'luenti 1 in the or t1on o~ 1teh a • 
" 11 cy of Simple Loc tlon . 
it head' doctrin or perc t1on a includi both 
1 d1 te or direct perce tion an symb lie r t renee s 
1nflueno 
emory 
on' ph 1 upon pure perc pt1on and 
both invol ed in xper1eno • 1tehe d's d ctrine 
or causal effie cy 
or pure p rc pt1on . 
elos ly r lated to B r son's d ctrine 
itehe d ' s 1 elusion of both ntal and pbyeio 1 poles 
in the con titution or all actual entitle w s pos 1bly in• 
lu need by B r son' 1ns1steno that tt r 
in whic the tension ot dur ti n h r lax 
negl1 ible . 
imply 1 re 
until it i 
iteh ad' as ertion that conaciou mental ty h vin 
ersonal order is the hi heat form o ctuality w s poe ibly 
1n lu need by rg on' a doctrine that pirit the hi heat 
development of th evolution ry dv no • 
3 . on 
hi survey of r son's r lati nship to th tho ht or 
iteh d w11l b conclude with brief' ceo 0 he ay 
in which teh ad us d th i 0 Ber on t produc n 
adv nee in tho ht . In g n ral , it appe r hat it head 
o 1t1ed practic lly every d a th t h ot ~o r on . 
This modification w s to brin B r on's ide a into r ter 
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co erena !th one nether, th the tota d t or e per -
noe d 1t t met p y 1a 1 y t w 1e t 
ere te • rg on's philosophy a not nearly so system t:tc 
itehe 
' 
n m ny r s ! th t tehe used 
wer only ugg at n w ich 1t develo e ore fully. 
te e develop -rg on' oetrine o t ~1 
-
vit nd i tCorporated in o v ew or er t1v1.ty. e 
v r son or t e d recti en r the ere t1ve urge 1 the 
aubj ctlv aim or God. ite als expand Bergson ' 
theor of intuition nd 1ncl ded e e r t e idea 'nto 
hi octr n o reel n s, cr prehen ions, altho h intui-
tion r on con der d 1 t, .i te e d . e only ne type 
0 eel1 . , t at known " ubjeet .,. urp ee." t h d 
tt d with er son th t intuition • n ee ary for !n-
tell ctu 1 dv nee but guarde t more clo ely t n r on 
did, 1th a r ater in ietence t the ins1 hts o ntui-
tion b t ted and ex m ne by t e criterion of lo e 1 eo-
r nee. 
ite ea a mitt ergson that t e ntell at 1 
apt to fals fy t coneep on o re 11. ty nd b se his 
•Fall cy of Simple Loc t1on" n t~i view. But t ead 
would not admit that t a nece a ry t the intellect 
r 1 1 y reality. 
valid if proper care 
eld t t the d t of cience could b 
t n to distin utah bet een t t 
h1ch s b tr ct nd t at w ch 1 concrete, and betwe n 
potent! lity and ctunlity 
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e f 1lur to und rst nd t t 
one is de 1 n with b tr otion it head referr d to the 
F llacy of isplao d Concreten s • 
fultehe d, by applyin th theory 0 r 1 t1v1t 0 
Bergson' v1 of spac nd tim , improved upon rg on's 
vl ws by the 1 1lation or sp c and tim into le 
old, th sp c - tim oontinu • iteh d also rted 
th t t er w s a multiplicity of dur t1on in actual1.ty, 1-
though pot nti lity ia continuous . Thi 1d as only v gue• 
ly hinte t in rg on . Berg on' doctrin of contlnuou 
dv ncing cr ative ur tion fu1teh d dev lop d into hi 
vie of "the p sage of natur , or th creative adv no 
0 nature . Thi pass , ccord1 to the view t ex 
ion include spec nd tim in a singl continu , pro-
c e ed by both spaJ~i 1 and tempor 1 pochs . 01' thls r 
n-
son 
itehe d felt that the 'sp ti liz tion which the 1nt 11 ct 
perform d w not fal 1f1c tlon out tru pect o~ the pro-
e of or tiv dvance . 
op d 
t h ad took hints of plur 11 m in Ber son nd d el-
s te at1c pluralistic philo oph in wh ch r 1 t has 
th uni~ and multiplicity or n or ism . h act 1 n-
t1t1ea are compl x or pr h n ion nd aeh ne ha nta1 
p le , thu including th idea found in Bergson that 11 
~e 11ty i spiritual . it d also dev l op d a oompl tel 
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worked out doctrin of perception in hich he included man7 
1 menta round in Ber eon . 
Fin lly, it he d xt nded the theor1 e or B rg on 
in the d1r otion t t rg on htmeelf later ext nd d the • 
that ia, toward th doctrine that the goal in cr ation 1 
the aelf-realiz t1on or God, ju t e the go 1 or th con-
cresoenc of each ctual ntit ia its elf-r aliz tion or 
aatiaf etion . 
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T AC OF DI S R A IO 
T INFL OF GSO I HE AD 
by Rolan Stahl, Jr . 
( .B . , B 1 in- llac Coll e, 1939; 
.T •• , Boston Univ r ity School or Theolo y, 19 4) 
ub i tted in rtial fulfillment of the requir nts for 
th e ree of Doctor of Philosophy , 1950 . 
Although an influ c upon the thou ht of hit hea 
by the r sonian hilosophy has frequently been notea, only 
Victor Lo e in one article has a any atte pt to lac v r 
th ext nt of this irflu nee . Because ~he importance of 
it bas se d wise to ake a stu y of 
th ritin s of both a n in or r to de rm1n s nearly a 
oa ible just bow extensive this influ nee was . 
Th fir t ch ter is an historical orientation to the 
subJect ase on consideration of 1 teh ad's basic prin-
ciple, th concept f or anis , or th octr1 e that r ality 
1 ba ically ynamic roc ss . The orl in of the princ1 le 
is in Heraclitus . It received full expre s1on in lato, 
whose i lu nc on itehead wa considerable . Aristotle's 
philosophy also exem lif1 d th rinci le . In modern 
h1loaophy h or nlc rinciple • s anticipated in the 
th u t of S 1noza, Look an Hum • Lat r H 1 c 
very close to certain h of itehead's thou t . or 
itehe d's conte oraries , Alexander and er son o t · 
closely approxim d his philosophy, which w s of a syn-
thetic nature co bin1ng the insights of both r alists and 
idealists . hitehe ci• reconstruction of hilosophy as, 
11 
1n part, also occasioned by an follow d the insights of the 
theory of r lat1 vi ty and other recent dvances in cienoe 
an mathematics . 
Chapter II is a preliminary survey of the philosophies 
ot iteh ad and Bergson. TP ir view on sci nee, ta-
physics 1 p1stemology 1 philosophy of value, and philosophy 
of religion , are bri fly compare • 
Chapter III is an 1nvest1g tion into the roots of 
it bead ' s philosophy . His for al e~uoat1on . the class1• 
cal ducat1on of the ngl1sb schools of th lat nineteenth 
century , is first tr oed . Th n follows a study of tb gene -
sis of itehead ' ld as . His earliest work wa in mathe• 
at1cs and athematical logic whll he w s at th University 
of Cambridge . hil at. the Un1v rsity of london his ork 
was in the philo ophy of scienc , and hen h came to merica 
as Frofess r o~ hilosopby at Harvard Un1ver 1ty h1 t -
ph7sical wr1t1n s pprear • ur1ng hi hole c re r h 
m 1n'ta1ne lo or beauty and c!llture . Also his work r -
veals an interest in metaphysics from an early d t • 1h11 
in London it head par'tici at d in the London Aristotelian 
Society, an 1t wa through this exp rienoe, an his contacts 
with 1 ader in the aca em1c world , that his inter st 1n 
iii 
philosophy was quicken d . 
h ilosophy 1 th particular 
iteh ad also read idely in 
phasi upon ancient Greek 
thou ht an ritisb 1r1cis • The common 1nflu noes on 
both r on and itehead sre noted . 
Chapter IV 1 an an lysi or important .Bergsonian 
• 
ide and their intlueno on 1 tehe d . r son's dootrin 
o~ ore tive evolution as the pro res of the / lan vital in-
flu nee itehe ad•s octrir of cr tivity a the c tegory 
or tb ultimate and his broad doctri ot ore ti ve change • 
His doctrine of perishln occasions s i~enoed by Bergson's 
laps of the .e~l~-v-!.t~a.l into atter . lhite-doctrine or the 
h d's doctrine of tl • mo U'ied partly becau e of Berg-
son's doctrine or dur tion, the b sic i a of which it -
he dopted . lthough in his own views h modified it con-
sider blf , brin in it clo r to the doctrine of r lativity . 
Bergson• emph si upon intuition as contrast d with th in-
llect w intlu ntial upon itehead . H used th doctrine 
of intuition in hi own doctrine of reheneions , hile th 
s .ati li in ctivity of th 1ntell ct a an 1 of Berg-
on' t.h t iteh d us d in tb for ulation of his " allaoy 
o~ S i le Location. Eerg on•s doctrine of fr edo as nece -
sit at by the xp rience of novelty lso founa acceptance 
in 1tehea , along with the ld a of rowing an etem lly 
velopin univers • iteh a 's solution of th r lation 
of body and mind rs triking r emblance to rgson•s 
tv 
v1 • because they both assert tbe primacy of spirit. nd th 
tact that 1 r grades of matter are merely example ot 
splr1tu 1 activity in *hom atal1tJ 1e almost ne 11 ible, 
although never wholly absent. 
Ch pter V is n an ly 1s of certain leading 1d as of 
1tehead hich appear to have roots in on. It 1 
noticed that both Bergson and 1tehead consid r language 
inad q at tor the stat men~ of philosophic truth. bite-
head's doctrine of the prim y of process is traced to 1t 
phas1 in Eer son upon dur tion a un1v rsal b com1n • 
Botb men ou ht to rrive at a synth tic view of nature 
that would combine realism and 1dealis • In iteh d' 
concept or nature he was 1 fluenced by the th ory or rela-
tivity, th quantu theory and oth r scientific vi s, by 
which he arrive at different views fro those of Eergson, 
but he ace pt.ed in g ner 1 Ber son's view of tiq. H lso 
agreed with Bergson that nature was dynamic rather tJl n 
stat1~, and that the ~n1verse 1s both a unity ana a ult1-
pl1c1ty. In Whitehead's theory of pr hensions h ap roach s 
the theory of rgson at the doctrine of intuition. althou h 
at oat places th vi w is foreign to most of r son• wo~k. 
In itehea 's theory ot knowledge he ring in 1 ht in 
l3e r son tnat ar similar to hi$ own 1nt.o gr at r coherence. 
He is intluenc d by Bergson in his doctrine of imme iat 
ex erience and causal efficacy. 
Chapter VI is a study of the relations of r son and 
1tehea ~o mod rn philosophy . Their relations to En 11 h 
an r1can neo-realism ana to critical real1s are oon-
si ered , ano then their relations to pragmatism an instru-
mentalism. Fin lly, their rel tions to the various forms 
of idealism, Platonic, Berkeleian, He elian an Lotzean are 
treate • Panpsychism, a variant of the Lotzean or persona-
listic form of idealism, is a main strand of !h1tehead•s 
thought. Both Bergson and Whitehead, but especially the 
latter, take 1m ortant insights from all schools of modern 
thought, and iteh ad draws them to ether 1n his synthetic 
philosophy of organism. 
v 
In the f inal chapter. Bersson•s or1 1nality 1 discussed 
first . His thought was base primarily upon Fr nch spir1-
tu lis , as relat d to modern biology . A brief summary of 
the concl sione of the dissertation follows this ect1on, and 
tbe dissertation concludes with a note ooncern1n the way in 
which Whitehea has advanced in the philosophy of organi m, 
ov r the 1ns1gnt which be ained from Bergson . 
Th conclusions of this aert tion re as follows: 
1. Whitehead's interest in ~taphyslcs dated from 
hie mathematical period , but t.h i interest was greatly en-
hanced while be was in London participating in the meetings 
of the London r1stotelian Soc1 ty . At. this society he met 
H. ildon Carr • from whom came much of Wh 1 tehead 'a l3e rgsonian 
Vl 
influence . 
2. atural Knowledge reveal 
a con 1derable Bergeon1a.n 1rflu.ence , a• do most of it -
he d's later books . 
3 . itehe d agreed with Eergson•s criticism of science, 
although he d1sagr d that the 1nt llect necessarily falsi-
__ ..,. ____ ...... •'----... ._.....__ - -- - _....__ __.__ 
vi 
influence . 
2. Knowledge reve 1 
consider le Eergson1 n irfluence , • do most or hite-
be d's later books . 
3 . 1tehe d agreed with Bergson's or1tic1s of scienc , 
although he d1sagr 
ties r ality. He 
that the intellect necesearily falsi-
' ree that it was apt to do so becaus it 
t nus o fall in o th "Fallacy of Simple Location . " Con-
fu ion between the a strac and concrete results fro the 
~Fallacy of 1s laced Concreteness .• 
4 . Whitehead as influenced by Bergs'n in his emphasis 
upon th pri acy of rocess , the view that r lity is not 
st tic but yn ic--un1vera 1 beco 11 • He also a reed with 
Bergson that the ~iverse as ternally rowing and pro-
due in nove 1 ty . The proc ss 1n 1 tehead w s rooted in an 
ultl ate or at1v1ty as in Ber son it a roote ~n th / lan 
vit 1. 
5 . rgson's octrine of pure urat1on influenced 
iVhi teh ad's cha fror a doctrln of time as com ose o 
instant 1 tO OnG Of ti a co pose of epoch or dur tions . 
6 . itehead's doctrine of fe lin was rooted 1n part 
in r son's octrin of intuition . i tehead believed 
with rgson that intuition was essent1 l tor intell ctual 
ad vane • The types of r h ns1ons • known as 
poses are compara le to Bergson's intuitions. 
hysio 1 pur-
v11 
7 . 1tehe d• s oot.rlne of' perc tiona as including 
both 1 me iat or direct perception an sym olio rerer nee 
was pro a ly influenced by rason's em has1e upon ure 
per e tion an me ory as both involved in x erienc • 
~ t.ehead's doct.rine of oau al e ff icacy an r s ntatioJ 1 
1 mediacy are to &~her com ar ble to 
t.1on . 
. 
er son 1s pnre perc p-
e. 1tehe d's ass rt1on that conscious mentality 
having personal order is the high t form ot actuality as 
possibly inf'luenced by Berge on' doctr1 that spirit is 
the highest development of' the evolutionary advanc • 
1itehead 1 in hia use of rgson•s 1d as, modified 
th m in the d1r ct.1on of re ter coher; noe an tull r ev lop-
ment; . 
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Roland tahl , Jr., was born Novem r 20, 1917' in 
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c. Stahl , an Bva Chay r Stahl . He moved with his amily 
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and as erauuated from Lowell Hibh School 1n San Francisco 
in 1934 . In 1935 he enrolled in the University of Califor-
nia, Colle e of rioulture in Davis, Califor ia . The fol-
lo in- ye r h transferred to Balawin-~all ce Coll e, 
Ohio, from which he was gradu ted in 1939 1 th the 
r 
of Bachelor of Arts , with a maJor ln psycholo y, and s o1al 
Honors in psyoholo y and hilosophy. 
After t o years of soc1 l work in C lifornia , h n-
rolled in Boston University School of Th olo y, from which 
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h received the degr e of Bachelor of Sacred Theolo y, ~ 
laude, in 1944. H was elected Lucinda Bidw 11 Beeb Fel-
lo for 1945 . He enroll d in 1945 in Boston University 
School of Tbeolo y a candidate for the d re of Doctor 
of Theology. In 1947 he transf rred to Boston University 
Graduate choo1 a a candidate for the degr e of Doctor of 
Philosophy . He ex eats to r aeiv this d gree in June. 
1950. 
Mr . tahl was ordained Ul er in the Uetho is~ Church 
in 1947, and was r oeived in full connection as a member 
of the New Hampshire Annual Confere ae of the ethodist 
Church in 1946 . He has s rved et.hodist Churches in Ch rry 
Valley, Massachusetts; Lisbon, New Hampshire; Suncook, ew 
Hampshire; and at pr s nt he is serving the Tenney emor1 1 
Kethod1st Church in Salem , New Hamp hire, and the thodist 
Church in Afer's Village, Massachusetts . 
He was married in 1943 to Hiss lizabeth Boyajian of 
Somerville, Massachusetts . They are the parents of two 
sons: Mark Chayer, born in l9t4, an John olaad. born in 
1947. 
